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Abstract
This thesis presents three essays on social preferences and the influence of
the intentions of another party. Each applies conceptual and methodological
tools from behavioural and experimental economics. All studies investigate
reciprocity and its relevance but do so in di↵erent strategical settings. Reci-
procity refers to people’s predisposition to reward someone perceived as kind
and to punish unkind individuals.
The first study examines the role of reciprocity during a bargaining pro-
cess: Communicating one’s preference over the final outcome of the bargaining
does impact the willingness of the other agent to strike a deal. It turns out
that adopting too tough a bargaining stance can lead to worse outcomes. The
second and third study seek to identify the psychological factors driving recip-
rocal behaviour. Specifically, the second essay investigates complex “revealed
intentions” as specific combinations of possible gains and losses for the in-
volved players. The main finding is that intention-based benevolence is more
than just repaying another person’s generosity. Individuals also react pro-
socially to the other’s willingness to be vulnerable, i.e. his willingness to take
the risk of being worse o↵ by acting than by maintaining the status quo. The
third essay emphasizes the role of beliefs on an agent’s evaluation of another’s
intention. The hypothesis is that individuals react di↵erently because of their
beliefs about other’s payo↵ expectations, but do so systematically in accor-
dance with the theories of guilt aversion and kindness-reciprocity. Results do
not support our claim but strengthen the previously often found “no-e↵ect”
of expectations on pro-social behaviour.
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General Introduction
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“There is no duty more indispensable than that of returning
a kindness.”
Cicero in his first book of “De O ciis” written 44 BC.1
“A man ought to be a friend to his friend and repay gift
with gift. People should meet smiles with smiles and lies with
treachery.”
The Edda, a 13th century collection of Norse epic verse.2
Why do people tip in a restaurant? Why do people participate in col-
lective movements such as political demonstrations? And why do they
1The original reads “Sin erunt merita, ut non ineunda, sed referenda sit gratia,
maior quaedam cura adhibenda est; nullum enim o cium referenda gratia magis
necessarium est.”. The quote refers to the last part and is a translation by C. R.
Edmonds (Edmonds, 1855).
2The quote is from the translation by D. E. Martin Clarke in The Ha´vama´l, with
Selections from other Poems in the Edda, Illustrating the Wisdom of the North in
Heathen Times (Clarke, 1923).
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spend time and e↵ort to write or review Wikipedia articles? More gener-
ally: Why do people forgo their own money and time to help or cooperate
with strangers even if they will never meet (again)?
Observations of reciprocal behaviour following the motto “tit for tat”
as well as altruism towards strangers are not rare in everyday life. This
dissertation examines the impact of several intentions and driving forces
on an agent’s pro-social behaviour. It contains three studies that aim
to contribute to the better understanding of reciprocal interactions by
applying conceptual and methodological insights from behavioural and
experimental economics.
This thesis takes as its point of origin the cognisance that people of-
ten care about the well-being and actions of others, and cooperate daily
with each other. In fact, many influential economists like Adam Smith,
Kenneth Arrow or Amartya Sen made this point and indicated that such
behaviour may also have important economic consequences (Fehr and
Schmidt, 2006). Nevertheless, economists ignored this intuition for a
long time and routinely modelled (and many still model) decision-makers
as purely self-interested money-maximizers. That is, economists have
assumed that (i) individuals are rational decision-makers who seek to
maximize their utility, where (ii) utility is defined in terms of the in-
dividual benefit such as own monetary profit. While the material self-
interest assumption started as a convenient proxy for other potential
motives (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000), it quickly became a or even
the key characteristic of the “homo oeconomicus”. While Simon (1955)
had already challenged the capacity of perfect information processing,
and Tversky and Kahneman (1974) put pressure on the rationality as-
sumption, it was not until the 1980s that the selfishness really came under
attack. The experiments conducted by Gu¨th et al. (1982) provided some
5of the earliest evidence contradicting this standard view: A substantial
number of people seem to be strongly motivated by concerns for altru-
ism, fairness, and reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).3 Slowly, initial
scepticism waned as the findings proved to be robust and systematic
(Henrich et al., 2005). By now, the evidence gathered on behavioural
patterns that cannot be explained by exclusively selfish preferences is
overwhelming. Human behaviour is simply more complex. Fairness con-
siderations proved to motivate people’s actions especially in experiments
in which decisions about payo↵ allocations among participants are made
(Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Cox et al., 2007) but are also important in
bilateral negotiations. Theoretical and empirical work has shown that
they also influence outcomes in market settings (e.g. Fehr et al., 1993,
1997).
Economists generally might be tempted to call people’s social be-
haviour irrational. However, Andreoni and Miller (2002) as well as Fis-
man et al. (2007) show that it can be expressed in the traditional eco-
nomic language of a well-behaved preference ordering and is thus rational.
Such “social” or “other-regarding preferences” capture people’s valuation
for their own material resources but also include a concern, positive or
negative, for the (material) well-being of others.4 Thereby, the rational-
ity assumption is retained but the conception of agents’ utility function
is modified, thus adjusting the “selfishness” assumption.
But not only economists have struggled to account for the empirical
evidence with their models. Cooperation and pro-social behaviour are
3Note that there existed evidence on cooperation already beforehand (see Sally,
1995, for a review). Furthermore, a rational choice model of pure altruism by Fran-
cis Edgeworth dates back as far as the 19th century as discussed in some of David
Collard’s work (e.g. Collard, 1975).
4In the remainder of the thesis, I will be using the terms social and other-regarding
synonymously.
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also hard to explain from an evolutionary point of view as they seem
to contradict Darwin’s principle of “the survival of the fittest” (Darwin,
1969): The theory of natural selection has often been understood as im-
plying that individuals should selfishly promote their own interest. Thus,
it may not be surprising that the Science magazine listed the “Evolution
of Cooperation” as one of the most fundamental and broad-ranging 25
unsolved puzzles which present an opportunity to be exploited (Pennisi,
2005).
Research on social behaviour has by now spread its wings across many
disciplines – starting from psychology to evolutionary biology to eco-
nomics and even into neuroscience. This provides a unique opportunity
for interdisciplinary thought and method exchange and indeed such col-
laborations led to much progress over the last couple of years as can
be seen from the insights already gained from behavioural and neuro-
economics.
1.1 Evolution of pro-social behaviour
Evolutionary biologists define altruistic behaviour as an action that ben-
efits another organism at a cost (Trivers, 1971). In evolution, the es-
sential measurement is “reproductive fitness” or the expected number
of o↵spring. By acting altruistically, the incurring costs reduce the in-
dividual’s own number of o↵spring while boosting the other’s number
(Okasha, 2013).
Altruism is very common throughout the animal kingdom and not
peculiar to humans. Monkeys give alarm calls to warn group members of
predators although this increases their own risk of being attacked because
they attract attention by doing so. Vampire bats are another example:
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They often donate collected blood to fellow bats which were unsuccessful
in their own nightly hunt to ensure that they do not starve. Neverthe-
less, the scope and variety of altruism and cooperation observed among
humans is quite extraordinary and distinct (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003;
Bowles and Gintis, 2009).
Already Darwin himself acknowledged such pro-social behaviour as a
challenge to his theory of natural selection, which teaches us that or-
ganisms should behave in ways that boost their own rather than the
other’s chances of survival and reproduction. His proposed explanation
was group selection. Darwin argued in The Descendent of Man (1871, p.
166) that “a tribe including many members who [...] were always ready
to give help to each other and sacrifice themselves for the common good,
would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural
selection”.5 However, the major weakness if such a selection process is
to work is what Dawkins (1976) calls “subversion from within”: Within
any group, altruists would be exploited by selfish free-riders who benefit
from the altruists without incurring the costs of behaving altruistically
themselves. Thus, they would have a fitness advantage.
Hamilton (1964) proposed the alternative kin selection theory. His
theory assumes discriminating altruists who only behave altruistically
towards relatives who share their own genes. From a gene’s perspective,
it makes sense to cause its host to act altruistically towards kin who
are also (likely) bearers of this gene. In this way, a gene can assure the
maximization of its numbers as long as the so-called “Hamilton rule” is
satisfied: the benefit received by the recipient has to be bigger than the
costs for the donor divided by the coe cient of relationship between the
5For an interesting discussion on the importance of ancestral sociality and group-
membership on pro-social behaviour, see also Caporael et al. (1989), for instance.
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two involved parties which is defined by the probability that they share
the same genes. It predicts that the degree of altruism will be greater,
the closer the relationship. While kin selection is broadly accepted to
play a major role, it still cannot explain altruistic behaviour towards
non-relatives which is widely observed.
For unrelated individuals, Trivers (1971) proposed the theory of re-
ciprocal altruism: Individuals help others to the degree that they can
anticipate help in return. Pro-social behaviour occurs when the role
of donor and recipient of an altruistic act alternates over time. Any
costs incurred in a particular interaction are compensated by the ben-
efits received after several repeated transactions. Trivers explained the
evolution of cooperation as instances of mutually altruistic acts. Giving
is then self-interested as the costs associated with the initial act of giving
are outbalanced by future repayments.
A remaining puzzle are the costly traits like “pure altruism” or what is
typically called “strong reciprocity” (Bowles and Gintis, 2000). Pure al-
truism describes the unconditional willingness to make personally costly
contributions to others (including strangers). Similarly, strong reciprocity
imposes a cost on the giver without the prospect of repayment. However,
giving is not unconditional anymore in the sense that it depends on the
process resulting in the decision situation: People repay gifts and pun-
ish the violation of fairness and/or cooperation norms even in anonymous
one-shot encounters where reputation gains are absent. Fehr and Henrich
(2003) argue that strong reciprocity is not necessarily just a maladap-
tation to the previously discussed theories nor the product of the social
evolution6. However, convincing alternative explanations are still to be
6Social evolution refers to our second system of inheritance through cultural trans-
missions made from generation to generation.
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found.
While the ultimate cause(s) of pro-social tendencies in the human
nature is still not entirely understood, the widespread occurrence of co-
operation, adherence to social norms and altruism most certainly cannot
be entirely explained by genes. Instead, us humans developed methods
to externalize knowledge and to teach this knowledge to our o↵spring
(El Mouden et al., 2012; Binmore, 2005, p. 13). An increasing popula-
tion density in hunter-gatherer societies came with an ascending rate of
interaction and the rise of a cumulative culture. Evolution, nowadays,
occurs less and less on a biological level but rather by cultural adaptation:
The invention of technologies or the development of social institutions are
examples of how humans are able to circumvent biology and to establish
certain behavioural traits bringing pro-sociality to the next level.7
1.2 Aim and outline of the thesis
Previous research has shown that most altruistic behaviour is discrimina-
tory and that people do not seek to uniformly help others (Rabin, 1993,
2002). Instead, pro-social behaviour often depends on the previous ac-
tion(s) of other agents. This dissertation aims to further investigate the
role of intentions and their influence on people’s pro-sociality towards
the other person. Here, strong reciprocity plays a major role: People
have the predisposition to reward nice behaviour with kindness and to
punish unkindness – even if there is no prospect of gains in the future or
reputation e↵ects. “Tit for tat”, “What goes around, comes around” or
“A Roland for an Oliver” – there exist many expressions in the English
7Zizzo (2003), for instance, discusses interdependend preferences where genes and
environment codetermine preferences.
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language that describe this behavioural principle which is followed by
most of us on a daily basis. Everyday-life examples are numerous: the
waitress’ smile that assures her a larger tip, the dinner invitation that
follows fulfilling a favour or consumers who do not buy products from
an as unfair perceived firm although the products’ material value may
be bigger than their price. Furthermore, salespersons but also charitable
organizations know about people’s internalized norm of reciprocity. A
free food sample, for instance, not only exposes customers to the prod-
uct but also makes them feel indebted, making them more likely to buy
the product (Cialdini, 2001).
The experimental evidence confirms the importance of intentions of
one person on the succeeding choice of another person: People are fre-
quently willing to bear a personal cost in order to harm people that are
perceived as unkind/unfair or to help kind/fair people – even in one-shot
situations (Rabin, 1993). This means that reciprocity is not driven by
present material benefits nor the expectation of any in the future. The
absence of nepotistic motives distinguishes it from cooperative behaviour
in repeated interactions (Gintis, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), which
can be sustained as an equilibrium even among solely self-interested in-
dividuals.8 Instead strong reciprocity constitutes a powerful source of
the extraction of all e ciencies through its incentive to cooperate even
in non-repeated encounters with strangers.
Part II of this thesis presents three empirical essays on other-regarding
preferences triggered by intentions. While each of these chapters is self-
contained, they are all grounded on the methodological and conceptual
8The economic term “cooperative behaviour” refers to acts that Trivers (1971)
classified under the term “reciprocal altruism”.
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insights from experimental and behavioural economics. Furthermore,
they are interrelated by their contribution to the understanding of the
underlying motivational mechanisms driving pro-social behaviour. All
three chapters pay special attention to the concept of strong reciprocity9
but do so in di↵erent strategical settings. This thesis aims to provide
new insights into the dynamics of and the proximate motivations that
are present in sequential interactions. By investigating the concepts of
reciprocity, vulnerability-responsiveness, more complex intention-based
benevolence (such as trustworthiness) as well as guilt aversion, the pres-
ence of prevailing social norms and the role of pride, the research reveals
first factors that prevent and that encourage pro-social behaviour. The
recognition of these drivers provides the basis for strengthening and en-
hancing e ciencies in exchanges and negotiations.
The first essay Driving a hard bargain is a balancing act: The impor-
tance of reciprocity in bargaining10 investigates the role of reciprocity dur-
ing a bargaining process. Results from previous alternating-bargaining
games, in which two players have to find an agreement on how to di-
vide a given surplus via a process of o↵ers and counter-o↵ers, have indi-
cated that participants do not play as if they only aim to maximize their
own payo↵. Instead, claims and final outcomes are biased towards an
equal split. The main contribution of this study is the recognition of the
bargaining process as an important determinant of fairness judgements,
which in turn are crucial in determining the success or failure of the
negotiation. Employing a double-alternating bargaining game without
shrinkage of the pie and using a within-subject design, we find strong
9In the following, I will neglect the “strong” and only talk about reciprocity. It will
be clear from the context that it refers to “strong reciprocity” rather than “reciprocal
altruism” as this thesis focuses on one-shot situations. If potential misunderstanding
could occur, I will use the exact terms.
10This work is co-authored by Lionel Page.
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support for intention-based preferences as an important determinant of
a bargainer’s willingness to strike a (fair) deal. The optimal first pro-
posal from a first mover consists of a request slightly above the equal
payo↵ split. Higher requests will be punished through lower final o↵ers
that willingly hazard the consequence of a potential failure of agreement.
Our results thereby indicate that the punishment is not solely driven by
distributional preferences but that reciprocal concerns create additional
boundaries on how tough one should be in order to reach the best out-
come in a bargaining process. In that sense, driving a hard bargain is a
balancing act.
Chapter 5 presents the research project Why did he do that? Us-
ing counterfactuals to study the e↵ect of intentions in extensive form
games11. The novelty of this research project is an approach which allows
the investigation of complex “revealed intentions” as specific combina-
tions of possible gains and losses for the involved players. Following the
revealed altruism approach developed by Cox et al. (2008a), we study
how the observable properties of a first mover’s choice influence a second
mover’s decision to be more or less benevolent towards the first mover.
We extend their approach by looking at the e↵ect of gains and losses for
both players created by the choice of a first mover on the action of a sec-
ond mover. Our main finding is that intention-based benevolence is not
equal to positive reciprocity but can also be influenced through other
factors than generosity: We find that besides the possibility of gains
for the second mover (generosity), the risk of losses for the first mover
(vulnerability) is an important drivers for second mover behaviour. The
availability of a deal and an aversion against violating trust, contrariwise,
seem to be far less important motivations.
11The paper is joint work with Lionel Page and Rudolf Kerschbamer.
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Chapter 6 presents the essay Guilt-averse or reciprocal: Looking at
behavioural motivations in the trust game12. It addresses the unsolved
question whether the positive back-transfers observed in so called “trust
games” (Berg et al., 1995) are driven by (i) unconditional/pure altru-
ism, (ii) guilt aversion (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004), which is
the tendency to fulfil others’ manifest expectations in order to avoid the
feeling of guilt arising from consciously letting others down, or by (iii)
reciprocity in the sense of a willingness to repay a kind action even at
some cost (e.g. Rabin, 1993; Falk et al., 2005). The aim of this study
is to abstain from the idea that there is only one correct theory but to
test for individual heterogeneities. For this purpose, we use a modified
trust game that allows us to disentangle individual behavioural patterns
that are motivated by the three channels described above. The beauty
of the trust game is that the variation of the trustee’s belief about the
trustor’s payo↵ expectations results in opposing predictions for guilt-
averse and for reciprocal agents (in terms of their pro-social behaviour).
If the trustee is motivated by reciprocity, ceteris paribus higher expecta-
tions of the trustor should reduce the perceived kindness of his transfer,
and thus the trustee will return less. If the trustee, however, is motivated
by guilt aversion, the higher expectations of the trustor should induce
higher back-transfers. If the trustee is not motivated by either one, but
is purely altruistic, his back-transfer will be positive but independent of
the trustor’s expectations. By varying the probability that the trustee in
a trust game gets the chance to reciprocate, we can exogenously manip-
ulate the trustor’s expected reward and thus the second-order beliefs of
the trustee (Strassmair, 2009). Using a within-subject design allows us
to determine individual di↵erences and to disentangle trustees motivated
12It is a joint study with Lionel Page and Rudolf Kerschbamer.
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by either of the proposed explanations. However, in contrast to our re-
search hypothesis, we find very limited evidence of type heterogeneity.
This suggests that the two existing theories may imperfectly explain the
second mover behaviour in the trust game.
In the remainder of this introductory part, I will discuss the method-
ology of laboratory experiments in Chapter 2. Additionally, in Chapter
3, I will give a short overview of the empirical findings and theoreti-
cal developments regarding social preferences that are most relevant for
my research without imposing the claim to be exhaustive. The litera-
ture overview will be complemented by the more detailed and confined
literature reviews contained in Chapters 4 to 6 of Part II.
Part II is the “heart” of this thesis and is devoted to my research
projects which are presented in three self-contained essays – one per
chapter. Chapter 4 presents the research project Driving a hard bargain
is a balancing act: The importance of reciprocity in bargaining. Chapter
5 is dedicated to the study Why did he do that? Using counterfactuals
to study the e↵ect of intentions in extensive form games, and the last
essay Guilt-averse or reciprocal: Looking at behavioural motivations in
the trust game is presented in Chapter 6.
Part III concludes with a summary (Chapter 7), a discussion (Chapter
8) and some concluding remarks (Chapter 9).
Chapter 2
Methodology
I chose to study social preferences by developing and conducting labora-
tory experiments. While they were always a widely used methodology for
advancing causal knowledge in physical and life sciences, their adaptation
has been much slower in social sciences. In economics, the first lab exper-
iment was only conducted in the late 1940s (Falk and Heckman, 2009).
An initial low level of lab experiments however has steadily risen since
then, with a major increase since the mid-1980s which was accompanied
with a change in their recognition among economists (Durham et al.,
2007). Among others, Falk and Heckman (2009) nicely demonstrate this
development by the following quotes of Samuelson and Nordhaus. In the
1985 edition of their book Principles of Economics, the authors write:
“Economists (unfortunately) ... cannot perform the controlled experi-
ments of chemists or biologists because they cannot easily control other
important factors. Like astronomers or meteorologists, they generally
must be content largely to observe.” Seven years later in the 1992 edi-
tion, this view has changed and Samuelson and Nordhaus acknowledge
the virtue of controlled experiments also in economics: “Experimental
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economics is an ‘exiting new development’.”
The key advantage of laboratory experiments is the controlled varia-
tion of one variable keeping the other conditions fixed. This guarantees
insights into the behaviour of individual economic agents which are di -
cult to obtain using conventional econometric techniques. Empirical data
always include a large variety of environmental factors and a disentan-
glement of their influences is di cult if not impossible. In a laboratory
experiment, these factors can be controlled allowing research to iden-
tify and test causal relationships (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Levitt and
List, 2007). Lab experiments have proved to be particularly useful when
testing a specific theoretical model. One can test predictions made by
the theory because real agents play the exact game with real monetary
rewards in the lab. Additionally, it is relatively easy to test competing
explanations for the observed behaviour in case the model is rejected
(Charness and Kuhn, 2011). Another strength of lab experiments is to
provide behavioural insights when the theory makes no clear prediction
as in games with multiple equilibria. In such cases, they generate infor-
mation on people’s actual behaviour where the existing model is no guide
to what should happen (Charness and Kuhn, 2011).
A critical underlying assumption is that the results generated in the
artificial environment of laboratory experiments can be generalized (ex-
ternal validity). That is, they can be considered valid in the broader
environment (Levitt and List, 2007). Most this concerning objections
including the fact that participants are usually undergraduate students,
that stakes are low or that the environment is too abstract could be re-
futed by field experiments (see for example Charness and Kuhn (2011),
Falk and Heckman (2009) or Cooper and Kagel (2009)). Nevertheless,
Holt (2006) points out that caution is advised especially when social
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context is critically important.
While the laboratory only provides a model of the field environment
missing many details that may influence agents’ actions, Charness and
Kuhn (2011) conclude that lab experiments nevertheless provide useful
qualitative insights. In how far quantitative levels of behaviour apply to
naturally occurring settings, should however carefully be considered. Lab
experiments and field studies therefore should be seen as complementary.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
3.1 Empirical evidence of other-regarding
behaviour
“[E]xperimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that
systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that a
substantial fraction of the people exhibit social preferences, in particular,
preferences for reciprocal fairness.”(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, p. C1)
One of the first experiments that showed the relevance of other-regarding
behaviour was the ultimatum game published by Gu¨th et al. (1982). In
this very simple two-player game, the first player can make a proposal on
how to split a certain amount of money. The second player can accept
or reject the proposed division. If he accepts, both players receive an
amount according to the first player’s suggested partition. If he rejects,
both players earn nothing. While there exist several Nash equilibria, the
only subgame-perfect equilibrium under standard “selfish” assumptions
predicts that the second player accepts any positive amount of money,
and – anticipating this reaction – the first player allocates the smallest
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possible amount ✏ to the second mover and keeps the rest for himself.
In reality, however, experimental evidence robustly shows that the large
majority o↵ers the second player between 40 and 50 percent of the avail-
able money. Moreover, 40 to 60 percent of second players reject proposals
in which they receive less than 20 percent of the available surplus (Fehr
and Schmidt, 2006; Cooper and Kagel, 2009). Slonim and Roth (1998)
further showed that neither low stakes nor missing learning opportuni-
ties are the ultimate reason of the observed behaviour, thereby refuting
the claim inter alia made by Binmore et al. (1985) that findings mirror
erroneous anomalies.
In fact, even if any strategic uncertainties for the first movers were
removed, pro-social behaviour did not vanish. The latter was shown
using the dictator game which modifies the ultimatum game in such that
the second mover’s role is reduced to a passive acceptor: The first mover’s
division proposition is immediately paid out so that the first mover does
not bear any risk of rejection. In contrast to the classical predictions,
the first mover usually does not keep the entire surplus for himself but
assigns positive amounts up to 50 percent of the pie to the other person
(e.g. Forsythe et al., 1994).1
An interesting companion game is the slightly more complex invest-
ment (or trust) game (Berg et al., 1995), which again consists of two
players and two stages. Both agents are initially endowed with a certain
amount of money e. The first mover has the opportunity to send any
integer amount s between zero and e to the second mover, who receives
ks (typically k = 3). The second mover can then return an amount r
between zero and ks. The investment game resembles a typical exchange
1The average amount allocated to the second mover lies between 10 and 25 percent
with modal allocations at 50 percent and zero (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).
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situation in which the first mover gives up a sure payo↵ for an anticipated
future benefit. But receiving this future benefit is contingent on the sec-
ond mover’s behaviour. It is therefore in principle a dictator game in
which the second mover dictates the final payo↵ allocation with the dif-
ference that the first mover determines with his sent amount the surplus
that is being shared. Again, under classical assumptions, a self-interested
second mover will never return any money, i.e. r = 0. Anticipatory first
movers should therefore transfer nothing, i.e. s = 0. In experiments,
positive amounts of money are typically sent and returned albeit there
are considerable individual di↵erences. First movers invest on average
about half the maximum and second movers repay on average approx-
imately s. The most interesting observation that can be made is that
the amount second movers return increases on average with the initial
transfer s if the change in s is su ciently high (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).
The investment game is a specific kind of trust game. The broader
category of trust situations can be characterized through a sequential pro-
cess where the trustor moves first and the trustee observes the trustor’s
behaviour before making his own decision. Bacharach et al. (2007) char-
acterizes the most basic form as a two-person game, whose extensive form
is shown in Figure 3.1 and whose parameters fulfil the following criteria:
b < a Exposure,
a < c Improvement,
z < y Temptation.
Both players have two strategies to choose from. The trustor can ei-
ther trust or withhold, and the trustee can decide between fulfil and
violate. The inequalities imply thereby that a) the trustor accepts a risk
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by trusting as he is worse o↵ if the trustee violates, b) the trustor can be
better o↵ by trusting (i.e. if the trustee fulfils), and c) the trustee has a
monetary incentive to violate the trust. While, according to Bacharach
et al. (2007), most writers on trust agree that these inequalities are fun-
damental, some make more restrictive requirements on the parameters
(e.g. Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001). Particularly interesting is the ad-
ditional inequality of x < z. This “mutual gain” condition states that
the pair trust/fulfil results in a Pareto-improvement compared to the
status quo. However, we often think of trusting acts even if this condi-
tion is not satisfied: We frequently rely on another person to behave in
a way that makes him worse of, e.g. trusting the neighbour to water the
plants. Under standard assumptions of purely self-interested agents, the
prediction of any trust game is (withhold, violate): Foreseeing that the
trustee will play the weakly dominant strategy violate, the trustor plays
withhold and there is no trusting. Yet, not only the previously discussed
investment game but many other laboratory experiments show that the
standard prediction is systematically violated (see among others Fehr
and Ga¨chter, 1998; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Schotter and Sopher,
2006). In all studies, 50 percent or more of subjects in the role of the
trustor play trust and many subjects in the role of the trustee fulfil.2
Additionally, a great many of various di↵erent games can be found
that provide more evidence of social behaviour. They will be neglected
here as they are not particularly relevant for this thesis. Modifications
of the previously described games will be discussed in the sections where
they are of interest.3
2In fractional versions as the investment game, trustors give half or more of their
endowment and trustees fulfil to a substantial degree (return money).
3Note that there also exists a strand of literature investigating envy (Bolton,
1991), vendettas (Bolle et al., 2014) or similar destructive behaviour (e.g. Nikiforakis,
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Trustor
Trustee
trustwithhold
fulfilviolate
(a;x)
(c;z)(b;y)
Figure 3.1: Extensive form of a typical trust game.
3.2 Theoretical approaches to pro-social be-
haviour
The abundance and prominence of fairness behaviour has given rise to a
growing literature on models of “social” or “other-regarding preferences”
that assume that people’s well-being is not only determined by their own
material payo↵. Instead, these models try to explain when and how an
agent takes others’ monetary gain into account. All agents are assumed
to behave rationally so that the well known concepts of utility maximiza-
tion and game theory can be applied to analyse agents’ optimal behaviour
(Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). However, in the theories of other-regarding
preferences, arguments beyond material self-interest enter an agent’s util-
ity function. Typical examples for such arguments are others’ (material)
well-being (distributional preference models) or functions thereof. For
the latter, people’s weight put on the others’ well-being may depend
on others’ intentions or others’ observed behaviour (intention-based or
2008).
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reciprocity models), others’ payo↵ expectations (guilt aversion models)
or others’ other-regarding concerns (type-based models). Below, I will
shortly discuss the first three classes – models of distributional, models of
intention-based other-regarding preferences and models of guilt aversion
– in a two-player context. The list of discussed models is most certainly
not exhaustive but will provide an overview over the existing theories.4
Additionally, I will shortly discuss one more model of social norms.
While other-regarding preferences are often seen as the stabilizing factor
behind the coherence and enforcement of social norms (and Fehr and
Schmidt (2006) even claim that cooperative institutions enforcing rules
and norms may only exist because of the existence of other-regarding
preferences), others such as Krupka and Weber (2013) argue the other
way around by stating that measuring other-regarding preferences is
economists’ indirect way of measuring social norms. They propose a
model of norm-compliance where people do not care about others’ payo↵
per se but people care about behaving in a manner consistent with so-
cial norms. The model by Krupka and Weber (2013) and the empirical
implications thereof will be discussed at the end of this section.
3.2.1 Distributional social preferences
Motivated inter alia by results from the dictator and the ultimatum game,
distributional models of social preferences were developed in order to
account for the found results. These initially suggested models focus on
an agent’s actions that are motivated by the properties of the outcome.
In a two-player context, models of this strand assume that the utility of
a certain payo↵ of a game depends only on player’s own income xi and
4For a detailed literature review, see Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
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the other player’s payo↵ xj in the final outcome. The simplest altruism
model by Andreoni and Miller (2002) states that an agent is altruistic i↵
his utility is increasing in own and other’s income, i.e. @u(xi,xj)@xi > 0 and
@u(xi,xj)
@xj
> 0. Thus, the indi↵erence curves have the “typical” negative
slope indicating that own as well as other’s payo↵ is always a “good”.
To fit their data, they suggest the most familiar form of the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility functions:
u(xi, xj) =
 
x↵i + ✓x
↵
j
  1
↵ ,
where ↵ 2 ( 1, 1]\{0} and ✓   0.
Cox and Sadiraj (2007) propose a modified CES utility function in
their model of egocentric altruism. Their model includes non-linear in-
di↵erence curves resulting from the utility function with the parameter
restriction ✓ 2 [0, 1):
u(xi, xj) =
8<:
 
x↵i + ✓x
↵
j
 
↵ 1 ↵ 2 ( 1, 0) [ (0, 1],
xix✓j ↵ = 0.
The major advantage of this modification is the possible incorporation of
reciprocity concerns (which I will discuss in Section 3.2.2) as the altruism
coe cient ✓ does not necessarily need to be restricted to be positive.
These altruism models already include a concern for the relative stand-
ing between the agents which is captured by the convexity parameter ↵.
In the following models of distributional preferences, the importance of
this relative standing is increased as they assume a qualitative change in
preferences at equality. The probably most prominent models postulate
that people are “inequality-averse” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
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Ockenfels, 2000): They do not like their payo↵ to di↵er from the equal
share (and they especially do not like to fall behind). While an agent likes
money, he also compares his own payo↵ with the payo↵ of the other(s)
and experiences distress from compassion if he is better o↵ and from
envy if he is worse o↵. The two-player version of the Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) model has piecewise linear indi↵erence curves for di↵erence-averse
preferences over the income for himself xi and the other’s income xj. The
corresponding utility function is linear in own earnings and the di↵erence
in earnings:
u(xi, xj) = xi   ↵ ·max[xj   xi, 0]    ·max[xi   xj, 0]
or
u(xi, xj) = (1 + ↵)xi   ↵xj for xj > xi,
u(xi, xj) = (1   )xi +  xj for xj  xi.
The marginal rate of substitution parameters are assumed to satisfy 0 
   ↵ and   < 1. The latter assures that one always likes own income
while the former assumes that the marginal rate of substitution between
own and other’s income depends on who has the higher income whereby
an agent su↵ers more from inequality if he falls behind in payo↵s than if
the other earns less.
The Bolton-Ockenfels utility function only di↵ers in that it takes
a non-linear form: u(xi, xj) = v(xi, xi/(xi + xj)), where v is a non-
decreasing function which is concave in the first argument and strictly
concave in the second argument, the relative income, with a maximum
at 1/2. The second assumption on v states that an agent’s well-being
increases in other’s income if better o↵, but decreases in other’s income
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if behind (holding own material payo↵ constant).
While these models are good in explaining positive acts to others such
as the generosity observed in dictator games or the positive back-transfers
in investment games, they are less equipped to describe negative acts as
the rejections in ultimatum games. Additionally, the underlying assump-
tion that the agent’s social preferences only depend on the final distribu-
tion of payo↵s often seems too restrictive. Only the intrinsic properties
of outcomes are assumed to be decisive while alternative choices that
players face or the choice process are irrelevant. As a consequence, other
(non-distributional) models of social preferences that emphasize the role
of intentions and/or the way a decision situation came to place have been
developed.
3.2.2 Intention-based social preferences
The second approach of other-regarding preferences tries to explain pre-
dictions inconsistent with self-regarding preferences by the agent’s desire
to react to another’s intention. Agents’ behaviour is no longer solely mo-
tivated by the final outcome but also by the way this outcome has been
achieved. People pay attention to the perceived intentions that drive the
other players’ actions and may be willing to reward and/or punish cer-
tain types of behaviour. Individuals’ preferences can thus become more
or less altruistic depending on the perceived intention of another subject.
The idea of an attribution of intentional states to others originates
from what cognitive scientists call “mindreading” or “folk psychology”
(Baron-Cohen, 1997). Humans routinely attribute mental states such
as beliefs, deliberateness or desires to others in order to explain their
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actions. Similarly, we use this attribution of mental states to constantly
and mostly unconsciously predict other’s behaviour (Baron-Cohen, 1997;
McCabe et al., 2003).
Theories of this strand typically focus on reciprocity, i.e. subjects’
responsiveness to behaviour perceived as nice with positive reciprocal
(more friendly) actions and to as unkind perceived actions with negative
reciprocity (more nasty behaviour). Hence, preferences depend not only
on material payo↵s but also on the player’s interpretation of his oppo-
nent’s behaviour, and accordingly his belief about the reason for a chosen
action, i.e. the intention. A key question for reciprocity models is how
individuals assess the kindness of a particular action.
Blount (1995) shows as one of the first that the intentional act, the
free will, behind a choice is relevant for its perceived kindness. She
shows that rejection rates are much lower in the ultimatum game when
low proposals were generated by a computer and not by another partic-
ipant. This indicates that fairness norms are only or at least more often
imposed if payo↵ allocations are reached deliberately through choices of
the opponent. Similar results are found by O↵erman (2002) and Falk
et al. (2008).
An additional way of evaluating kindness is the comparison of a choice
with the alternative acts that could have been chosen. Evidence for the
relevance of the available actions, the strategy space, is shown for example
by Falk et al. (2003): Second movers in the ultimatum game rejected the
same o↵er less often when it is the most generous o↵er than when it is
the least generous in the first movers opportunity set.
The models by Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) go one step further. They propose that for
the evaluation of another person’s kindness, not only the alternatives are
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relevant but also the beliefs about why the other chose a particular action.
To evaluate the intention behind the act, one therefore needs to form
beliefs about what the other person believes oneself to do. Their models
are based in the literature of psychological game theory (Geanakoplos
et al., 1989), where players’ preferences do not only depend on material
payo↵s but also on a player’s beliefs about other’s choices or beliefs. In
particular, perceived kindness in zero-sum games depends crucially on a
player’s second-order belief: The more the other hopes/expects to accrue
for himself from the final payo↵ allocation, the less kind the other’s choice
is. Hence, given a certain choice, the higher one’s second-order belief, the
less kind the other’s choice is interpreted and in turn the less kind one’s
own action.
These models provide quite sophisticated theories of reciprocity but
unfortunately, they are not very tractable even in simple games and of-
ten yield many equilibria. To avoid these problems, Cox et al. (2007)
and Cox et al. (2008a) propose a more modest reciprocity or “revealed
altruism” approach that relies solely on observable actions but which is a
pure preference and not an equilibrium model. Their model builds on the
egocentric altruism model of Cox and Sadiraj (2007, cf. Section 3.2.1)
but modifies it in such that the “emotional state” ✓ that determines
the weight put on the other agent’s (material) well-being is no longer a
parameter but a function of the kindness or unkindness of the other’s ob-
served choices. For this purpose they define a “reciprocity” or “revealed
kindness” variable r and assume that ✓ is an increasing function of r.5
The revealed kindness r, in turn, is an increasing function of the “generos-
ity” of the other’s choice. It is defined as: r(aj) = xmaxi (aj) xi(a0). The
5In their paper, Cox et al. (2007) also include status as a positive influence of ✓
which will be neglected in the further analysis as it is irrelevant for this thesis.
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revealed kindness of a first mover’s action aj is the di↵erence between the
maximum payo↵ a second mover can guarantee himself given the choice
aj, xmaxi (aj), and his payo↵ in a reference action a
0 that is “neutral in
some appropriate sense”. By replacing the restriction of ✓ 2 [0, 1) by
✓ < 1, Cox et al. (2007) explicitly allow for negative concerns for the
other’s payo↵. The essence is that the first mover’s kindness is revealed
by the generosity of the opportunity set that his choice induces for the
second mover, which is evaluated by a comparison to the other options
that were available to the first mover.
3.2.3 Guilt aversion
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) argue that not only the kindness of an
action determines reciprocity but that people may help the other because
they would feel guilty if they did not.6 This idea builds on psychologi-
cal research where guilt is considered a form of emotional distress which
is based in social relationships. Typically, guilt is generated when be-
haviour has deviated from social standards that have been internalized
by the individual; its anticipation motivates and encourages pro-social
behaviour (Lazarus, 1991). Guilt in the context of social preferences
refers to a guilt-feeling as the consequence of not living up to others’
expectations (Baumeister et al., 1994; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007).
In what follows I focus on the theory of “simple guilt” proposed by Char-
ness and Dufwenberg (2006) and extended by Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2007). It postulates that players experience a utility loss if they be-
lieve that they let others’ payo↵ expectation down.7 The basic idea is
6The focus lies only on positive reciprocity; punishing behaviour cannot be ac-
commodated.
7In contrast, the theory of “guilt from blame” (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007,
2009) postulates that players experience a utility loss if they believe that others believe
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that player i su↵ers from guilt to the extent that he believes that player
j 6= i gets a lower monetary payo↵ than i believes j expects to receive.
Thus, a player’s utility depends directly on beliefs. Using psychological
game theory (Geanakoplos et al., 1989), an agent i’s utility function in a
two-player game can be defined as:
u(z,↵ji) = xi(z)  ✓max{0, E↵ji [xj]  xj(z)},
where z is the outcome of the game (the reached terminal node), xi(z)
(xj(z)) is the monetary payo↵ of agent i (j) at z, ↵ji is player j’s ex-ante
belief on i’s play of the game, E↵ji [xj] is j’s subjective expected payo↵
calculated using ↵ji, and ✓ is an exogenously given positive constant.
While player i’s utility is strictly increasing in own payo↵, he also ex-
periences a psychological cost of not fulfilling player j’s ex-ante payo↵
expectations. The extent of the latter is given by ✓ which measures i’s
guilt-sensitivity. Player i feels guilty about disappointing player j and
will feel guiltier the larger the di↵erence between between E↵ji [xj] and
xj. A guilt-averse agent will consequently assign more money to agent
j when he expects more. There is no gain from exceeding the other’s
payo↵ expectations, though. Note further that player i has to form and
use his second-order beliefs in order to compute his expected utility from
his di↵erent action choices since he typically does not know player j’s
first-order belief ↵ji.
In order to test their model, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) con-
ducted several trust games with a preceding promise stage: Before the
actual trust game started, the second mover could promise the first mover
to reciprocate if the first mover trusts him. They found that communi-
that they believe that they let others’ payo↵ expectation down.
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cation (i.e. promising) does not only enhance trust, reciprocation and
e ciency but more importantly they found support for guilt aversion:
A second mover was significantly more likely to help the first mover the
more he believed that “his” first mover expected him to help.8
3.2.4 Social norms
Another approach to explain social behaviour is based on people’s desire
to comply with social norms. Social norms typically refer to a mutual
understanding among members of a group regarding a certain behaviour
or action, rather than outcomes. Each individual in a particular group
shares its judgement regarding the (in)appropriateness of behaviour with
the whole group and this common judgement is a social norm (see, for
instance, Krupka et al., 2011; Young, 1998; Burke and Young, 2010). The
force of social norms thereby stems from people’s willingness to punish
(or reward) others’ deviation from (or adherence to) social norms within
a population on the one hand, and from the experience of positive or
negative emotions produced by one’s own adherence or deviation from a
social norm on the other hand (Elster, 1989; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).
The importance of social norms on people’s behaviour has been rec-
ognized for a long time in psychology or sociology. In economics, con-
trariwise, social influences have more or less been ignored (Krupka and
Weber, 2013). In fact, the founders of economics such as Mill acknowl-
edged them more than neoclassical theorists of the last century (Burke
and Young, 2010). Furthermore, social norms often served mainly as a
post-hoc interpretation of otherwise unexplained phenomena (Fehr and
Ga¨chter, 2000; Con, 2003; Ostrom, 2000). It is only until very recently
8For a more detailed discussion on the empirical evidence on guilt aversion, please
refer to Section 6.2.
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that researchers started to incorporate norms into economic models, in-
vestigating how they a↵ect people’s behaviour. This development was
mainly driven by the experimental evidence of systematically deviating
behaviour from game-theoretic predictions based on self-interest. This
evidence on deviations was interpreted as the impact of social prefer-
ences (how players feel when others earn more or less money) and social
norms (what players expect and feel obligated to do) (Camerer and Fehr,
2004). However, often the distinction between both is not made or un-
clear. Krupka et al. (2011) and Krupka and Weber (2013) go as far as
claiming that measuring other-regarding preferences is economists’ indi-
rect way of measuring social norms, i.e. the norm of fairness or inequity
aversion (e.g. Fehr and Falk, 1999; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000), of reci-
procity (e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004), or the norm to honour
obligations (e.g. Hart and Moore, 2008).
More recently, Krupka and Weber (2013) introduced a model of social
norms and maybe even more importantly a method on how to iden-
tify and measure social norms. Following the literature, they define
social norms as “collective perceptions, among members of a popula-
tion, regarding the appropriateness of di↵erent behaviours. They are
things that people in the population jointly recognize one should or
should not do, and people who belong to the population expect oth-
ers to be aware of and understand this agreement.” In their model,
a social norm N(ak) 2 [ 1, 1] is a collective judgement that assigns a
degree of (in)appropriateness to every action ak available to the decision-
maker (and which can be empirically determined). This definition allows
actions to vary in the degree to which they are perceived as socially
(in)acceptable rather than only being right or wrong. The crucial as-
sumption is that people’s utility does not only depend on the money they
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obtain but also on the degree to which their actions reflect social norms.
This means that decision-makers have a preference to take actions that
are seen as socially appropriate and to avoid actions considered as so-
cially inadequate. Translated in a utility framework, these consideration
read:
u(ak) = V (⇡(ak)) +  N(ak),
where V (⇡(ak)) is the value an individual puts on his monetary payo↵
⇡(ak) resulting from his action ak and     0 represents the degree to
which a decision-maker cares about complying with social norms.
It follows that individuals with a preference for norm-compliance (i.e.
  > 0) may choose di↵erent actions (select di↵ering payo↵ pairs) across
choice environments even if the sets of available actions and payo↵s are
exactly the same, but the two environments di↵er in their social norms.
Based on the introduction of this model (and the associated elici-
tation method for social norms), a horse-race between the two (di↵er-
ent?) explanations of pro-social behaviour has been started by asking
the question: Is pro-social behaviour driven by stable other-regarding
preferences or rather by the compliance with social norms (i.e. socially
appropriate behaviour in a given context). Krupka et al. (2011) find that
elicited social norms have a substantial explanatory power in dictator
and Bertrand games. Krupka and Weber (2013) furthermore show that
context-dependent variations in the dictator game, which cannot be cap-
tured by the models of social preferences, can be explained by social norm
compliance. These findings are in contradiction with those of Ga¨chter
et al. (2013) who ask the same question for a di↵erent context, exam-
ining peer e↵ects in a three-person gift-exchange game. Their results
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suggest the superiority of distributional social preferences to preferences
for behaving socially appropriate.
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Part II
Three Essays on Intention-based
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Chapter 4
Driving a hard bargain is a
balancing act:
The importance of reciprocity
in bargaining
Abstract1
We investigate the e↵ect of opening o↵ers in bargaining. We find that,
even if a first o↵er is costless to reject, it has a significant impact on the
bargaining outcome. Opening o↵ers convey information on the player’s
reservation value induced by his social preferences and they are most
often accepted when they are not above the equal split. However, o↵ers
which request much more than the equal split induce punishing counter-
o↵ers triggered by the responder’s social preferences. The bargaining
outcome is therefore critically influenced by the balance of toughness and
kindness signalled through the o↵ers made during the haggling phase.
1This is work co-authored by Lionel Page.
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The usual haggling process is based on imperfect information,
the hagglers trying to propagandise each other into miscon-
ceptions of the utilities involved. Nash (1953), Two-person
cooperative games
Lest readers think erroneously that it’s always wise to bargain
tough. Rai↵a (1982), The Art and Science of Negotiation
4.1 Introduction
Bargaining is pervading in economic and social interactions and it has
been a natural object of study for economists. The large economic liter-
ature on economic bargaining has brought many insights about how bar-
gaining outcomes are determined depending on the bargaining power,
exit options and preferences of the bargainers. However, still little is
known about the negotiation process itself: What is a good opening pro-
posal, how long should you stick to a proposal and how much should
you change your proposal when it is a deadlock? Negotiation in real-
economic situations often seems an art which requires expert practice
to excel. Studying the negotiation process in the field is unfortunately
challenging since negotiations are typically characterized by imperfect
information and the use of messages which are hard to measure and
quantify.
This paper investigates a critical aspect of negotiations: the “hag-
gling” process where players exchange split proposals which are costless
to reject. We focus here on the e↵ect of first proposals. To do so, we
design a game where the zone of possible agreements is known (simi-
larly to an ultimatum game). Under standard assumptions of common
knowledge of rationality and payo↵-maximization, first proposals should
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not influence the final outcome. However, the fact that bargainers may
have social preferences transforms this game into a game with imper-
fect information where players’ preferences are not common knowledge.
Players can use the haggling process to try to influence each other’s be-
liefs about personal preferences (Nash, 1953). To assess the e↵ect of first
proposals on the bargaining process, we study the e↵ect of a wide range
of first proposals on the reaction of the player receiving it. We elicit both
the actions of the receiver and his first- and second-order beliefs. This
design allows us to study whether and how the level of the opening pro-
posal influences bargainers’ beliefs, their actions and the final bargaining
outcome.
This study contributes to several important strands of literature. First,
it extends the literature on the role of social preferences in bargaining by
investigating how social preferences do not only limit the range of accept-
able outcomes, but also constrain the negotiation process itself. Bargain-
ing experiments have shown that bargaining outcomes are influenced by
players’ preferences over payo↵ distributions (Camerer, 2003a), and by
their preferences over the intentions of other players (Blount, 1995; Of-
ferman, 2002). We complement these results by studying whether social
preferences can be triggered during the sequence of o↵ers and counter-
o↵ers in a negotiation and consequently influence the final bargaining
outcome. In the haggling process, players making an o↵er can aim to
signal a preference for fairness suggesting that unfavourable splits will
be rejected; they can also try to bargain tough to secure the best out-
come possible. The intention-based preferences of the players receiving
these o↵ers can play a role if proposals are perceived as signalling some-
thing about the likely intention of the other player. We investigate these
possibilities by studying carefully the e↵ect of a first proposal in a nego-
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tiation game.
Second, this paper adds to the literature on bargaining with reputation
where a player has the possibility to build a reputation for stubbornness
by sending an initial message to the other player (Abreu and Gul, 2000;
Wolitzky, 2012; Embrey et al., 2014). Opening proposals in real-world
negotiations are often intended to signal the toughness of one’s bargaining
strategy. Yet, little is known about whether the first proposal has indeed
an impact on the other bargainer’s beliefs.2 We elicit the belief of the
player receiving the first proposal (Responder) about the minimal amount
the player making the proposal (Proposer) would accept. Doing so, we
can measure whether first proposals convey any information about the
player’s final bargaining stance.
Third, our study complements the research on the role of communica-
tion in bargaining games. Experimental studies have found that “cheap
talk” phases before the bargaining itself influence players’ strategies and
therefore the bargaining outcome (Croson et al., 2003; Rankin, 2003; An-
barci et al., 2015). Moreover, proposals themselves can be used to com-
municate feelings and intentions to the other player (Xiao and Houser,
2005). In the context of our lab experiment, we isolate and study a sim-
ple and precise piece of information: the level of an opening o↵er which
is costless to reject. Because it is costless to reject is does not formally
a↵ect the bargaining power of the player making the proposal. Whatever
role this proposal has on the bargaining process, it has to come from its
role as a communication tool.
Our results are striking in what they reveal about the bargaining pro-
2An interesting related study by Goldreich and Pomorski (2011) looks at the e↵ect
of the decision to initiate the bargaining process by making a first proposal. In our
case, the initiating role is pre-assigned and we study the e↵ect of the level of the first
proposal.
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cess. First, we find that the first proposal has a substantial e↵ect on
the bargaining outcome even though it is costless to reject. Proposers’
first proposals are correlated with their minimal acceptable amounts and
therefore carry some information about the Proposer’s likely refusal of
unfavourable splits. We also find that once the first proposal has been
made, our Proposers are credibly obstinate as they tend to reject un-
favourable counter-proposals with a high probability. In the end, our
Proposers are able to get a high proportion of the pie to be divided
even though, under standard assumptions, they have as much bargain-
ing power as in the ultimatum game – which is none.
Second, we find that the Responder’s intention-based social prefer-
ences are triggered by first proposals. Proposals which favour the Pro-
poser are not only rejected but often lead to low counter-o↵ers from the
Responder. In a substantial number of cases, the Responder chooses a
punishing counter-o↵er which is lower than what he believes to be the
Proposer’s minimal acceptable amount. Looking at the mechanisms be-
hind these intention-based preferences, we are able to investigate di↵erent
theoretical explanations. Using the elicited first- and second-order beliefs
from the players, we do not find evidence suggesting that these beliefs
drive players’ behaviour as suggested by psychological game-theoretic
models of reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004).
We however find support for the Levine model of reciprocity and spite-
fulness where agents care about the type of the other player (Levine,
1998). We also find evidence suggesting that players react negatively
to proposals which are perceived as disrespectful as suggested by Yam-
agishi et al. (2012) in line with recent research pointing to individual
preferences for self-esteem (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006; Ellingsen and Jo-
hannesson, 2008), the demand for respect (Eriksson and Villeval, 2012)
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and status (Besley and Ghatak, 2008; He↵etz and Frank, 2008; Charness
et al., 2010) in social interactions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section
ties our research in the context of the existing literature. Section 4.3 in-
troduces our experimental design and outlines our research hypotheses.
It is followed by the analysis of our data and the obtained results in Sec-
tion 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes with a short summary and the discussion
of our findings.
4.2 Related literature
Bargaining experiments have found systematic departures from game-
theoretic predictions. In the case of alternating bargaining games (St˚ahl,
1972; Rubinstein, 1982), the subgame-perfect equilibrium predicts for
similarly impatient and purely self-interested bargainers who have com-
plete information an immediate agreement on a bigger share for the party
that makes the initial o↵er. The evidence from bargaining experiments
however reveals that participants do not play rationally in order to max-
imise solely their own payo↵. As a consequence, the literature in be-
havioural game theory has proposed that bargainers may have some be-
havioural types whose strategies di↵er from standard assumption.
In particular, the experimental evidence shows that bargainers care
about the “fairness” of the bargaining outcome (Roth, 1995b). The ro-
bustness of this evidence has contributed to the motivation of models
of social preferences where players care about others’ payo↵s and how
these compare to their own payo↵ (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). Besides distributive
concerns, it has been suggested that players also care about each other’s
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intentions and that players react to the perceived kindness of other play-
ers. Blount (1995) and O↵erman (2002) showed that when the first
mover’s “action” is determined by a random device, responders are less
likely to reject smaller o↵ers than when the o↵er is made intentionally
by the first mover. More evidence for the importance of intentions on
rejections can be found in Falk et al. (2003). They show that a (8;2) split
in favour of the proposer is more likely to be accepted if the only other
alternative was even more unfair (10;0) than if the only other alternative
was equitable (5;5).
Models of intention-based preferences have been developed to ratio-
nalise these observations. First, in the framework of psychological game
theory, Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) have pro-
posed models of reciprocal preferences where players deduce the other
players’ kindness from their beliefs about the other players’ intended ac-
tions. In such a framework, a player A will respond kindly to a move
made by a player B when A believes that B made this move with the
intention that his move would lead to a good (in some sense) outcome
for the player A. Second, another influential model by Levine (1998) sug-
gests that people react the the type of the other player. An altruist player
may want to act altruistically when facing other altruists but spitefully
with other players who are no altruists. Finally, rejections of low o↵ers
in the ultimatum game have also be explained by a concern for respect.
Rejections can be driven by “wounded pride” (Straub and Murnighan,
1995): Disadvantageous o↵ers are seen as signalling a lack of respect on
part of the other player. This explanation has received support from the
observation that the rejection decisions in the ultimatum game are not
correlated with reciprocal attitudes in other distributive games (Yamag-
ishi et al., 2012). Instead, such a behaviour could be driven by a concern
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for maintaining a reputation as a tough bargainer, which could have been
selected by evolution (Burnham, 2007; Embrey et al., 2014).
If bargainers have di↵erent types, it potentially increases the impor-
tance of communication in order to find an agreement in a negotiation.
Bargainers may want to communicate their true type or lie about it.
Real-world bargaining situations typically allow players to communicate
either verbally or through (costless) proposals and counter-proposals.
This communication phase usually contains declarations about desired
outcomes and reservation values which are not verifiable. From a non-
cooperative game-theoretic point of view with self-centred bargainers,
such communication is “cheap talk” (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) and
should therefore not be expected to impact the final outcome of the bar-
gaining process.3 However empirical evidence shows that cheap talk in
bargaining games can have an e↵ect on the outcomes by influencing play-
ers’ beliefs (Croson et al., 2003; Rankin, 2003; Tingley and Walter, 2011;
Kriss et al., 2013; Anbarci et al., 2015).4 Players’ claims in pre-play com-
munication seem to be interpreted as if they contain an element of truth.
Models of bargaining with reputation (Abreu and Gul, 2000; Wolitzky,
2012; Embrey et al., 2014) show that such signals should indeed have an
e↵ect if the population contains bargainers with “obstinate” behavioural
types who refuse low proposals.
The e↵ective communication between bargainers is not necessarily re-
3This is the case because communication has no direct payo↵ implications. Players
with competing interests, as in a bargaining process, have no incentive to communicate
truthfully. Theoretically, cheap talk should consequently not have any e↵ect on the
equilibrium strategies of the players in most games.
4Early experimental studies with unstructured bargaining designs already indi-
cated that free communication between bargainers plays a role. In particular, face-
to-face bargaining has been found to improve the likelihood of a bargaining agreement,
possibly because it provides a richer array of channels of communication “including
tone of voice, body language and facial expression” (Roth, 1995, p. 296).
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stricted to explicit communication signals. Proposals themselves can be
used to communicate intent and/or emotion to the other player. Studies
have found that allowing players to communicate with messages reduces
the proportion of rejections in the ultimatum game (Xiao and Houser,
2005; Andersson et al., 2010). The rejection of a proposal seems to be
used to convey a message of dissatisfaction. When the dissatisfaction
can be either attenuated or expressed by explicit communication be-
tween players, the rejection of a proposal loses its appeal as its role as
a signal is mitigated or even redundant. And vice versa, if no cheaper
communication channel is available, the rejection is used to signal one’s
unease with a certain proposal.
If proposals can send a signal, the players can potentially use the
sequence of proposals and counter-proposals to try to convey the impres-
sion that they have a high reservation value in order to claim a larger
slice of the pie. Conversely, they may want to convey a signal of agree-
ableness to increase the chance of a deal. If communication has an e↵ect
on players’ perception of each other’s intention, it can play a substantial
role in the determination of the bargaining outcome because of bargain-
ers’ intention-based preferences. And if proposals convey messages of
intent, then bargainers have to consider the message they may be send-
ing when choosing an opening proposal. Whilst we know little about the
mechanisms behind real-world negotiation strategies (for an exception,
see Goldreich and Pomorski, 2011), the art of negotiation is part of the
training in Business Schools. And it indeed stresses the importance of
making reasonable first proposals when initiating a bargaining process
(Rai↵a et al., 2002).
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4.3 Experiment
4.3.1 Experimental design
We designed a two-stage alternating-o↵er bargaining game with no shrink-
age of the pie from the first to the second period (see Figure 4.1). In
a first stage, the Proposer makes a proposal on how to divide a pie
of $10 between himself (PP ) and the Responder ($10   PP ).5 The
Responder can then either accept or reject the proposal. If the Re-
sponder accepts, both players receive the amount corresponding to the
Proposer’s suggested partition. If he rejects the proposal, the Respon-
der makes a counter-proposal to the Proposer regarding the split of the
money (PCP , $10   PCP ). The Responder’s counter-proposal is then ei-
ther accepted or rejected by the Proposer. If the Proposer accepts it, the
suggested partition is implemented. If the Proposer rejects the counter-
proposal, both players earn nothing. For simplicity, we characterize the
proposals and counter-proposals in the remainder by the amount they
ascribe to the Proposer in the suggested split of the pie.6
The absence of shrinkage makes the message (in the form of a split
proposition) in the first stage costless to reject. Under standard assump-
tions, in particular for money being the only carrier of utility for the
bargainers, all the bargaining power relies in the hand of the Responder
who can make the final take-it or leave-it proposition. In the subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the game, the Responder refuses any initial pro-
posal which gives a positive amount to the Proposer and proposes zero
in his counter-proposal which is accepted by the Proposer. In that sense,
5All monetary amounts are in Australian dollars.
6In the experiment, the wording was neutrally for both players to characterize a
proposed split between oneself and the other.
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the Responder is in a position very similar to a proposer in the ultimatum
game.7 The existing experimental research in behavioural game theory
shows that bargainers do not care only for their own money. They also
care about the fairness of the split. As a consequence their reservation
value is typically higher than zero. Our haggling game is therefore char-
acterized by imperfect information about the players’ preferences (e.g.
minimal acceptable proposals). Proposers can use the initial proposal to
try to influence the Responder’s belief about their preferences.
The Proposer The Responder The Proposer
Proposal: PP to Proposer
$10  PP to Responder
Acceptance
(PP ;10  PP )
Rejection
Counter-proposal
PCP to Proposer
Acceptance
(PCP ;$10  PCP )
Rejection (0;0)
Figure 4.1: Game tree of our two-stage alternating bargaining game with-
out shrinkage of the pie.
The experiment took place between March and September 2014. In
total, we collected data on choices of 158 subjects in total in the bar-
7Note that while the first proposal is costless to reject, it can also be accepted. For
that reason, it is not a cheap-talk message but bears a cost for the Proposer: For any
proposal assigning him less than the full amount, he accepts the possibility to forego
higher amounts. An ultimatum game with a pure cheap-talk request in a pre-play
communication phase was investigated by Rankin (2003). The study unexpectedly
found a negative e↵ect of the option to make a request. In light of our results, we
interpret this finding as the consequence of the high level of requests observed in the
study (and possibly from the emotional e↵ect of the words “I request” used by the
receiver).
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gaining experiment. Each participant played either the Proposer or the
Responder (79 participants in each each role). There were ten exper-
imental sessions with ten to 20 subjects. It was conducted using the
experimental software CORAL (Scha↵ner, 2013) with students from a
large university in Australia, recruited via the ORSEE software (Greiner,
2015). After reading the instructions, subjects had to answer a couple
of control questions to ensure their understanding of the game and the
payo↵ structure.8 Participants were then randomly assigned to the role
of Proposer or Responder and kept their role during the entire experi-
ment. At the end of the bargaining session, we also elicited participants’
beliefs on the intended actions and/or beliefs of the other player.9 At the
end of the experiment, participants were randomly matched into pairs of
one Proposer and one Responder, and payo↵s were determined according
to their choices and stated beliefs. At no time were subjects informed
about the identity of their matched partner. Each session lasted approx-
imately 45 minutes. All subjects received a fixed participation fee of
$3 and earned on average $14.30. The full instructions can be found in
Appendix A.
We used the strategy method to elicit the Responders’ decisions and
beliefs for each possible proposal from the Proposer. This allows us to ob-
serve how a Proposer’s first proposal a↵ects the Responder’s subsequent
counter-proposal.10 To avoid experimenter demand e↵ects, we randomly
8Participants who answered wrongly to some of these questions received additional
explanations until the experimenter was satisfied that they understood the game.
9When participants made their action decisions, they did not know about the
belief-estimation task, yet. Following Dufwenberg et al. (2011), we decided on this
timing to avoid any influences on decisions through strategic choice making in order
to subjectively simplify subsequent guesswork. This problem also partly reflects what
Blanco et al. (2010) calls the risk for hedging.
10There are potential factors such as a reduction in incentives or a “hot” vs. “cold”
e↵ect that might a↵ect the participants’ choices by using the strategy method (Zizzo,
2010). However, the experimental evidence does not report any case in which a treat-
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shu✏ed the presented order of first proposals.
Proposer
Choice
Proposal PP
Direct response
Responder
Choice
Acceptance or rejection
Proposer
First-order belief
P’s belief about
R’s choice to accept/reject
Responder
Second-order belief
R’s belief about
P’s belief whether R
chose to accept/reject
For all proposals PP
Responder
Choice (if rejected)
Counter-proposal, PCP
Proposer
First-order belief
P’s belief about
R’s counter-proposal, P˜CP
Responder
Second-order belief
R’s belief about
P’s expectation, P˜ECP
For all proposals PP
Proposer
Choice
P’s minimal
counter-proposal, PMACP
Direct response
Responder
First-order beliefs
R’s beliefs about
P’s minimal
counter-proposal, P˜MACP
For all counter-proposals PP
Figure 4.2: Elicitation of players’ strategies and beliefs. Proposer and
Responder are designated by the letters P and R, respectively.
Figure 4.2 presents all the strategies and beliefs elicited from both
players. The Proposer made the decision about his initial proposition
on how to split the $10. In addition, he was asked about his minimal
acceptable counter-proposal (PMACP , 10  PMACP ), or more specifically
about his reservation value PMACP , i.e. the smallest amount which he
would need to receive in order to just accept a Responder’s counter-
proposal. The Responder made his acceptance/rejection decision for ev-
ery possible initial proposal. If he rejected a proposal, he also made a
counter-proposal to suggest another split of the $10.
In order to understand the potential dynamics initiated by a Pro-
poser’s first proposal and its e↵ect on a Responder’s decision, we elicited
participants’ first- and second-order beliefs about their partners’ choices
ment e↵ect is observed with the strategy method and not with the direct-response
method (Brandts and Charness, 2011). Note further that although the strategy
method may have an e↵ect on the overall level of counter-proposals, the e↵ect should
be similar for all initial proposals. Our analysis will focus on the di↵erences in reac-
tions (rather than absolute reactions) and thus should not be a↵ected significantly.
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and beliefs. This allows us to capture if and how beliefs change as a func-
tion of a Proposer’s opening proposal. Given the abstract nature of first-
and second-order beliefs, we designed an innovative elicitation procedure
representing the question with stylized figures of players thinking of other
players.11 Using these figures, we asked the Proposer to guess whether
the Responder will accept or reject his initial proposal regarding the split
of the $10. We did so for all proposals that he could have made. In case
he expected the Responder to reject the proposal, we furthermore elicited
the Proposer’s guess on how much money the Responder will assign him
in the counter-proposal. We asked the Responder to guess how the Pro-
poser expects him to react to each of his potential partition propositions,
i.e. whether the Proposer expects him to accept or reject that particular
partition. If the Responder thought that the Proposer expects a rejec-
tion, we additionally asked the Responder to guess the Proposer’s belief
about his counter-proposal in case of rejection ( ePECP ). The Responder’s
belief about the Proposer’s toughness is conveyed by his belief about the
Proposer’s minimal acceptable counter-proposal ( ePMACP ). This belief
was elicited for all possible first proposals from the Proposer.
Participants were rewarded for correct guesses (and only for those).
Given the relative complexity and large number of elicited beliefs, this
procedure was chosen because it is easy to understand.12 The Pro-
11First-order beliefs were elicited showing pictures of the player thinking about the
action of the other player. Second-order beliefs were elicited using the same picture
but now representing the other player thinking about the player’s thoughts. The
pictures can be found in the experimental material in Appendix A.
12This incentive method su ces to elicit the mode of a discrete distribution (Wilcox
and Feltovich, 2000; Hurley and Shogren, 2005). Hurley and Shogren (2005) further
show that this method is robust to deviations from expected utility maximization and
risk neutrality. In our design, we however face the problem that participants were
only asked for their belief about the other’s (belief about one’s) counter-proposal if
they stated a belief of rejection in the first place. This may lead to a rejection guess
even if subjects assign the rejection less than a 50 percent chance. Looking at our data
however reveals that this potential risk is, if at all, a small problem as the acceptance
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poser received $0.50 for each correct belief about the Responder’s accep-
tance/rejection decision. If he correctly guessed that the Responder re-
jected his proposal, the Proposer earned extra $0.50 if his guess about the
Responder’s counter-proposal coincided with his actual counter-proposal.
The Responder earned $0.50 for each correct guess about the Proposer’s
minimal acceptable counter-proposal. Furthermore, the Responder re-
ceived additional money if his guess about the Proposer’s expectation
matched the Proposer’s actual expectation. The Responder earned $0.50
for each correct guess on whether the Proposer expected him to accept
the proposal. In case of a correctly expected rejection, the Responder
received $0.50 for each correct guess about the Proposer’s expectation
about his counter-proposal.
4.3.2 Third party observers
In order to gain richer insights in the likely beliefs and feelings of play-
ers, we elicited the views from third party observers. We recruited 59
participants to indicate their beliefs about actions and perceptions of the
Proposer’s intention for each of the possible proposals presented as hy-
pothetical scenarios. By using third party observers, we avoided to make
these questions about beliefs and perceptions too salient to the players
during the actual experiment and avoided a potential experimenter de-
mand e↵ect. It also limits the risk of a false consensus e↵ect whereby a
player’s beliefs can be influenced by his choices (Bellemare et al., 2011).
Subjects received a flat payment of $10 for a session of roughly 30 min-
utes.
The survey presented all situations a Responder could have been con-
guesses exceed the actual acceptance rate (see Figure 4.4).
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fronted with to the additional participants (i.e. one scenario for each
possible proposal made by the Proposer). The participants in the role of
the observer were asked to consider these hypothetical situations, and to
indicate their beliefs about the motive of the Proposer as well as to imag-
ine their feelings if they were to receive these proposals as a Responder.
The full questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.
4.3.3 Definitions and hypotheses
The payo↵ facing a Proposer at the end of the bargaining can be char-
acterized by the Responder’s final proposal, PFP :
PFP =
8<: PP if the Responder accepted the first proposal,PCP if the Responder rejected,
where PCP is the counter-proposal made by the Responder after rejecting
the initial proposal PP .
The Responder’s belief about the Proposer’s minimal acceptable counter-
proposal is ePMACP . In addition, we define his belief about the Proposer’s
minimal acceptable proposal, ePMAP , as the payo↵ the Responder expects
the Proposer to be willing to accept at the start of the game. By defini-
tion:
ePMAP = minnPP , ePMACPo
And the Responder’s belief about the Proposer’s expected final pro-
posal, ePEFP , is defined as:
ePEFP =
8<: PP if the Responder believes the Proposer expects him to accept,ePECP if the Responder believes the Proposer expects him to reject,
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where ePECP is the Responder’s belief about the Proposer’s expected
counter-proposal (PECP ).
Non-cooperative game theory with own-payo↵ maximizing agents would
predict that the first stage of the game does not give any bargaining
power to the Proposer. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this
game under these conditions is the same as for an ultimatum game where
the Responder makes the take-it of leave-it proposal.
Hypothesis 4.1 (Common knowledge of rationality)
The Responder makes a final o↵er PP = 0.
From the results of the ultimatum game, we know that Hypothesis
4.1 is unlikely to be confirmed as players typically reject low proposals:
Experimental findings show that many agents refuse very unfavourable
splits due to their social preferences. We can therefore expect Proposers
to refuse some unfavourable final proposals. In addition, results from dic-
tator games show that many agents assign positive amounts to the other
player even if the other cannot refuse. In our game, a selfish Responder
facing a Proposer with social preferences would propose to the Proposer
what he believes to be his minimal acceptable proposal. However, if the
Responder has social preferences himself, he may o↵er the Proposer more
than what he believes to be his minimal acceptable proposal.
Hypothesis 4.2 (Bargainers with social preferences)
(i) If the Responder is rational and self-regarding and he perceives that
the Proposer has social preferences, then he makes a final o↵er
PFP = ePMAP .
(ii) If the Responder has social preferences himself, then he makes a
final o↵er PFP > ePMAP .
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We are particularly interested in the role of the first proposal. Under
standard assumptions, the first proposal does not carry any information
and should therefore not e↵ect the bargaining outcome.
Hypothesis 4.3 (Absence of information in first proposal)
The Responder’s belief about the Proposer’s minimal acceptable proposalePMAP and the Proposer’s expected proposal ePEFP are not a↵ected by the
Proposer’s first proposal PP .
Experimental evidence however suggests that cheap talk can influence
players’ beliefs prior to a bargaining game (Croson et al., 2003; Rankin,
2003; Tingley and Walter, 2011; Kriss et al., 2013; Anbarci et al., 2015).
In contrast to Hypothesis 4.3, we therefore expect that the first proposal
PP may influence the Responder’s beliefs and behaviour, and consider
the following alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.4 (E↵ect of first proposals on beliefs)
(i) The Responder perceives PP as conveying information about the
Proposer’s resolution to refuse unfavourable proposals, i.e. his min-
imal acceptable proposal PMAP . The more the Proposer claims in
his proposal, the higher the Responder’s belief about the Proposer’s
minimal acceptable proposal ( ePMAP ).
(ii) The Responder perceives PP as conveying information about the
Proposer’s expectations. A higher PP from the Proposer signals
higher expectations regarding the final split of the pie (PEFP ) and
thus triggers a higher belief by the Responder ( ePEFP ).
The experimental literature also indicates that the agents’ reactions
depend on how they interpret the intention of the other player (e.g. Ra-
bin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Levine, 1998; Straub and Murnighan,
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1995). Specifically, agents react kindly to a move perceived as triggered
by a kind motive and they react unkindly to a move perceived as unkind.
If first proposals have an e↵ect on Responders’ beliefs, then di↵erent first
proposals may be interpreted as signalling di↵erent degrees of kindness
from the Proposer. In line with Hypothesis 4.4, we assume that higher
claims from the Proposer in the first proposal can be perceived as sig-
nalling a desire to get a larger part of the $10 pie. We therefore expect low
proposals PP to be perceived as kinder than high proposals. Measuring
kindness thereby typically requires a benchmark (Rabin, 1993). Hypoth-
esis 4.5 proposes the Responder’s belief about the Proposer’s minimal
acceptable final proposal ( ePMAP ) as a benchmark. This choice is moti-
vated by the fact that a self-centred payo↵-maximizing Responder would
precisely o↵er ePMAP . This choice is however not critical for the rest of
the analysis.
Hypothesis 4.5 (Kind behaviour)
The Responder answers positively (negatively) to the perceived kindness of
the Proposer by making a final proposal (PFP ) relatively higher (lower) to
his belief about the Proposer’s minimal acceptable final proposal ( ePMAP ).
4.4 Data and results
4.4.1 Bargaining outcomes
The outcomes of the bargaining interactions are summarized in Table
4.1. The Proposers’ average first proposal PP is $5.5 or 55 percent of the
surplus. In contradiction with Hypothesis 4.1, the final proposal from the
Responder, PFP , is on average $4.7. This is relatively high compared to
findings from the ultimatum game (on average around of 30-40 percent of
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Mean Bs’ Mean Mean As’ Mean Mean Mean
Proposal Rejection PCP PFP Rejection PMACP Earnings Earnings
PP Rate Rate Proposer Responder
(SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)
Actually 5.53 32% 4.12 4.73 48% 4.68 4.23 4.25
played (1.24) (1.11) (.79) (1.59) (1.83) (1.84)
For all 5 48% 4.22 3.49 n/a n/a n/a n/a
proposals (3.16) (1.40) (1.88)
Table 4.1: Summary statistics.
the pie, see Camerer, 2003a). Payo↵s are on average balanced between
the Proposers and the Responders with $4.23 and $4.25, respectively.
Responders’ relatively high average earnings are driven by two mecha-
nisms: First, even though first proposals are costless to reject, they are
accepted most of the time, this is the case in 68 percent of the bargaining
situations. Second, even when first proposals are rejected, the counter-
proposal still tends to be substantial. Rejected first proposals PP are on
average $6.64 and the subsequent counter-proposals PCP are on average
$4.1. Even though the first proposal should not give bargaining power to
the Proposer under standard assumptions, we observe that being able to
make a first proposal allows the Proposer to get a share of the pie which
is higher than in the ultimatum game where the player receiving the last
o↵er also has no bargaining power.
4.4.2 Proposers’ choices
As can be seen in Figure 4.3, the large majority of Proposers makes a
50:50 split-proposal. Nobody requests less than $4 and only less than 13
percent make proposals di↵erent to $5 or $6.
Although the final level of counter-proposals is on average above $4,
counter-proposals are rejected by the Proposer in 52 percent of the time.
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Figure 4.3: The Proposers’ decisions. The left panel shows the distribu-
tion of the first proposals. The right panel shows Proposers’ minimal ac-
ceptable counter-proposals, PMACP , depending on their initial proposal.
When the counter-proposal is below $5, it is rejected in over 80 percent
of times which is high compared to ultimatum games (Camerer, 2003a,
lists 16 studies with average rejection rates typically in the range of 10-30
percent). The high level of rejections is driven by the Proposers’ high
average level of minimal acceptable counter-proposals (PMACP ) of $4.7.
The average PMACP is rather large compared to the average level of min-
imal acceptable proposals in typical ultimatum studies, which is around
20-30 percent of the pie size (e.g. Blount, 1995; Straub and Murnighan,
1995).13
While the PMACP is rather large, the first proposal is not a simple
reflection of it. All but two participants choose to make a first proposal
equal to or above $5. For most Proposers who make a proposal PP = 5,
we observe PMACP = PP = 5. A request of a fair split is therefore a
rather informative signal that the Proposer is likely to reject an unequal
split. For Proposers who make a proposal PP > 5, we observe that almost
all the time PP > PMACP . Nevertheless, there is a positive relationship
13It could be that the possibility of making an initial proposal evokes an increased
sentiment of entitlement and/or reciprocity-sensitivity. Moreover, it could be driven
by the Proposers’ desire to be consistent with their stated proposal as suggested by
the findings of Cialdini et al. (1995).
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between the Proposers’ first proposals PP and their minimal acceptable
counter-proposals PMACP . This pattern indicates that demanding pro-
posals PP > 5 are not a strong indication of the Proposer’s toughness of
his bargaining stance although the level of the proposal contains some
information about the likelihood that the Proposer rejects low counter-
proposals.
Overall, this pattern supports part (i) of Hypothesis 4.4 whereby the
first proposal conveys, in practice, some information about the Proposer’s
PMACP . It is also compatible with the literature on bargaining with
reputation where a bargainer can send a signal of commitment to reject
future proposals below some threshold (Abreu and Gul, 2000; Wolitzky,
2012; Embrey et al., 2014). In our sample, a substantial proportion of
proposers adopt an “obstinate” strategy where they commit to refuse
counter-proposal below $5 while making a proposal of $5. In such a
situation, the existence of such obstinate players gives weight to initial
signals and allows players sending the signal to claim a substantial part
of the pie. We observe indeed that the final payo↵s of Proposers and
Responders are almost equal in our design which is in stark contrast
to findings from ultimatum games even though our Proposer has under
standard assumptions the same bargaining power as the recipient of the
ultimatum o↵er. The possibility to make a first proposal coupled with
the existence of a substantial amount of obstinate players improves the
bargaining power of the Proposer significantly.
4.4.3 Responders’ reaction to the opening proposal
Most Responders accept any proposal where the Proposer requests $5 or
less. For initial proposals PP above $5, the acceptance rate falls sharply
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and quickly reaches nearly zero. The acceptance rate of the Responder
(as well as the associated beliefs from the two players) are represented in
Figure 4.4. The Proposers’ expectations regarding the Responders’ ac-
ceptance decision as well as the Responders’ belief about the Proposers’
expectations are on average quite accurate. Players do not behave as if
they are payo↵-maximizing agents with common knowledge of rationality.
Instead, the equal payo↵ allocations appears as a benchmark with pro-
posals from the Proposer requesting more than 50-50 being much more
likely to be rejected.
Result 4.1 (Acceptance of initial proposals)
Most Responders accept non-zero proposals PP which are below or equal
to $5. Their acceptance rate falls quickly for proposals requesting more
than the equal payo↵ allocation. For PP of $7 and above, it is close to
zero.
Figure 4.4: a) The Responders’ acceptance rate; b) The Proposers’ av-
erage expected acceptance rate; c) The Responders’ average belief about
the Proposers’ expected acceptance rate.
4.4. DATA AND RESULTS 63
Closely related to the Responder’s acceptance decision is his final pro-
posal (PFP ). As can be seen in Figure 4.5, the Responders’ average PFP
follows closely the 45 degree line up to a proposal of approximately $5
(reflecting the high acceptance rate for low proposals). Note that it lies
slightly above it up to a proposal of $4 and from then onwards slightly
below. Note further that it never reaches the equal payo↵ allocation of
$5. The observed severe kink at a proposal of $5 reflects the sudden drop
in the acceptance rate.
Figure 4.5: Responders’ a) average final proposal, PFP , alongside their
average beliefs about b) the expectation of the Proposer, ePEFP , and
about c) the Proposer minimal acceptable proposal, ePMAP , depending
on the Proposer’s initial proposal.
Most noticeable is the kink in the curve with the average final proposal
declining as the first proposal reaches more than 60 percent of the amount
to split. This downward slope is significant using an OLS regression for
proposals above $5. Table 4.2 presents the result of this regression.
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PFP ePMAP ePEFP
(Robust SD) (Robust SD) (Robust SD)
Constant 6.261*** 4.408*** 5.129***
(.286) (.249) (.326)
Proposal PP (> 5) -.222*** .044 .005
(.041) (.035) (.050)
Estimated on the subsample of proposals PP > 5, N=395.
Standard errors in brackets. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
Table 4.2: Slope estimations for the Responder’s PFP , ePMAP and ePEFP
as a function of the Proposer’s first proposal (for PP >5).
Result 4.2 (Final proposals as a function of first proposals)
The Responders’ average final proposal increases with the opening pro-
posal if this proposal is below 50 percent of the pie. It decreases with the
proposal if it is above 60 percent of the pie.
We now turn to the question how the Proposer’s first proposal PP
impacts the Responders’ ePMAP and their ePEFP . The associated data is
displayed in Figure 4.5. When the Proposer’s first proposal is below or
equal to five, most Responders accept such proposals and also believe that
they are expected to do so. Hence, ePEFP ⇡ PP . However, once proposals
exceed the equal payo↵ split, i.e. when PP > 5, Responders’ ePEFP
becomes a function of the Responder’s belief about what the Proposer
expects as a counter-proposal. ePMAP follows a similar course: ePMAP ⇡
PP for PP < 5 but the Responders’ average belief about the minimal
counter-proposal the Proposer would accept, ePMAP , increasingly deviates
from PP for larger opening proposals.
Interestingly, proposals above $5 do not seem to impact the Respon-
ders’ beliefs on average. They are interpreted by the Responder as in-
dicating a PMAP and a PEFP of around five, no more. In that way,
proposals requesting more than the equal split seem to have the same
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e↵ect as cheap talk.14 We verify the visually obtained result by estimat-
ing the e↵ect of first proposals above five on the Responders’ ePMAP andePEFP . We find that the Responders’ beliefs do not change significantly
as a function of PP for PP > 5 (see Table 4.2).
Result 4.3 (Demanding proposals and Responders’ average beliefs)
Proposals above the equal payo↵ split are not interpreted as:
(i) Signalling a credible indication of a tough bargaining stance (highePMAP ).
(ii) Signalling a higher payo↵ expectation from the Proposer (high ePEFP ).
Notably, the decrease in the final proposal PFP for initial proposals above
$5 does not seem to be driven by these beliefs as they stay roughly
constant.15 However, hiding behind the absence of e↵ect of first proposals
on average beliefs, we observe a change in the distribution of Responders’
beliefs. Figure 4.6 displays these distributions. For first proposals above
$5, Responders’ beliefs become more dispersed.
A closer look at the relationship between Responders’ average final
proposals and their average beliefs shows that final proposals exceed the
Responders’ belief about the Proposer’s PMAP up to an initial proposal
of approximately $7 (see Figure 4.5). This result could suggest a small
impact of distributional preferences or positive reciprocity. In several
cases, the Responder accepts a reasonable split-proposition even though
he could try to claim more for himself. Very modest (kind) opening pro-
posals from the Proposer (up to approximately $4) are sometimes even
14Note that high initial proposals also do not signal a “gamesman” with a very
low PMAP .
15The di↵erence in slopes between the Responders’ average PFP and the Respon-
ders’ average ePMAP is significant (p = 0.006).
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Figure 4.6: Responders’ beliefs about the Proposer’s minimal acceptable
proposal, ePMAP (left panel), and about his expected final proposal, ePEFP
(right panel).
followed by a counter-proposal o↵ering the Proposer more than what he
had asked for (PFP above the 45 degree line). Once first proposals go be-
yond $7, though, the Responders’ PFP falls on average short of the ePMAP .
The Responders respond to high proposals by making counter-proposals
which are on average lower than what they believe the Proposer’s PMAP
to be. By doing so, they seem to punish the Proposer at their own cost
as according to their own beliefs their final proposal is likely to lead to
a rejection from the Proposer and therefore to a null payo↵ for both
players.16 This pattern gets stronger as proposals tend towards the full
amount of the pie. Figure 4.7 displays the pattern of such punishing be-
haviour. The left panel shows the di↵erence between PCP and ePMAP for
each initial proposal. The right panel shows the proportion of punishing
counter-proposal (PCP < ePMAP ) for each initial proposal. For a very
high initial PP , more than 40 percent of the counter-proposals can be
considered as punishing.
16This interpretation is supported by Schweinsberg et al. (2012)’s psychological
study which found evidence that extreme requests in negotiation may lead to the
other party walking away.
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Figure 4.7: Responders’ punishing behaviour. The left panel shows the
di↵erence between the Responders’ average final proposal and their av-
erage belief about the Proposer’s PMAP . The right panel shows the
proportion of Responders making a punishing counter-proposal for each
proposal. The Responder is said to punish the Proposer if PCP < PMAP .
Result 4.4 (Punishing demanding proposals)
The Responders’ PFP exceeds on average their ePMAP for low first pro-
posals from the Proposer. For higher first proposals, the Responders’
average PFP decreases and drops below their average ePMAP . Respon-
ders seem willing to terminate the bargaining without an agreement as a
consequence of the Proposer’s first proposal.
4.4.4 External observers’ perceptions
Observers’ expectations about players’ choices and beliefs in the game
resemble the actual pattern of answers observed in the experiment (see
Figure 4.8). This result suggests that they have a good understanding of
the game and the likely state of mind of the Proposer and Responder in
each situation.
We also asked the observers about their perceived intentions and per-
ceptions of the di↵erent bargaining situations. Figure 4.9 shows what
observers consider to be the likely motive driving each possible level of a
Proposer’s opening proposal. Unsurprisingly, most observers regard the
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Figure 4.8: Observers’ expectations about the Responders’ acceptance
rate (left panel) and about Proposers’ expected final proposal, PEFP ,
and their minimal acceptable proposal, PMAP , (right panel).
Proposer as fair when making a proposal PP = 5. Proposals above $6
are perceived as indicating selfishness. However, a proposal of PP = 6
is not yet perceived as selfish by many observers. Similarly, half of the
observers interpret o↵ers PP   6 as indicating a desire to secure more
than half of the $10. Proposers making proposals with a very large share
for themselves, PP   9, are even classified as nasty by a third of the
observers. Observers generally do not tend to interpret first proposals as
being used strategically to suggest to the Responder that the Proposer
has a higher PMAP than it is. The proposals perceived as the most “rea-
sonable” are PP = 5, 6, 7, with lower and higher requests being harder
for the observers to make sense of.
Additionally, we asked observers about their feelings if they were faced
with each possible opening proposal. Figure 4.10 represents the fraction
of observers experiencing a particular feeling. Observers tend to feel good
and happy for proposals PP  5 and angry and insulted for proposals
PP   7. Interestingly, the proposal evoking a neutral feeling by most
observers is PP = 6. This can be understood as a level for which they
feel neither happy as it is beyond the equal payo↵ nor insulted/angry yet
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Figure 4.9: Observers’ views on the motives driving the Proposer’s dif-
ferent opening proposals.
as it is not a large deviation from it.
4.4.5 What drives these intention-based preferences?
Our experimental design allows us to investigate the mechanism be-
hind the Responder’s reaction to the Proposer’s proposal.
According to the reciprocity approaches by Rabin (1993) as well as
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006),
perceived kindness in zero-sum games depends crucially on the Respon-
der’s second-order belief: The more the Responder believes the Proposer
expects to accrue for himself from the final payo↵ allocation, the less
kind the Proposer’s choice is perceived. Hence, given a certain choice,
the higher the Responder’s belief about the Proposer’s payo↵ expecta-
tion, the less kind the Proposer’s choice is interpreted and in turn the
less kind the Responder’s response should be. Our elicitation of first- and
second-order beliefs in this experiment allows us to investigate the empir-
ical predictions of psychological game theory in this bargaining contest.
We observed that first proposals have an e↵ect on the Responder’s
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Figure 4.10: Observers’ feelings when faced with the Proposer’s di↵erent
opening proposals.
belief about the Proposer’s expectations. While, on average, proposals
above $5 are associated with expectations of around $5, Figure 4.6 re-
vealed that Responders’ beliefs are quite dispersed. We therefore test
whether punishing counter-o↵ers are Responders’ answer to their be-
lief that the Proposer expects to get more than the equal payo↵ split
resulting from his proposal. In Table 4.3 (column 1), we regress the
Responder’s final proposal on the Proposer’s opening proposal and his
beliefs – ePMAP and ePEFP . We find a positive but insignificant e↵ect ofePMAP . We cannot rule out that the Responder does not react to his
belief PMAP when making a counter-proposal. The e↵ect of ePEFP on
Responders’ PFP is surprisingly positive (not negative). This result is
in contradiction with the idea that reciprocity concerns may be driving
the drop in counter-proposals for high first proposals from the Proposer:
Since Responders’ ePEFP is on average > 5 for proposals PP > 5 (Fig-
ure 4.6), models of reciprocity would predict that negative reciprocity
should prevail for PP > 5 and Responders’ counter-proposals should be
lower, not higher, the higher they believe the Proposer’s expectation to
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(1) (2)
PFP Punishing PCP
Constant 4.929*** -0.664***
(0.597 ) (0.124)
PP -0.229*** 0.040***
(0.043) (0.011)ePMAP 0.143 0.168***
(0.089) (0.015)ePEFP 0.137* -0.023
(0.061) (0.016)
For proposals PP > 5, N=395.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
Table 4.3: Slope estimations for (1) Responder’s level of the PFP , (2)
Responder’s decision to punish (binary).
be. Even more surprising, we find that, for high first proposals, the level
of the proposal influences the Responder’s kindness negatively even after
controlling for fPPMAP and ePEFP . This pattern suggests that the level of
the first proposal has an e↵ect which is not reducible to its impact on the
Responder’s belief about the Proposer’s expectation (and/or his ePMAP ).
In Table 4.3 (column 2), we take a closer look at punishing counter-
proposals. We regress the Responder’s decision to make a punishing
counter-proposal on the Proposer’s opening proposal and his beliefs –ePMAP and ePEFP . The most important insight to be gained is the in-
significance of the Responder’s ePEFP : The Responder’s decision whether
to punish or not does not seem to be driven by negative reciprocity (as
considered by psychological game-theoretic models) as it is independent
of the Responder’s belief about the Proposer’s expected final proposal.
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Result 4.5 (Final proposals not driven by beliefs on Proposer’s expectation)
(i) The level of the final proposal following a first proposal above $5 is
not negatively correlated with ePEFP .
(ii) The probability to make a punishing counter-proposal, PCP < ePMAP ,
is not correlated with ePEFP .
Notably, the decreasing slope in counter-proposals for high first pro-
posals also cannot be explained by distributional preferences which would
predict counter-proposals staying close to a constant (typically $5) re-
flecting the preferred split (typically 50-50).
Turning to the data elicited from the third party observers allows
us to gain more insights into the drivers behind Responders’ reactions.
The observers were asked more emotionally weighted questions about
their perception of the game. In particular, they were asked about their
perceived type or intention of the Proposer and his actions. They were
also asked how they would feel if they were in the shoes of the Responder
and whether they would want to make a punishing counter-o↵er or even
stop the game without any counter-o↵er (leading to a payo↵ of zero for
both players).
Table 4.4 presents the results of regressions where observers’ beliefs
about PMAP , ePOMAP , and about PEFP , ePOEFP , as well as perceived types/
intentions and associated feelings are used to explain answers to the
question about the experienced feelings of happiness, anger and insult,
and the decision to end the game or punish the Proposer. We find thatePOMAP and ePOEFP both influence the feeling of happiness (1-2). But only
a high ePOMAP is associated with anger (3-4). When controlling for beliefs
about the other’s type, neither ePOMAP nor ePOEFP predicts the feeling of
being insulted (6). Looking at the choice to end the game or punish the
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Proposer, we observe that ePOEFP is most often not significant while ePOMAP
is significant in most cases (7-12).
Additionally, we looked at other perceived intentions/types as factors
evoking certain feelings and negative actions (ending the game or making
punishing counter-o↵ers). We find that the feeling of being insulted is
significant both in predicting punishing counter-proposals and decisions
to end the game. The belief that the Proposer wants to secure the largest
part of the $10 is in turn the most predictive of the feeling of being
insulted. The feeling of kindness is significant when predicting punishing
counter-proposals, but not when predicting decisions to end the game.
Taken together, these results suggest that preferences over intentions
are driving the negative reaction to high proposals from the Proposer.
We observe strong negative emotional reactions for demanding proposals
PP > 6 and a substantial propensity to punish the Proposer for such
proposals. The desire to punish is linked with the observers’ perception
of the Proposer’s intention. The absence of a clear link between ePOEFP
and negative emotions as well as punishing behaviour does not point to
an explanation relying on the positive/negative reciprocity models from
psychological game theory. Alternative explications of intention-based
preferences such as models where agents are spiteful against non-altruistic
agents (Levine, 1998) or have a “wounded pride” when receiving low
proposals (Straub and Murnighan, 1995; Yamagishi et al., 2012) seem
better able to account for the observed behavioural pattern.
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4.4.6 What is a the profit-maximizing opening pro-
posal?
We have seen that Responders will accept low proposals PP but punish
proposals which are too high above the equal split. In that context, an
interesting side question is what is the “best” or rather most profitable
opening proposal. Figure 4.5 revealed that the highest final proposal
is on average made following a proposal slightly above the equal payo↵
split. Since averages mask individual di↵erences, we additionally look at
the choice distributions. Figure 4.11 displays the boxplots of Responders’
final proposals for each first proposal from the Proposer. For proposals up
to a value of five, the large majority of Responders accept the Proposer’s
proposal. Hence the boxplot contracts to a line at the exact value of the
proposal. The most interesting observations can be made for proposals
between five and seven. While the mode of Responders’ final proposals
remains at five, the fairly homogeneous behaviour of Responders trails
o↵. First proposals of six are still accepted by a decent number of players
but are mostly followed by a counter-proposal of five so that the 75th
percentile moves upwards. For proposals of seven and larger, this trend
is reversed. Indeed, the 75th percentile returns to a level of five and
the 25th percentile declines to four: A substantial number of Responders
rejected and chose a counter-proposal below five.
On aggregate, these responses to a proposal of six deliver an average
payo↵ for the Proposer which is higher than a proposal of five. The opti-
mal initial payo↵ proposal from the Proposer’s point of view is therefore
not the equitable 50:50 split but it lies slightly above it. Yet, this is a
slightly more risky choice which might explain why the large majority
of players in the role of the Proposer chose a proposal of five and only
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Figure 4.11: Boxplot of Responders’ final proposals for each first proposal
from the Proposer.
roughly 20 percent went for the on average payo↵-maximizing proposal
of six (see Figure 4.3). Note that while six is the optimal first proposal,
it is associated with an expected final payo↵ of almost exactly five (see
Figure 4.5). Therefore, asking for an amount slightly above the equal
payo↵ (fairness) split was the best way to ensure such an equal split in
the end.
Result 4.6 (The optimal first proposal is just above the equal payo↵ split)
A Proposer’s maximal expected final proposal can be obtained by making
a first proposal of six which leads on average to a slightly better final
proposal than a first proposal of five.
The data from the third party observers give additional valuable in-
sights into why this is the case. For each proposal, the observers were
asked how they would feel if faced with such a proposal. While a proposal
of six did not make the observer happy, it also did not make him angry.
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In fact, it is for proposals of six that the observers think they would feel
most neutral as a Responder.
4.5 Summary and discussion
We have investigated the e↵ect of opening proposals on the outcome of
a negotiation. We designed a double-round alternating-o↵er bargaining
game mimicking the typical start of a negotiation process, with one bar-
gainer making a proposal for a split of a $10, which the other bargainer
can accept or reject to make a counter-proposal. This design allows us to
observe how a bargainer receiving the opening proposal in a negotiation
reacts to it. While the Proposer’s initial proposal should not influence
the final outcome under classic assumptions, we find that it nevertheless
influences the Responder’s behaviour with the Responders’ average final
proposal following an inverse U-shape: The Responders’ final proposal
is maximal for first proposals close to the even payo↵ split and smaller
both for lower and for higher proposals from the Proposer.
In line with the literature on bargaining with reputation (Abreu and
Gul, 2000; Wolitzky, 2012; Embrey et al., 2014), we interpret this pat-
tern as resulting from the informational e↵ect of the first proposals. We
observe that most Proposers ask for the equal payo↵ and that it is a
credible signal of their willingness not to accept any lower amounts as
they set their minimal acceptable proposal also at the equal payo↵. Re-
sponders rightly react to Proposer’s first proposal and in most cases
do not try to make a lower counter-proposal when the first proposal is
equal or below the equal payo↵ split. However, for proposals requesting
more than the equal split, Proposers are mostly willing to accept lower
counter-proposals. Responders accurately perceive that proposals above
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the equal split do not signal their true minimum acceptable amount.
Though, such proposals are not well received by Responders who tend
to make punishing counter-proposals. A survey from external observers
shows that proposals requesting too much are likely to trigger Respon-
ders’ anger and unhappiness at the perception that the Proposer is trying
to secure more than the equal split.
These results indicate that opening proposals can send two di↵erent
signals. Proposals equal or below the equal split are informative about
the Proposers willingness to refuse any lower amount. They may there-
fore signal that the Proposer is from an obstinate type and induce the
Responder to accept the proposal. Proposals requesting more than the
equal split are not credible signals of stubbornness. However, they signal
that the Proposer would be willing to secure more than the equal split
and that he is from an unkind type in terms of social preferences. This
induces the Responder to react with spitefulness to a first proposal re-
questing more than the equal split. The inverse U-curve is the result of
these two e↵ects: Proposals up to the equal split signal an obstinate type
who will likely reject anything below the requested amount and propos-
als above the equal split signal an unkind type which triggers a spiteful
response from the Responder.
Our findings nicely unite two conflicting views in the existing psycho-
logical literature on first proposals in negotiations. On the one side, it is
argued that a high opening proposal results in a higher individual out-
come because it works as an anchor. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have
shown that an initial salient piece of information is used to make sub-
sequent judgements. And because behavioural adjustments tend to be
insu cient, irrespective of the level of the anchor, high opening propos-
als bias the final outcome in the direction of the proposal (Galinsky and
4.5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 79
Mussweiler, 2001). The second view suggests that bargainers initiating
the negotiation with a reasonable proposal achieve the more favourable
outcomes because extremely high opening proposals may sour the atmo-
sphere and endanger the agreement (Rai↵a, 1982; Schweinsberg et al.,
2012). We find support for both hypotheses: The highest bargaining
outcome is not obtained for a first proposal requesting the equal split,
but for a slightly higher request which increases the chances to get the
equal split or above. But proposals with too large requests trigger a
negative reaction from the Responder’s preference over intentions.
A large body of economic research has shown that bargainers’ distri-
butional preferences play a substantial role in their decision to accept
a deal or not. This study adds to this evidence by showing that an-
other type of social preferences, intention-based preferences, also plays a
role. As a consequence, the success or failure of a negotiation does not
only depend on the final proposal on the table but also on the emerging
dynamics of the bargaining process. The intermediary proposals made
during a negotiation can be interpreted by the other bargainer as sug-
gesting either kind and compromising intentions or unkind and tough
ones. And the perception of such intentions can, in turn, influence the
final outcome of the bargaining process. For this reason, as suggested by
the quote of Rai↵a in a classical book on negotiation at the beginning of
this article, it is not the best strategy to always be as tough as possible
in a negotiation.17
The role played by intention-based preferences in bargaining suggests
that striking a good bargain is a balancing act requiring not to be too soft
17The importance of (reciprocal) fairness in bargaining processes echoes the role
it has been found to play in other economic activities such as firms’ price setting
decisions (Kahneman et al., 1986), wage negotiations (Kahneman et al., 1986; Camp-
bell III and Kamlani, 1997), the contribution to public goods (Sugden, 1984) or con-
tract enforcement (Fehr et al., 1997).
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(as it is not often rewarded) and not too tough (as it is often punished).
The field of Negotiation, taught in Business Schools, investigates the
role of soft skills in negotiations: It asks how the interaction process
during the negotiation can be used to enhance the likelihood to reach
a successful agreement. The present research suggests that economists
can meaningfully venture into this aspect of economic behaviour using
inter alia the insights of models of intention-based preferences as well as
signalling game theory.
Chapter 5
Why did he do that? Using
counterfactuals to study the
e↵ect of intentions in
extensive form games
Abstract1
We investigate the role of intentions in two-player two-stage games.
For this purpose, we systematically vary the set of opportunity sets the
first mover can chose from and study how the second mover reacts not
only to opportunities of gains but also of losses created by the choice of
the first mover. We find that the possibility of gains for the second mover
(generosity) and the risk of losses for the first mover (vulnerability) are
important drivers for second mover behaviour. E ciency concerns and
an aversion against violating trust, on the other hand, seem to be far less
important motivations. We also find that second movers compare the
actual choice of the first mover and the alternative choices that would
have been available to him to allocations that consist of equal material
payo↵s.
1This is a joint study with Rudolf Kerschbamer and Lionel Page.
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5.1 Introduction
Other-regarding preferences capture people’s valuation not only for their
own material resources but also for the material payo↵s of other individu-
als as well as the perceived kindness of others’ behaviour. The theoretical
literature on such preferences can be divided into two broad classes: mod-
els with distributional (unconditional) other-regarding preferences and
models with intention-based (conditional) other-regarding preferences.
The distributional preference approach focuses on preferences over
allocations of resources which are driven by distributional properties of
the allocations. The altruism models by Andreoni and Miller (2002)
and by Cox et al. (2007) fall into this category, as well as the models of
inequality-aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), and the model of altruism and spite by Levine (1998).2
The intention-based approach, on the other hand, tries to explain find-
ings neither consistent with self-regarding preferences nor in line with
existing models of distributional concerns by agents’ desire to react to
others’ intentions. In this strand, a second mover’s preferences in a two-
person two-stage game typically become more or less benevolent depend-
ing on the perceived “kindness” of the first mover, and kindness is inter-
preted as generosity.
Two approaches have been proposed to investigate intention-based
preferences theoretically. First, in psychological game theory, a player
evaluates another person’s kindness by forming beliefs on what the other
person believes the consequences of his choice to be (see Rabin, 1993;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, for instance). This necessarily in-
2Another example for a model where decisions are shaped by distributional prop-
erties of the available allocations is the quasi-maximin model by Charness and Rabin
(2002) which adds to material self-interest surplus maximization and the Rawlsian
maximin motive as drivers for behaviour.
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volves second-order beliefs entering the picture. Models incorporating
second-order beliefs provide quite sophisticated theories of reciprocity.
Unfortunately, they often yield multiple equilibria even in quite simple
games and finding these is often not trivial. To avoid such problems, a
second approach, the “revealed intentions” approach, has been proposed
by Cox and Sadiraj (2007) and Cox et al. (2008a). Here, a second mover’s
benevolence in a two-player two-stage game is a function of the relative
kindness or unkindness of the first mover as revealed by the objective
characteristics of his (observed) choices. The first mover’s kindness, in
turn, is determined by the relative generosity of the opportunity set im-
plied by his choice relative to alternative opportunity sets he could have
chosen instead.
The present paper contributes to the revealed intentions approach of
conditional other-regarding preferences by exposing subjects in the lab
to a large number of two-player two-stage games and by studying how
second movers react to the opportunities of gains and losses for each
player generated by the choice of the first mover. Specifically, we expose
subjects in the lab to graphical representations of two-player two-stage
games in which (i) the first mover has to choose between two budget sets,
one containing a single allocation, the other containing several possible
payo↵ allocations; and (ii) the second mover has to choose one of the
available payo↵ allocations in the non-trivial budget set – provided the
first mover has chosen it. By systematically varying the two budget sets
available to the first mover, we investigate how opportunities of gains and
losses for each player influence the second mover’s benevolence towards
the first mover. We find that the possibility of gains for the second mover
(generosity) and the risk of losses for the first mover (vulnerability) are
important drivers for second mover behaviour. On the other hand, the
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possibility to mutually gain and an aversion against violating trust seem
to be far less important motivators. We also find that second movers
compare the actual choice of the first mover and the alternative choices
that would have been available to him to allocations that involve equal
material payo↵s.
Compared to the existing literature on conditional other-regarding
preferences the present paper makes three critical contributions: The
first contribution is the introduction and implementation of an experi-
mental design in which subjects are exposed to geometric representations
of choice sets; this allows for the collection of a large number of observa-
tions per subject which facilitates statistical analysis at the level of the
individual decision-maker. Regarding this contribution, the paper closest
to ours is Fisman et al. (2007). Those authors are interested in uncondi-
tional other-regarding concerns. As a consequence, in their experiments
there is only one player role – that of a dictator – and each dictator is
exposed to 50 di↵erent decision problems, each graphically represented
as a linear budget set from which the subject can choose.3 Since our
main research focus is on conditional other-regarding preferences we ex-
tend this approach by having two player roles – the role of a first mover
and the role of a second mover; the first mover chooses among graphical
representations of opportunity sets while the second mover makes a dic-
tator decision within a given opportunity set similar to the one subjects
are asked to make in Fisman et al. (2007). By varying the set of budget
3This is the baseline experiment in Fisman et al. (2007). In addition to this, the
authors also investigate two alternative treatments: one has linear budget sets as the
baseline but di↵ers from the latter in that each dictator decision has now consequences
for two other persons (i.e. budget sets are three-dimensional in this treatment); the
other has two-dimensional budget sets as the baseline but di↵ers from the latter in
having allocations in the choice set that di↵er only in the material payo↵ of the
recipient, or only in the material payo↵ of the dictator (i.e. budgets are step-shaped
in this treatment).
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sets available to the first mover we are able to investigate how the second
mover’s choice varies with the budget set actually chosen by the first
mover and with the counterfactual alternative opportunity set the first
mover could have chosen instead.
Our second innovation is the experimental investigation of the rela-
tive importance of di↵erent motives for behaviour of players in extensive
form games. In this respect the papers closest to ours are Cox (2004)
and Cox et al. (2007, 2008a, 2014). While Cox (2004) employs a tri-
adic experimental design to disentangle the relative importance of con-
ditional and unconditional other-regarding preferences for behaviour of
second movers in the investment game, the present paper’s main aim is
to disentangle the relative importance of di↵erent basic motives for the
conditional part of players’ other-regarding preferences. Similar to Cox
et al. (2007, 2008a), we suppose that the second mover in a two-player
two-stage game cares about how the opportunity set chosen by the first
mover compares to alternative opportunity sets the first mover could
have chosen instead. However, while these papers compare opportunity
sets in terms of generosity by the first mover towards the second mover
and focus on reciprocity as possible motivation for the second mover, we
look not only at the possible gains for both players but also at possible
losses and look at a broader array of possible motivations. In this latter
respect our paper is similar to Cox et al. (2014). However, in contrast to
that work, we look not only on trust game constellations and we collect
many observations per individual.4 The latter feature of our experimen-
tal design allows us to estimate utility functions at the individual level in
a within-subjects design while Cox et al. (2014) derive their results from
4As will become clear later, the treatments in Cox et al. (2014) are all located in
area 11 of Figure 5.2 while we expose subjects to decision situations in each of the
cells in the figure.
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comparisons of aggregate data across treatments in a between-subjects
design.
Our third innovation is the introduction of a silent social norm –
the equal-split norm – into the revealed intentions approach. In this
respect, our paper is related to previous work on the importance of the
equality norm for economic behaviour – see Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), for
instance. While Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) stress the importance of the equal-split norm for unconditional
other-regarding preferences, we show that this norm is also crucial for our
understanding of conditional other-regarding preferences. Conditional
other-regarding preferences might also be relevant for behaviour in the
experiments reported by Andreoni and Bernheim (2009). However, while
Andreoni and Bernheim are interested in the impact of “audience e↵ects”
on behaviour, we are interested in situations where audience e↵ects are
unlikely to play a role.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents
our experimental design. It is followed by our conceptual framework in
Section 5.3, which consists of a classification of choice characteristics, our
model of other-regarding preferences, and predictions derived from the
model. In Section 5.4, we report our data and estimate the parameters
of our model. Section 5.5 discusses our findings and concludes.
5.2 Experimental design
Our workhorse is a two-stage game with two players. In the first stage,
the first mover (FM, he) makes a binary decision – he chooses between
a fixed allocation (consisting of a payo↵ for himself and a payo↵ for the
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second mover) and an opportunity set containing several possible payo↵
allocations. In the second stage, the second mover (SM, she) chooses a
fixed allocation from the opportunity set whenever the FM has chosen
this option – otherwise she has no move.
Our design can be seen as a (generalization of a) hybrid between an
investment game (a` la Berg et al., 1995) where both players have rich
choice sets (provided the FM has made a “trusting choice”) and a mini
trust game (a` la McCabe et al., 2003) where both players have only a
binary choice to make (provided the FM has made the “trusting choice”):
In our design, the FM has a binary choice to make (it can be interpreted
as a choice between transferring a given amount s to the SM and not
transferring anything) while the SM has a richer choice set (in our design
a choice between seven allocations provided the FM has transferred s).5
We are interested in how the SM reacts to the opportunities of gains
and losses for both players generated by the FM’s choice. To investigate
this question we expose subjects to a large number of graphical represen-
tations of choice situations. Across choice situations, we systematically
vary the set of opportunity sets available to the FM in the first stage. By
doing so, we can investigate how a wide range of “intentions” revealed
by the FM’s choice a↵ect the SM’s benevolence in the second stage.
The experiment was conducted by pencil and paper with students
from a large Australian university. The subjects in the experiment were
recruited via the ORSEE software by Greiner (2015). After subjects read
the instructions (they are contained in Appendix B), they were read aloud
by an experimenter. Subjects answered a couple of control questions to
5Some of the games investigated by Charness and Rabin (2002) constitute special
cases of our design. They found in these cases that the SM often reciprocated to
the kindness of the FM (as revealed by his choice). Our design systematically varies
the set of choices o↵ered to the FM to investigate other potential factors driving the
behaviour of the SM.
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assure their understanding of the task and the payo↵ procedure. Then,
each participant was randomly assigned a role, either the role of a FM
or the role of a SM. The randomization was such that in each session we
had the same number of FMs and SMs and the participants kept their
roles during the entire session.
Subjects in both roles were faced with 60 graphical representations of
sets of opportunity sets. Each set of opportunity sets consisted of two
options, a fixed payo↵ allocation and the opportunity to let the SM make
a decision among a set of seven possible payo↵ allocations threaded on
a downward sloping straight line. In the following we call the former
option the point and the latter the line. If the FM chooses the point,
the SM has no further move while for the line, she has to decide among
the allocations in the non-trivial opportunity set. To obtain all data
from SMs we used the strategy method: Each SM was asked to make a
decision as if the paired FM had assigned her the opportunity to make
the choice between the seven payo↵ allocations on the line.6
Figure 5.1 shows three typical examples of a decision situation. The
task of the FM (Player 1) is to check one of the boxes below the figure
indicating whether he prefers option A, the point, or option B, the line
of hollow dots. The task of the SM (Player 2) is to indicate her choice
by circling her preferred allocation on the line of hollow dots. The 60
6The strategy method o↵ers the benefit of making the responses in all decision
nodes observable. While there are potential e↵ects of using the strategy method
instead of the direct-response method (such as a reduction in incentives or a “hot”
vs. “cold” e↵ect that might a↵ect the participants’ choices – see Zizzo, 2010, for a
discussion), the experimental literature reports no case in which a treatment e↵ect
was observed with the strategy method and not with the direct-response method
(see Brandts and Charness, 2011). We further argue that while it is likely that the
strategy method has an impact on the level of the reaction strength of SMs, it is
unlikely to have a systematic impact on their response to changes in the dimensions
we are mainly interested in. Our analysis will focus on changes in the pro-sociality
of responses rather than on the level of pro-social behaviour and thus the strategy
method should most likely be innocuous (Charness and Levine, 2007).
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decision tasks di↵ered in the positions of the available opportunity sets
and the positions were allocated randomly to pairs of subjects. The
randomization ensured that lines stayed in the positive orthant and the
location of the point was varied around the lines as depicted in Figure
5.2.7
Figure 5.1: Typical decision tasks.
7The randomization also limits concerns for an indirect experimenter e↵ect
whereby participants observing systematic variations of a point location relative to
the same line would infer that their behaviour is expected to change as a consequence
of the relative position of the point.
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In each session, one subject in the role of the FM and one subject
in the role of the SM received exactly identical experimental question-
naires – that is, two experimental subjects in each session faced exactly
the same 60 decision tasks. At the end of the experiment, we paired
the subjects who received identical questionnaires. In each pair, we then
picked randomly one of the 60 decision tasks, and paid the participants
the payo↵s corresponding to their joint choices in this situation. Overall,
sessions lasted around one hour and participants earned $16.5, on aver-
age, plus a show up fee of $5. All monetary amounts are in Australian
dollars.
5.3 Conceptual framework
5.3.1 Second mover’s social preferences
In line with the revealed intentions approach, we suppose that the SM
cares about how the opportunity set chosen by the FM compares to the
alternative opportunity set the FM could have chosen instead. Similar
to Cox et al. (2008a), we look at the possible gains for both players
resulting from the FM’s choice. Similar to the companion paper Cox
et al. (2014), we extend this approach by also looking at the possible
losses for both players. Compared to Cox et al. (2014), we study a
richer array of possible motivations covering all constellations displayed
in Figure 5.2.8 We discuss the features of the areas in this figure in the
8The Cox et al. (2014) design comprises five treatments implemented between
subjects. In all these treatments, the SM decides how to divide 60 experimental
currency units between herself and the FM in case the FM sends her his endowment
of 15. The treatments di↵er in what happens in case the FM decides not to send the
endowment to the SM, and whether the FM can make such a decision at all. Thus, in
the language of the current paper, the Cox et al. (2014) design keeps the location of
the line constant and varies the location of the point and whether a point is available
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next subsection.
To allow for errors in decision-making, we adopt a random utility
approach. In our experiment, in each of the 60 decision tasks, the SM’s
opportunity set consists of seven discrete options. We therefore use a
random utility discrete choice framework – see Train (2009) for details.
Experimental data from dictator games suggests that the egocentric
altruism model by Cox et al. (2007) or a similar constant elasticity of sub-
stitution utility function represents revealed preferences quite well (see
Andreoni and Miller, 2002, or Cox and Sadiraj, 2012, for instance). To
incorporate reciprocal motivations, Cox et al. (2007) extend the egocen-
tric altruism model by allowing an agent’s willingness to pay for increases
or decreases in the payo↵ of another person (hereafter “benevolence”) to
depend on this other person’s prior actions (on whether the other person
was kind or harmful to the agent). Specifically, Cox et al. (2007) propose
a model where a subject’s benevolence depends on his emotional state,
which in turn depends on the other player’s choice. For the two-player
case the proposed utility function reads:
u(xs, xo) =
8>>><>>>:
(x↵s + ✓x
↵
o )↵
 1 ↵ 2 ( 1, 0) [ (0, 1],
xsx✓o ↵ = 0,
where xs is the subject’s own material payo↵ which contributes positively
to his utility, xo is the payo↵ of the other subject and ↵ and ✓ are pa-
rameters, both supposed to be (weakly) smaller than one. The convexity
is captured by ↵ through the elasticity of substitution   = 1/(1   ↵).
The parameter ✓ is called the agent’s “emotional state” and the e↵ect
at all. In terms of Figure 5.2, the Cox et al. design only investigates constellations
in area 11 while we expose subjects to decision situations in each of the cells in the
figure.
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of the other’s payo↵ on utility depends on the sign of ✓. A positive ✓
means that the individual under consideration cares positively for the
other agent in the sense that he is willing to give up money to increase
the other’s payo↵. The agent’s willingness to pay – which is the amount
of own income the agent is willing to give up in order to increase the
other agent’s income by one unit – is given by:9
WTP =
 u/ xo
 u/ xs
= ✓
✓
xs
xo
◆1 ↵
.
As is easily seen, the larger ✓, the higher the WTP. Note further that
↵ measures the importance of relative payo↵s. For positive ✓, ↵ = 1
yields linear preferences implying that the WTP is independent of relative
payo↵s, while ↵ < 1 yields convex preferences implying that the WTP
and with it the agent’s benevolence towards the other agent increases as
the other’s relative payo↵ decreases. And the more convex the preferences
(the smaller ↵), the higher is the sensitivity of the WTP to changes in
the relative payo↵ (xo/xs).
Here we adopt this functional form and – in line with Cox et al. (2007)
– we capture intention-based benevolence from the SM by allowing her
emotional state ✓ to depend on the FM’s previous choice. Specifically,
we allow a SM’s ✓ to depend on the observable characteristics as defined
in the next subsection:
✓ = ✓(observable characteristics of FM’ actual choice).
9For interpretation purposes, it is easier to talk about the willingness to pay
(WTP) than the more more familiar marginal rate of substitution (MRS), which is
given by: MRS =  u/ xs u/ xo = ✓
 1
⇣
xo
xs
⌘1 ↵
= 1/WTP .
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Figure 5.2: Observable characteristics of the FM’s choice when choosing
the point for di↵erent positions of the point relative to the line.
5.3.2 Classification of first mover’s choices, attributed
intentions and their impact on second mover’s
behaviour
The classification in Figure 5.2 is based on the gain/loss principle applied
to both players, i.e. whether the opportunity set that was chosen by the
FM (the line) comes with an actual or potential increase or decrease
of each player’s payo↵ compared to the not chosen opportunity set (the
point). Our first hypothesis is motivated by the experimental evidence
indicating that reciprocity is an important driver for behaviour in games.
Reciprocation entails responding to positive perceived kindness with pos-
itive kindness, and to negative perceived kindness with negative kindness
(Rabin, 1993; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004). In a material context, kindness is usually equated with generosity.
To formulate a hypothesis regarding the impact of positive reciprocity on
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the behaviour of the SM, we therefore characterize the choice of the FM
in terms of the implied generosity towards the SM. Here, we distinguish
between three levels of generosity when the FM chooses the line over the
point :
Definition 5.1 Let the FM choose the actual opportunity set for the SM
from a collection consisting of a point and a line. Suppose the FM chooses
the line.
a) If the chosen opportunity set (the line) only includes allocations
which decrease the SM’s payo↵ compared to the not chosen oppor-
tunity set (the point), the FM’s choice (of the line) is said to imply
a sure loss for the SM.
b) If the line includes allocations for which the SM’s payo↵ is (weakly)
higher, and allocations for which the SM’s payo↵ is (weakly) lower
compared to her payo↵ in the point, the FM’s choice of the line is
said to imply a potential gain for the SM.
c) If the line only includes allocations which increase the SM’s payo↵
compared to the point, the FM’s choice of the line is said to imply
a sure gain for the SM.
Using this classification of FM behaviour, it seems plausible that choices
of the FM that imply a sure gain for the SM are interpreted by the SM
as more generous than choices that imply a potential gain for the SM,
and that choices that imply a potential gain for the SM are interpreted
as more generous than choices that imply a sure loss for the SM. This
consideration yields our first prediction:
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Hypothesis 5.1 (Impact of Generosity)
The SM’s benevolence increases with the level of generosity implied by the
choice of the FM. That is, the SM becomes progressively more benevolent
when we move from situations where the FM’s choice implies a sure loss
for the SM, to situations where the FM’s choice implies a potential gain
for the SM, to situations where the FM’s choice implies a sure gain for
the SM.
Our second hypothesis is based on experimental evidence indicating
that the vulnerability of the FM is an important driver for the behaviour
of the SM in the investment game (see Cox et al., 2014, for an investiga-
tion of the role of vulnerability in the investment game). Vulnerability
in our context means that the FM, by choosing the line, accepts the risk
of losing money depending on the SM’s choice. To formulate a hypothe-
sis regarding the impact of vulnerability on the behaviour of the SM we
therefore characterize the choice of the FM in terms of the implied risk
for the FM. Here, we distinguish between three levels of vulnerability of
the FM when he chooses the line over the point :
Definition 5.2 Let the FM choose the actual opportunity set for the SM
from a collection consisting of a point and a line. Suppose the FM chooses
the line.
a) If the chosen opportunity set (the line) assures the FM a payo↵
increase compared to the not chosen opportunity set (the point),
the FM’s choice is said to imply a sure gain for the FM.
b) If the line includes allocations for which the FM’s payo↵ is (weakly)
higher, and allocations for which the FM’s payo↵ is (weakly) lower
compared to the payo↵ in the point, the FM’s choice of the line is
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said to imply a potential gain for the FM. In that case, we also
say that the FM’s choice of the line makes him vulnerable.
c) If the line only includes allocations which decrease the FM’s payo↵
compared to the point, the FM’s choice of the line is said to imply
a sure loss for the FM. In this case, we also say that the FM’s
choice of the line corresponds to a sacrifice.
Using this classification of FM behaviour, we now posit two hypothe-
ses. Hypothesis 5.2a predicts that choices by the FM that make him
vulnerable lead to benevolent behaviour by the SM:
Hypothesis 5.2a (Impact of Vulnerability)
The SM’s benevolence increases if the FM’s choice of the line makes him
vulnerable. Specifically, the SM becomes more benevolent when we move
from situations where the FM’s choice of the line implies a sure gain for
the FM, to situations where the FM’s choice of the line implies a potential
gain for the FM.
We also suspect that FM choices that correspond to a sacrifice influence
the behaviour of the SM. This is the content of Hypothesis 5.2b. Note
that Hypothesis 5.2b does not make any prediction on how the e↵ect of
sacrifice compares to the e↵ect of vulnerability.
Hypothesis 5.2b (Impact of Sacrifice)
The SM’s benevolence increases if the FM’s choice of the line implies a
sacrifice for him. Specifically, the SM becomes more benevolent when we
move from situations where the FM’s choice of the line implies a sure
gain for the FM, to situations where the FM’s choice of the line implies
a sure loss for the FM.
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Our next hypothesis is based on the idea that SMs may reward FM
choices that have the potential to increase the payo↵s of both parties.
This conjecture is motivated by the experimental evidence indicating
that e ciency concerns are important for behaviour in the lab and in the
field (see Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr et al., 2006, among others).
To formulate a hypothesis regarding the impact of concerns related to
Pareto-e ciency on SM behaviour, we characterize FM choices according
to the payo↵ consequences for both players as follows:
Definition 5.3 Let the FM choose the actual opportunity set for the
SM from a collection consisting of a point and a line. Suppose the FM
chooses the line. If the line includes allocations which represent a Pareto
improvement relative to the point, the FM’s choice of the line is said to
allow for a deal.
We then state:
Hypothesis 5.3 (Impact of Deal)
The SM’s benevolence increases if the FM’s choice of the line allows
for a deal. That is, the SM becomes more benevolent when we move
from situations where the choice of the FM does not allow for a Pareto
improvement to situations that allow for a mutual improvement.
Our next (and last) hypothesis is motivated by the large experimen-
tal literature on trust and trustworthiness. In experimental economics,
the most frequently used instrument to study the importance of those
concepts for behaviour is the investment game (Berg et al., 1995) and its
close relative, the binary trust game (studied by McCabe et al., 2003, for
instance). There is by now an impressing amount of evidence indicating
that SM behaviour in those games is neither consistent with own-money
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maximization nor in line with purely distributional concerns (see Cox,
2004; Ashraf et al., 2006; Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2007; Cox et al.,
2008b, 2014, among others). Less clear is the answer to the question what
is really driving SM behaviour in this class of games. Here, we address
this question indirectly by investigating whether FM behaviour charac-
terized by the combination of characteristics defining a trusting move
in the investment game induces more benevolence in the SM than be-
haviour characterized by other combinations. To formulate a hypothesis
regarding the impact of trusting acts by the first mover on the behaviour
of the second mover we define:
Definition 5.4 Let the FM choose the actual opportunity set for the
SM from a collection consisting of a point and a line. Suppose the FM
chooses the line. If the choice of the line makes the FM vulnerable and
if in addition it allows for a deal, then the FM’s choice is said to reveal
trust.
We then hypothesize that choices revealing trust have the power to trigger
benevolence in the SM:
Hypothesis 5.4 (Impact of Trust)
The SM’s benevolence increases if the FM’s choice of the line reveals
trust. That is, the SM becomes more benevolent when we move from
situations where the choice of the FM does not reveal trust to situations
where the choice of the FM reveals trust.
5.4 Data and results
We first provide an overview of the data collected in our experiment and
a descriptive analysis. We then proceed with the parameter estimation
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of our model.
5.4.1 Data
We carried out 14 experimental sessions involving 190 subjects in total.
Since our research focus lies on the conditional part of an individual’s
social preferences, we are only interested in the data collected from ex-
perimental SMs. Since we collected the data via the strategy method,
our data set consists of 60 decisions for each of the 95 SMs.
Looking at the individual data, we find that 37 subjects (that is 38.9
percent of our SM population) behaved in a perfectly selfish way by
choosing the lowermost point on the line in each of the 60 decision situ-
ations. Hence, ✓ = 0 and u(xs, xo) = xs for almost 40 percent of our SM
sample. This compares to previous studies (Andreoni and Miller, 2002;
Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000), where typically completely selfish behaviour
was reported for between 20 and 50 percent of individuals.
Nevertheless, the majority of our subjects (61.1 percent) behaved in a
way that is inconsistent with the only self-interested rationalist assump-
tion by not choosing the selfish allocation in 57.6 percent. We therefore
observe that many participants exhibit other-regarding preferences of
some kind.
For our further analyses, we exclude the purely selfishly acting SMs
from our data sample and focus on the 58 participants that reveal some
form of other-regarding behaviour.10 The overall distribution of the
choices of those SMs is presented in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1.11 In Table
5.1, we see that the uppermost four points on the line (points 4-7) are
10Since ✓ = 0 for purely selfishly acting individuals, the behaviour of subjects in
this subsample is not informative about how intentions influence social preferences.
11The experiment was conducted by pen and paper and a small number of answers
(N=17) were missing in the questionnaires. This leaves a dataset of 3463 observations.
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chosen in only 27.6 percent of decision tasks. This is not really surprising
as point 7 is the most benevolent decision a SM can make, and point 1
is the least benevolent one. Thus, the subjects in the subsample under
consideration – although not purely selfish – have a tendency to care
more for their own than for the other’s payo↵.
Figure 5.3: SMs’ choice distribu-
tion.
Choice Freq. % Cum. %
7 (Most Altruistic) 106 3.1 3.1
6 177 5.1 8.2
5 252 7.3 15.4
4 422 12.2 27.6
3 498 14.4 42.0
2 540 15.6 57.6
1 (Least Altruistic) 1468 42.4 100.0
Total 3463 100.0
Table 5.1: Summary of participants’
choices.
5.4.2 Descriptive analysis
In a first step, we analyse whether the characteristics defined in Section
5.3 influence SM behaviour. For this purpose, we define a set of binary
variables reflecting Definitions 5.1 and 5.2 introduced in Subsection 5.3.2:
“sure gain for the FM” (FMSG), “potential gain for the FM” (FMPG)
and “sure loss for the FM” (FMSL), as well as “sure gain for the SM”
(SMSG), “potential gain for the SM” (SMPG) and “sure loss for the SM”
(SMSL). In addition, we analyse the e↵ect of the dummy “Deal”, which
is one if the choice of the line allows for a deal according to Definition
5.3 and zero otherwise; we also analyse the e↵ect of the dummy “Trust”,
which is one if the choice of the line reveals trust according to Definition
5.4 and zero otherwise. Note that the shaded areas in Figure 5.2 cover
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situations where the choice of the line allows for a deal, while area 111
contains all situations where the choice of the line reveals trust.
Our first observation supports our main hypothesis that the choice of
the SM on the line depends significantly on the nature of the counter-
factual choice the FM could have made: Figure 5.4 displays the mean
SM choice as a function of the characteristics of the FM’s choice. The
significance of the di↵erence in means is indicated using t-tests (from
regressions on dummies using cluster-robust variance to control for the
non-independence of observed choices within participants). The data dis-
played in Figure 5.4 suggests that the choices of SMs become more benev-
olent if the level of generosity increases from SMSL to SMPG (p = 0.072)
and from SMPG to SMSG (p = 0.010). SMs seem also to become more
benevolent if the FM’s choice implies vulnerability – moving from FMSG
to FMPG (p < 0.001) – or sacrifice – moving from FMSG to FMSL
(p = 0.012). Interestingly, the mean choice of SMs is not significantly
di↵erent between situations characterized by FMPG and situations char-
acterized by FMSL (p = 0.437). Turning to Deal and Trust, we find that
SMs are relatively more benevolent when the choice of the FM allows for
a Deal (p = 0.036) or reveals Trust (p = 0.027). It should be noted
however that these latter observations do not imply that SMs react to
Deal and Trust per se; they might rather react to the FM’s generosity
and vulnerability which are both present in situations of Deal and Trust.
The e↵ect of the counterfactual choice the FM could have made on
SM behaviour can also be seen in Figure 5.5. In this figure the cu-
mulative distribution functions (CDFs) of SM choices on the line are
represented depending on the level of generosity, the level of vulnerabil-
ity, and on whether the choice of the FM allows for a Deal or reveals
Trust. A first-order stochastically dominating CDF reflects more benev-
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Figure 5.4: SM’s benevolence as a function of the characteristics of the
FM’s choice. The figure shows the average choice of the SMs on the line.
Higher values indicate more benevolence.
olence. It can be seen that the CDF for choices exhibiting SMSG first-
order stochastically dominates the CDF for choices featuring SMPG (KS
test: p = 0.025), which in turn first-order stochastically dominates the
CDF for FM choices featuring SMSL (KS test: p = 0.005). This finding
strengthens the previous result that a more generous choice by the FM
triggers a more benevolent response by the SM, and therewith provides
further support for Hypothesis 5.1. We also find support for Hypothesis
5.2. The CDF of choices featuring FMPG first-order stochastically dom-
inates the CDF of choices with FMSG (KS test: p = 0.003), which is
clearly in line with Hypothesis 5.2a. It is also the case that the CDF of
choices featuring FMSL first-order stochastically dominates the CDF of
choices with FMSG (KS test: p = 0.034), which is in line with Hypoth-
esis 5.2b. Comparing the distribution of choices featuring FMPG to the
distribution of choices featuring FMSL, we see that they di↵er (KS test:
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Figure 5.5: Cumulative distributions of the SM’s choice by characteristics
of the FM’s choice.
p = 0.001) although the mean choice is statistically indistinguishable be-
tween the two situations. Specifically, the distribution of SMs’ responses
to FMSL features both more most altruistic choices and more least al-
truistic choices. In the second row of Figure 5.5, we see that the CDF
of choices that allow for a Deal first-order stochastically dominates the
CDF of choices without a Deal available (KS test: p < 0.001). However,
as previously stated this finding might be confounded by the fact that if
the FM’s choice allows for a Deal, it necessarily also entails either SMSG
or SMPG which might be responsible for the e↵ect on SM’s benevolence.
Finally, we also find some support for Hypothesis 5.4: The CDF of SM
choices featuring Trust almost first-order stochastically dominates the
CDF of SM choices not revealing Trust (KS test: p < 0.001). Again,
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this finding might be confounded by the fact that the SM may simply
react to the generosity and vulnerability which are present in the trust
situation.
5.4.3 Disentangling revealed intentions
The structural model described in Subsection 5.3.1 makes it possible
to disentangle the e↵ects of di↵erent characteristics of the FM’s choice
on the SM’s behaviour. Following the random utility approach (Train,
2009), we assume that the utility of SM i for payo↵ pair x = (xs, xo) in
a choice situation featuring the characteristic combination j includes a
stochastic term which represents the unobserved part of utility (including
quixotic variations in utility due to cognitive limitations when assessing
the options):
vij(x) =
 
x↵SM + ✓
i
jx
↵
FM
 
↵ 1 + ", (5.1)
with
✓ij = ✓00 + ✓
i+
+ FMPG j2{10,110,111,12} +  FMSL j2{20,21,22}+
+ SMPG j2{01,110,111,21} +  SMSG j2{02,12,22}+
+ D j2{01,02,111,12} +  T j=111.
(5.2)
Here, ✓ij is the emotional state of SM i when she observes that the FM has
chosen the line in a choice situation where the alternative choice he could
have made (that is, the point) is located in area j 2 {01, 02, 10, 110, 111,
12, 20, 21, 22} as defined in Figure 5.2. This formulation assumes that
“motives are additive” in the sense that adding a given motive has the
same e↵ect independently of whether other motives are present or absent.
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We will relax this assumption later on. Note also that this formulation
allows for individual heterogeneity in social preferences with the inclusion
of an individual specific term ✓i. We follow a standard approach in
discrete choice modeling (Train, 2009) in assuming "; Gumbel( ). This
implies that the choice model is a non-linear multinomial logit model
with the probability that a given allocation x0 is chosen among a set X
of possible allocations given by:
P(x0) = exp( v(x
0))P
x2X exp( v(x))
,
where   is the subjects’ precision parameter.12 We estimate the parame-
ters ↵ and ✓ij by maximum-likelihood. Each participant provided 60 data
points, we therefore cluster the standard error by participant.
Table 5.2 reports the estimates of our basic model. As expected ↵ < 1
which indicates convex preferences. In the sequel, we focus our discussion
on the parameter ✓j since this is the parameter related to our research
question. The impact of the characteristics of the FM’s choice on this
parameter is measured in comparison to the reference categories FMSG
and SMSL. These reference categories are arguably associated with the
lowest level of benevolence by the SM.
The parameter estimates in Table 5.2 suggest that – starting from the
reference categories – an increase in the level of generosity from the FM
towards the SM, as well as an increase in the FM’s vulnerability indeed
have a significant positive impact on the SM’s altruism coe cient ✓ and
thus on her benevolence. Regarding generosity, we find that a sure gain
for the SM (SMSG) has a significant e↵ect on the SM’s benevolence while
a sheer potential gain (SMPG) does not have a significant e↵ect. This
12This is called the “Luce model” (see Wilcox, 2008).
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Model (N=3463): vij(x) =
⇣
x↵SM + ✓
i
jx
↵
FM
⌘
↵ 1 + "
Parameter Estimate Robust SE
↵ 0.282 0.170
✓ FM payo↵s
FMSL 0.188* 0.080
FMPG 0.190** 0.071
FMSG (ref)
SM payo↵s
SMSG 0.206* 0.098
SMPG 0.042 0.038
SMSL (ref)
Deal 0.001 0.066
Trust 0.027 0.075
  4.078** 1.391
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 5.2: Estimation of ↵ and ✓ij by maximum-likelihood taking FMSG
and SMSL as reference categories.
result provides partial support for Hypothesis 5.1:
Result 5.1 (Impact of Generosity)
The SM’s altruism coe cient ✓ and therewith her benevolence increases
with the level of generosity implied by the choice of the FM. However, the
e↵ect is significant only for situations where the FM’s choice implies a
sure gain for the SM.
Turning to the e↵ect of vulnerability, we see that FMPG raises ✓ sig-
nificantly. This result confirms the finding of the descriptive analysis
and is in line with Hypothesis 5.2a. In line with Hypothesis 5.2b, we
also find a positive e↵ect of FMSL on the SM’s benevolence. Compar-
ing the two, we see that the estimated coe cients of FMSL and FMPG
are roughly equal. Thus, acts that make the FM vulnerable and acts
that imply a sure loss for the FM seem to have a similar impact on the
intention-perception of the SM as revealed by her behaviour.
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Result 5.2 (Impact of Vulnerability and Sacrifice)
The SM’s altruism coe cient ✓ and therewith her benevolence increases
if the choice of the FM entails vulnerability (potential loss for the FM) or
sacrifice (sure loss for the FM). Comparing the two e↵ects, we see that
they are similar in size.
Investigating the question whether the behaviour of SMs becomes
more benevolent when the choice by the FM allows for a Pareto im-
provement, we observe that Deal availability has no significant e↵ect on
the benevolence of the SM. Hypothesis 5.3 is therefore not supported
by the data. The previously observed shift in the CDF of SM’s choices
(Figure 5.5) seems indeed to be driven by generosity and/or vulnerability.
Result 5.3 (Impact of Deal)
The availability of a deal by itself has no e↵ect on the second mover’s
altruism coe cient ✓ and therewith on her benevolence.
Similarly, we do not observe any e↵ect of trust in itself when the
potential gains and losses of the two players are controlled for. Hypothesis
5.4 is therefore not supported by the data either. Here again, the shift in
the CDF of the SM’s choices between situations where the FM’s choice
reveals trust and situations where it does not (Figure 5.5) seems to be
driven by the e↵ects of generosity and vulnerability without an additional
impact of trust in itself.
Result 5.4 (Impact of Trust)
The expression of trust has no e↵ect in itself on the SM’s altruism coef-
ficient ✓ and therewith on her benevolence.
As previously mentioned our estimation of Model (5.1) assumes that
motives are additive in Equation (5.2). We now relax the additivity
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assumption and allow for possible interactions between the FM’s vul-
nerability and his generosity towards the SM. Specifically, we define a
dummy for each area displayed in Figure 5.2 and estimate the model:
✓ij = ✓00 + ✓
i +
X
k
 k j=k,
with j, k 2 {01, 02, 10, 110, 111, 12, 20, 21, 22}.
Our chosen reference category is FMSG ⇥ SMSL (area 00 in Figure
5.2). The estimation results of this model are presented in Figure 5.6.
By and large the results confirm our earlier findings. We observe that the
SM’s benevolence is high in situations where the FM’s choice makes him
vulnerable as long as vulnerability comes together with either a potential
or a sure gain for the SM (SMSG, SMPG). The SM’s benevolence is also
always significantly positive for situations where the FM’s choice implies
a sacrifice, and, as long as the choice implies either a potential or a sure
gain for the SM, there is no significant di↵erence between the reaction
of the SM to vulnerability and her reaction to sacrifice (no significant
di↵erences between  12 and  22 and between  110,  111 and  21). When
the FM’s choice implies a sure loss for the SM (SMSL), the SM’s benev-
olence increases with the opportunities of losses for the FM: FMPG has
a positive but insignificant e↵ect and FMSL has a positive and signifi-
cant e↵ect. This latter e↵ect seems rather strange at first sight and it is
investigated further in the next subsection.
While SMPG and FMPG in isolation are not enough to influence the
benevolence of the SM ( 01 and  10 are not significantly di↵erent from
zero), it is noteworthy that their joint presence (in  110 and in  111)
does. It therefore looks like there is an interaction between the e↵ect of
generosity and vulnerability. Increasing the level of generosity to SMSG
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Material Payo↵
Second Mover
Material Payo↵
First Mover
Sure Gain
(SMSG)
Potential Gain
(SMPG)
Sure Loss
(SMSL)
Sure Gain
(FMSG)
Potential Gain
(FMPG)
Sure Loss
(FMSL)
 02 = 0.205
(0.136)
 12 = 0.369**
(0.127)
 22 = 0.305*
(0.151)
 01 =  0.012
(0.086)
 111 = 0.225*
(0.098)
 110 = 0.225*
(0.103)
 21 = 0.151
(0.092)
Reference
Category
 10 = 0.079
(0.086)
 20 = 0.311**
(0.116)
Figure 5.6: Maximum-likelihood estimation results of ✓ij. The chosen ref-
erence category is FMSG⇥SMSL. Robust standard errors are displayed
in brackets. Significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
enhances the SM’s benevolence even further ( 12 is significantly larger
than  111 and  110), assuring the highest level of benevolence by the SM
observed in our experiment.
Turning to Hypotheses 5.3 and 5.4 about the impact of Deal and
Trust on the behaviour of the SM, we see that the coe cients  110 and
 111 do not significantly di↵er from each other. Area 111 corresponds to
FM choices revealing Trust and it di↵ers from area 110 by the presence
of a Deal. Thus, the relatively high level of benevolence from the SM
observed in the area 111 seems solely be driven by the presence of FMPG
and SMPG. This finding supports and strengthens our previously stated
Results 5.3 and 5.4.
Overall, we conclude that relaxing the assumption that motives are
additive does not change our previous results qualitatively: Positive reci-
procity – whereby a generous choice by the FM triggers a benevolent re-
5.4. DATA AND RESULTS 111
sponse by the SM – and vulnerability-responsiveness – whereby a choice
by the FM that exposes him to the risk of losing money triggers a benev-
olent response – seem to be important drivers for SM behaviour, while
deal-responsiveness – where the SM reacts positively to choices that cre-
ate the possibility of mutual improvements – or trust-responsiveness –
where the SM rewards acts that reveal trust – seem behaviourally less
relevant.
5.4.4 Interpreting intentions from observed actions
and salient social norms
In the precedent analyses, we have investigated whether a SM’s benev-
olence is a↵ected by the objective characteristics of the FM’s choice –
specifically by how his actual choice compares to the counterfactual alter-
native choice he could have made instead. By doing so, we have extended
the revealed intention approach and looked at the possible gains and
losses created by the FM’s decision. Here, we argue that this approach
can be extended further by incorporating the possible role of pre-existing
social norms in the analysis. Social norms are by definition shared and
common knowledge (Krupka and Weber, 2013). In games where allo-
cations of resources are made between players, prevailing social norms
may point to a “fair” allocation, that is one which would be considered
as such by the di↵erent players. In an experiment where subjects en-
ter the laboratory as equals, where they are allocated randomly to their
roles, and where the money to be divided is a windfall provided by the
experimenter, it seems plausible that fairness norms point to an equal
split. Even though equal sharing might not be the only norm prevalent
in the population of experimental subjects (e.g. asymmetry of roles may
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be considered as giving di↵erent entitlements to di↵erent players), it is
likely to be the most prevalent norm among all possible splits.
A look at the choices of experimental SMs suggests that the equality
norm has indeed an impact. Figure 5.7 shows by how much the SM’s
choice di↵ers from the least unequal allocation (the feasible allocation on
the line that is closest to the 45 degree line, henceforth LUA).13 Positive
(negative) entries in Figure 5.7 correspond to choices onthe line where
the SM earns more (less) in material terms than the associated FM. As
can be seen from the figure, there is a large concentration of SM choices
at the LUA (more than a third of all choices by experimental SMs are
at the LUA) and there is a pronounced discontinuity in the distribution
of choices immediately to the left of the LUA, arguably because there is
no social norm that dictates to give more than the “fair share” (implied
by the LUA) to the other player. It therefore seems that the 50-50 split
indeed plays a role for SM behaviour.
We next ask whether the interpretation of the FM’s intentions by
the SM is influenced by this norm. To address this question, we extend
the revealed intentions approach by investigating whether choices are
a↵ected by the fairness of the counterfactual choice, the point, taking
equality as the yardstick. Specifically, we estimate ✓ij, using Equation
(5.1), separately for situations where the point is above the 45 degree
line and situations where it is below that line. Table 5.3 displays the
associated parameters. It shows that in both subsamples coe cients have
the same sign as reported for the aggregate data, but the parameters are
13If the line crosses the 45 degree line and if the crossing point is one of the seven
feasible allocations onthe line, then this allocation is the LUA; if the line crosses the
45 degree line but the crossing point is not a feasible allocation then the feasible
allocation on the line that is closest to the 45 degree line is the LUA; and ifthe line
does not cross the 45 degree line then the feasible allocation onthe line that is closest
to the 45 degree line is the LUA.
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Figure 5.7: Distribution of the distance between the actual choice of
the SM and the least unequal allocation on the line. Positive numbers
represent unequal choices in favour of the SM, negative numbers represent
unequal choices in favour of the FM.
smaller and not significant when the point is an allocation that favours
the FM, while the coe cients of FMSL and SMSL are relatively large
and significant when the point is to the advantage of the SM. Overall,
this result suggests that intentions are read in relation to the 50-50 social
norm. The SM reacts more positively to the generosity of the FM and to
his vulnerability when the FM chooses the line in a situation where the
point is an allocation characterized by inequality in favour of the SM.
In such situations, by being generous, the FM is o↵ering potential gains
to the SM even though the SM was already advantaged by the initial
allocation. By making himself vulnerable, the FM gives the possibility
to the SM to make the FM worse o↵, even though the FM was already
disadvantaged by the initial allocation. Therefore, one interpretation
is that in such situations the generosity from the FM is perceived as
particularly kind and the choice to make himself vulnerable particularly
noticeable.
Turning to the result that the SM is relatively benevolent in the
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Model: vij(x) =
⇣
x↵SM + ✓
i
jx
↵
FM
⌘
↵ 1 + "
Start favours FM Start favours SM
Parameter Estimate Robust SE Estimate Robust SE
↵ 0.681⇤ 0.293 -0.135 0.199
✓ FM payo↵s
FMSL 0.032 0.089 0.181⇤ 0.092
FMPG 0.070 0.110 0.134 0.082
FMSG (ref)
SM payo↵s
SMSG 0.074 0.100 0.275⇤ 0.118
SMPG 0.021 0.045 0.065 .049
SMSL (ref)
Deal -0.004 0.038 -0.054 0.092
Trust 0.034 0.052 -0.058 0.086
  3.350⇤⇤ 0.893 12.245⇤ 5.934
N 1832 1631
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 5.3: Estimation of ↵ and ✓ij by maximum-likelihood for situations
where the point is above the 45 degree line and situations where it is
below that line, taking FMSG and SMSL as reference categories.
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FMSL ⇥ SMSL situation, we observe that the choice of the line by the
FM in this constellation can potentially be interpreted as an attempt to
avoid a split that is unfavourable to him, even if this leads to a loss in
the payo↵s of both players. To test whether this interpretation is consis-
tent with the data, we re-estimate the Model (5.1) allowing for di↵erent
values of the parameter ✓ in FMSL ⇥ SMSL situations above and below
the diagonal. Table 5.4 displays the results. Column (1) allows ✓ to de-
pend on a dummy PointFM taking a value 1 if the point favours the FM
and zero if it favours the SM (we do not consider situations of equality).
We find that the benevolence is overall larger for situations where the
FM abandoned a relatively advantageous point when choosing the line
(p < 0.001). In column (2), we interact this dummy with a dummy for
the FMSL ⇥ SMSL situation. We find that SMs are significantly more
benevolent when the FMSL ⇥ SMSL situation appears for points below
the diagonal. This e↵ect vanishes when the fixed allocation is above the
diagonal.
These results are important for the revealed intentions approach. They
show that the reaction of the SM to the FM’s choice is not only shaped
by di↵erences between the opportunities generated by the choice set se-
lected by the FM and the opportunities which could have been generated
by a counterfactual choice. The SM’s reaction seems also to depend on
how a prevailing social norm of fairness labels each of these opportunities
as fair or not. In the case of our experiment, the puzzling behaviour of
the SM in FMSL⇥SMSL situations makes sense if the SM interprets the
FM’s choice as an attempt to avoid a split that is unfavourable to him.
This as a consequence may induce the SM to make a more benevolent
choice than in FMSG ⇥ SMSL situations. By contrast, benevolence by
the SM is not observed when the (not chosen) point was favourable to
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the FM.
Model (N=3203): vij(x) =
⇣
x↵SM + ✓
i
jx
↵
FM
⌘
↵ 1 + "
(1) (2)
Parameter Estimate Robust SE Estimate Robust SE
↵ 0.288 0.178 0.308 0.179
✓
PointFM 0.170*** 0.043 0.177*** 0.044
FMSL⇥SMSL 0.254*** 0.089
PointFM ⇥ FMSL⇥SMSL -0.322* 0.153
  4.377** 1.497 4.241** 1.435
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 5.4: Benevolence as a function of the position of the (not chosen)
point relative to the equal-material payo↵ line.
5.5 Discussion
The empirical study of conditional other-regarding preferences based on
higher-order beliefs is di cult because such beliefs are not observable and
because eliciting them is a tricky task. An elegant alternative to belief-
based conditional other-regarding preferences is the revealed intentions
approach where a player cares about the generosity of the opportunity set
chosen by another player compared to other opportunity sets that could
have been chosen. The present paper has extended the revealed inten-
tions approach by allowing agents to care not only about the possibility
of gains generated by other agents’ actions but also about the possibility
of losses. In a two-player two-stage game, we have investigated how the
second mover’s other-regarding preferences are a↵ected by di↵erent char-
acteristics of the opportunity set chosen by the first mover compared to a
counterfactual opportunity set the first mover could have chosen. By sys-
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tematically varying the set of opportunity sets the first mover can choose
from and investigating the response of the second mover to the actual
choice of the first mover and the alternative choice he could have made,
we were able to elicit how the second mover reacts to a wide variety of
intentions as revealed by the first mover’s choice.
We found that second movers do react to the possibilities of gains
and losses generated for them and for the associated first mover. Sec-
ond movers are typically more benevolent when the choice of the first
mover creates an opportunity of gain for the second mover. This can
be interpreted as a manifestation of positive reciprocity from the second
mover. We have also seen that second movers react to the payo↵ con-
sequences for the first mover implied by his choice with second movers
becoming more benevolent when the first mover chooses an opportunity
set that implies either a potential or a sure loss for him. These results
suggest that future research should investigate further how self-imposed
vulnerability and losses of a player a↵ect the intention-based preferences
of another player.
Our approach makes it possible to study complex “revealed pref-
erences” as specific combinations of possible gains and losses for each
player. We looked into two of such combinations. First, we investigated
whether the second mover reacts to opportunities of joint improvements
o↵ered by the choice of the first mover. When a first mover chooses
an opportunity set that allows for a Pareto improvement compared to
the alternative opportunity set he could have chosen instead, the second
mover might consider this as a proposal saying “let’s make a deal”. Our
results indicate that whether the second mover reads such an intention
from the first mover’s choice or not, her behaviour is not a↵ected by
the presence of such mutually beneficial improvements as such. Second,
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we investigated whether in situations typical to trust games, the choice
of a trusting opportunity set by the first mover has a positive e↵ect on
the benevolence of the second mover. Here again, we find no evidence
that the second mover’s choice is a↵ected in such situations beyond the
e↵ects of possible gains and losses. These two results are of interest to
understand the specific motivations that shape second mover’s behaviour
in trust games.
Another significant contribution of our study is to show that incor-
porating a salient social norm, here the equality norm, can be useful to
discriminate between di↵erent “revealed intentions”. In its original for-
mulation, the revealed intentions approach relies only on the comparison
of actual choices to choices that would have been available but have not
been made. However, shared social norms may create salient expecta-
tions which also a↵ect behaviour. In such cases, it is simple to extend the
revealed intentions approach by looking not only at how the opportunity
set chosen by a player compares to the sets not chosen, but also at how
it compares to the set of allocations suggested by the social norm. In
our experiment, we find that this approach is useful to understand how
some choices are interpreted by the second mover.
Overall, our study shows that it is possible to study a rich array of
revealed intentions, without eliciting beliefs, by systematically varying
the set of opportunity sets available to the first mover in a two-player
two-stage game and by investigating the response of the second mover to
the actual choice of the first mover and the alternative choice he could
have made instead. This paper opens the path for further experimental
work on revealed intentions. One may for instance consider that not
only the possibility of gains and losses but their magnitude would have
an influence on social preferences. Building on the present approach and
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on the work by Fisman et al. (2007), further research might extend the
findings presented here by investigating a richer set of revealed intentions
using more complex choice sets than our, purposely simple, lines and
points.
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Chapter 6
Guilt-averse or reciprocal:
Looking at behavioural
motivations in the trust game
Abstract1
For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make
opposite predictions regarding the correlation between back-transfers and
second-order beliefs of the trustee: While reciprocity models predict a
negative correlation, guilt aversion models predict a positive one. This
paper tests the hypothesis that the inconclusive results in previous stud-
ies investigating the reaction of trustees to their beliefs are due to the
fact that reciprocity and guilt-aversion are behaviourally relevant for dif-
ferent subgroups and that their impact cancels out in the aggregate. We
find little evidence in support of this hypothesis and conclude that type
heterogeneity is unlikely to explain previous results.
1This study is co-authored by Rudolf Kerschbamer and Lionel Page.
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6.1 Introduction
In social interactions, people frequently rely on others and take risks in
the hope of reaching a more e cient outcome. Exchanges and trade typ-
ically involve an initial costly action by one party that benefits another
person. On first sight, such an action seems kind and altruistic. On
second thought, however, the underlying motivation driving such an act
often stems from some expected benefit. The rule of reciprocation typi-
cally takes care of a beneficial outcome for both involved parties – even
in one-shot situations. We frequently return favours, gifts and so like. In
fact, not only in the English language the phrase “much obliged” has be-
come a synonym for “thank you” indicating the feeling of indebtedness
after receiving something. But what drives this feeling of obligation?
Is it the other’s expectation to receive something in return or is it the
kindness of the act?
While documentation on reciprocal behaviour is vast, its motivation
is less well studied and even less well understood. It is now well ac-
cepted that players’ intentions and how these are perceived by the other
players play a key role in explaining observed behaviour. To interpret
the motivation behind an observed action, people have to form beliefs
about the other’s intention. As a consequence, it is di cult to derive
and test theories concerning the basis of reciprocal pro-social behaviour
purely from observed choices. Since the traditional game theory is not
su cient to describe many psychological or social aspects of motivation
(Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009), theoretical explanations are typically
based on the framework of psychological game theory that was developed
by Geanakoplos et al. (1989). In this framework, preferences directly
depend on beliefs about actions and beliefs: Players form higher-order
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beliefs about each others’ actions and their consequences on their own
and on others’ payo↵s.
For second mover behaviour in the investment game, the two most
prominent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite pre-
dictions regarding the correlation between second-order beliefs and be-
haviour. According to the reciprocity theories of Rabin (1993) and
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), a generous transfer by the first
mover is interpreted by the second mover as less kind if the first mover
is believed to expect a high back-transfer in return. These models there-
fore predict that the pro-sociality of the second mover decreases in his
belief about the payo↵ expectation of the first mover. By contrast, the
guilt aversion model introduced by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and
generalized and extended by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) assumes
that people experience a feeling of guilt when they do not live up to
others’ (payo↵) expectations. This model therefore predicts that the
pro-sociality of the second mover increases in his second-order belief.
Given the conflicting predictions of the two classes of models, it is
ultimately an empirical question whether high expectations (about the
payo↵ expectation of the other) are detrimental or beneficial for pro-
social behaviour. Previous studies investigating this issue – often ob-
tained by employing variants of the trust game as the working horse –
provide mixed results: While some papers (as for instance Guerra and
Zizzo, 2004, Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006 and Bacharach et al., 2007)
find a positive correlation between second-order beliefs and pro-social be-
haviour, many others (as for instance Strassmair, 2009, Ellingsen et al.,
2010, or Al-Ubaydli & Lee, 2012) find no correlation, or even a (slightly)
negative one.
This paper explores the possibility that the inclusive evidence reported
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in previous studies is due to preference heterogeneity in the population of
second movers. Some subjects may be mainly motivated by reciprocity,
some others by guilt aversion and a third group of subjects might not
react to others’ payo↵ expectations at all. If the former two groups are
similar in size then in the aggregate the positive correlation between pro-
social behaviour and second-order beliefs and the negative one might
simply cancel out. This could explain the no-correlation result obtained
in several previous studies.
To investigate this possibility, we use a triadic (that is, a three-games)
design implemented within subjects. Our experimental design is intended
to exogenously manipulate the second-order beliefs of trustees in the trust
game and we use it to classify experimental trustees into behavioural
types depending on how they react to the belief manipulation. In line
with previous findings, we find no pronounced e↵ect of the induced shift
in second-order beliefs in the aggregate data. More importantly, we also
do not find convincing evidence in support of our hypothesis that the
no-correlation result in the aggregate data is caused by heterogeneity in
second-mover preferences. Overall, it seems that the behaviour of second
movers in the trust game is either not primarily driven by beliefs on the
payo↵ expectations of the first mover or that it is driven by more complex
considerations than those reflected in existing theories.2
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows: Section 6.2 places our
contribution in the existing literature. It is followed by the description
of our experiment in Section 6.3 including our theoretical behavioural
predictions. After defining several behavioural types in Section 6.4, we
address our data and results in Section 6.5 before we conclude with a
2See Balafoutas et al. (2016) for evidence suggesting that more complex consider-
ations than those implied by the model of simple guilt shape the pro-sociality of the
“donor” in the standard dictator game.
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discussion in Section 6.6.
6.2 Related literature
Social preferences have been modelled in a number of ways. As a first
approach, outcome-based models have been suggested inter alia by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Levine (1998). In
these models, an agent’s actions are solely motivated by the (distribu-
tional) properties of the outcome, i.e. how does the agent’s own payo↵
compare to that of the other. The way in which a decision situation came
about is irrelevant.
In models of intention-based social preferences, di↵erent intentions
trigger variable responses to one and the same action. They thus take
into account that motives influence the perception of another’s action.
Since preferences do not only depend on material payo↵s but also on a
player’s interpretation of his opponent’s behaviour, he has to form beliefs
about the reason for a chosen action, i.e. the intention. In the literature
of psychological game theory (Geanakoplos et al., 1989), players’ utility
depends directly on beliefs about others’ choices or beliefs. Hereby, one
does not only have to form beliefs about what the other person is going
to do for the evaluation of the other’s action but also about why he is
going to it. Hence, one needs to form beliefs about what the other person
believes oneself to do. The probably best known application of the psy-
chological game theory is Rabin’s (1993) theory of kindness-reciprocity:
Players interpret other’s behaviour belief-dependent as (un-)kind and act
in turn (un-)kind themselves. His normal form model has been extended
to extensive form games by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and
Falk and Fischbacher (2006). For the trust game, these kindness models
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thereby predict (directly or indirectly) a negative relationship between
one’s second-order belief and one’s reciprocity: Given a certain distribu-
tional outcome, the higher one’s second-order belief (i.e. the more one
beliefs the other hopes/expects to accrue for himself from the final pay-
o↵ allocation), the less kind the other’s choice is interpreted and in turn
the less kind one’s own behaviour.3 Another suggested belief-dependent
preference is guilt aversion. According to Baumeister et al. (1994), peo-
ple feeling guilt for failing up to their partner’s expectations will alter
their behaviour (to avoid guilt) in ways that seem likely to maintain
and strengthen their relationship. Building on this statement, associ-
ated models of guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli
and Dufwenberg, 2007; Vanberg, 2008) assume that an agent experiences
some disutility (guilt) if he does not live up to the other’s expectations
which in turn a↵ects his utility influencing his decision-making.4 Hence,
given a certain choice, the higher one’s second-order belief, the more
generous one’s action in order to avoid the feeling of guilt.
While the reciprocity based on kindness theory as well as the guilt
aversion theory are in general able to explain reciprocal behaviour that
is observed in many experiments and specifically in the trust game, they
are distinct in the way that second-order beliefs a↵ect choices. In fact,
predictions go in opposite directions. However, both theories are di cult
to test as the manipulation just as the elicitation of beliefs is challenging.
3Note that the model by Rabin (1993) does not explicitly incorporate second-order
beliefs but one’s kindness is a function of the belief about what the other wants oneself
to receive. In a zero-sum game (such as the second stage of the trust game), this notion
is easily transferred into the notion of second-order beliefs: If a player believes that
the other wants oneself to receive less, this is equivalent to believing that the other
wants to receive more himself. In this way, also Rabin’s model on reciprocity predicts
a negative relationship between second-order beliefs and own kindness.
4A person however only feels obligated to fulfil payo↵/outcome expectations rather
than action expectations.
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Yet, they both strongly rely on beliefs about other’s payo↵ expectations.
Therefore, it may not be surprising that the experimental evidence is not
conclusive.
Stanca et al. (2009) compare reactions to intrinsically versus extrin-
sically motivated actions. In particular, they investigate how second
movers’ back-transfers in a gift-exchange game relate to their back-transfers
in a slightly modified game, in which first movers did not know about
second movers’ possibility to send money back when making their deci-
sion. They find an increased positive reciprocity when first movers’ trans-
fer was exclusively driven by intrinsic motivation (no information treat-
ment). However, on average, there is no increase in the back-transfer.
It is rather the slope of second movers’ average reaction function that is
steeper. Stanca (2009) makes a similar comparison between a treatment
of direct reciprocity (A helps B then B helps A) and a treatment of gener-
alized indirect reciprocity (A helps B then B helps C) in which transfers
made by the first mover are solely intrinsically motivated. He finds that
B’s transfer is on average significantly larger and his reciprocal behaviour
is stronger pronounced (i.e. steeper slope in second mover’s average re-
action function) in the latter. Overall, his results fit the kindness-based
reciprocity theory quite well.
Testing directly for guilt aversion, existing studies typically measure
the correlation between players’ second-order beliefs, their belief about
what others expect them to do, and players’ actions. The second-order
expectations are usually obtained by their direct elicitation from second
movers. Studies with such a belief manipulation often report (strong)
support for the guilt aversion hypothesis (Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Bacharach et al., 2007; Guerra and
Zizzo, 2004). This method might however entail the risk of an endogene-
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ity bias because the explanatory variable is not randomly manipulated.
A possible caveat is the (false) consensus e↵ect (Ross et al., 1977). This
e↵ect occurs if one believes that others behave similar to oneself and
thus that one also believes that others expect a behaviour that is sim-
ilar. If one makes a large transfer, one also thinks that others expect
this. Players’ second-order beliefs are then influenced by their actions
rather than vice versa. Bellemare et al. (2011) test the importance of
the (false) consensus e↵ect and indeed find that the estimation of the
willingness to pay to avoid guilt can be substantially overestimated if
stated belief data is being used and the correlation between stated be-
liefs and preferences is not accounted for. Nevertheless, the willingness
to pay remains significantly positive once using an exogenous belief ma-
nipulation, which supports the guilt aversion theory. Similarly, Ellingsen
et al. (2010) had already tried to establish causation by revealing ac-
tual first-order expectations to second movers.5 However, they find no
significant e↵ect of expectations on the paired player’s reciprocation –
neither in a dictator nor in two versions of the trust game. Instead, they
conclude that the consensus e↵ect is responsible for the major fraction
of the correlation between second-order beliefs and behaviour previously
found and that guilt aversion is smaller than thought. Another study
manipulating beliefs exogenously was conducted by Al-Ubaydli and Lee
(2012). In their first treatment, they disclose the expectations of neu-
tral observers to second movers and use the guesses as instruments. In
the second treatment, they adopt the design used by Ellingsen et al.
(2010) and transmit expectations to each first mover’s partner. They,
5The authors elicited these first-order beliefs in a way assuring maximized honesty.
First movers were asked to guess the outcome of the game (incentivized) while not
telling them that their guesses would be revealed to second movers. Second movers
were informed about the beliefs and knew about the nescience of their transmission.
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again, find no e↵ect of expectations on reward or punishment behaviour
in either treatment. Only when they elicit expectations directly, they
find a correlation supporting guilt aversion. Closest to our paper, is
the study by Strassmair (2009). In her modified trust game, second
movers can only reciprocate with some exogenous probability. Varying
the probability allows her to manipulate expectations: if it is high, the
first mover can expect a back-transfer more often than if the probability
is low. Hence, his behaviour is more likely to be “selfishly” motivated
and less kind. Again, her between-subject design reveals no indication
that expectations influence behaviour in either way. Overall, the exper-
imental evidence raises doubt on the early findings of guilt aversion as
the found correlation between expectations and behaviour seems to be
mainly driven by an endogeneity bias and thus vanishes once beliefs are
manipulated exogenously. However, evidence in support of the theories
of reciprocity based on kindness is also rare.
In line with the zero correlation findings, Vanberg (2008) reports that
while people are prone to keep their own promises, they are reluctant to
fulfil expectations if the promise was made by someone else. This lead
Ederer and Stremitzer (2014) to the assumption that an agent might
only be a↵ected by guilt aversion if he himself is responsible for causing
the expectations for example by making a promise. Their experimental
design resembles Strassmair’s (2009) and our’s but includes a communi-
cation stage. They do find support for their claim: Expectations (and
guilt) only mattered if they were supported by a promisory link between
the two acting parties. While this is an interesting explanation of the
often found zero correlation, the findings of Kawagoe and Narita (2014)
raise concerns about its validity. They test exactly for this “personal
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guilt aversion”6 using a trust game with hidden action and transmitting
beliefs from the first mover to the second mover following the design by
Ellingsen et al. (2010) and Reuben et al. (2009). Similar to Ederer and
Stremitzer (2014), they have treatments with and without pre-play com-
munication. In contrast to the prediction by the guilt aversion theory
as well as the personal guilt aversion hypothesis, elicited beliefs do not
(positively) correlate with reciprocal behaviour. In particular, even in
the communication treatment, no such correlation is found. In fact, they
report a slight positive correlation in the no communication treatment
although it is not significant.
Based on the mixed evidence, we think it is worthwhile considering an-
other potential cause of the “missing” impact of expectations on choices:
the existence of several types (kindness-reciprocal and guilt-averse) whose
behavioural di↵erences cancel out on average. Psychological motivations
thus remain undiscovered in between-subject designs. We base this hy-
pothesis on several findings in previous studies which were typically only
noted as side remarks. Reuben et al. (2009) for instance investigate sec-
ond movers’ behaviour in a lost wallet game. They compare their back-
transfers when they do not have any information about the partnered
first mover’s expectation with their behaviour after observing a low/high
expectation. While they observe a significant decrease in the average
back-transfer after observing a low expectation, the increase following an
observation of a high expectation remains insignificant. They interpret
their data as evidence for guilt aversion but also report quite diverse and
distinct reaction patterns. In both treatments, more than 10 percent
behave in a way consistent with the kindness-reciprocity theory by in-
6Personal guilt aversion postulates that people feel guilty when they betray an-
other person’s expectation, with that expectation having been raised by their very
own actions (typically by their promises).
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creasing their back-transfer when confronted with a low expectation and
vice versa. In addition, a substantial fraction of players does not react
at all to expectations. Furthermore, Bellemare et al. (2015) test for het-
erogeneities in a (mini) dictator game. Although, their work is focused
on and limited to guilt sensitivities, they provide a further indication of
diverse personal di↵erences in reaction patterns to second-order beliefs.
The study by Attanasi et al. (2013) pursuits a similar goal to us. They
determine belief-dependent preferences from an unincentivized question-
naire and confirm the presence of di↵erent types: more than 50 percent
behave consistent with guilt aversion, 16 percent with the reciprocity
theory based on kindness, 6 percent show a mixed reaction pattern and
the rest does not react to a change in the other’s expectations (15 per-
cent are motivated by self-interest only and 9 percent always return a
hypothetical positive but constant amount).
6.3 The experiment
6.3.1 Experimental design
The game
We employ a triadic (three-games) design implemented within subjects
to manipulate the second-order beliefs of experimental trustees in a bi-
nary investment game. The structure of each of the three games is as
illustrated in Figure 6.1.7 There are two players – a first mover (FM, he)
and a second mover (SM, she). The players start with identical initial
endowments of $10 (all amounts are in Australian dollars). In the first
7A similar experimental design has previously been employed by Strassmair (2009)
in an across-subjects study.
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stage, the FM decides between keeping the endowment and sending the
amount of $3 to the SM. If the FM decides to keep the endowment, the
game ends and both players receive their endowments of $10 as their final
payo↵s. If the FM transfers the amount of $3, this amount is multiplied
by 5 and the resulting $15 are then credited to the account of the SM.
Now, a random move by Nature determines whether the game stops.
With the probability 1  p, the state of the world is ! = 0 and the game
stops. In this case, the FM receives the $7 that are left from his initial
endowment and the SM receives her initial endowment plus the $15 from
the transfer of the FM. With probability p, the state is ! = 1 and the
game continues. In this case, the SM can now decide how much money
she wants to send back to the FM. She can choose any integer amount
x between 0 and 15. The FM then receives the $7 that are left from his
initial endowment plus the SM’s back-transfer x as the final payo↵. The
SM earns her initial endowment ($10) plus the multiplied transfer ($15)
minus the amount x she has chosen to send back to the FM. At the end
of the game, both players learn their payo↵s and the outcome of Nature’s
move (i.e. whether the game was stopped or the SM had the opportunity
to make a back-transfer).
The crux of our working horse trust game consists in the random
move by Nature after the FM’s sending decision. The game resembles a
standard binary trust game if p = 1, as the SM can then make a back-
transfer with certainty. By contrast, for p = 0, the game is reduced to a
dictator game (with the FM as the dictator). To manipulate the belief of
the SM about the payo↵ expectation of the FM (conditional on sending
the amount of $3), we vary – across treatments – the probability p that
the SM can make a back-transfer, while keeping everything else constant.8
8Note that by keeping the FM’s transfer constant across the three treatments, we
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FM
KEEPS $3 SENDS $3
$3 are multiplied by 5
FM receives: $10
SM receives: $10
Nature
[1  p]
STOPS THE GAME
(move ! = 0)
[p]
CONTINUES THE GAME
(move ! = 1)
FM receives: $7
SM receives: $25
SM
can send x back:
x between $0 and 15
FM receives: $7 + x
SM receives: $25 - x
Figure 6.1: Structure of our modified trust game.
The manipulation of the continuation probability p essentially allows an
exogenous belief manipulation: the lower p, the lower the chance that
the FM will receive some money back from the SM, the lower therefore
arguably his payo↵ expectation conditional on making the transfer of
$3, the lower therefore also the expectation of the SM on the payo↵
expectation of the FM. Conversely, the closer p is to 1, the higher the
chance of a back-transfer from the SM, the higher therefore arguably also
the SM’s belief about the payo↵ expectation of the FM. Because we are
interested in individual response patterns, every subject has to make a
choice in three treatments di↵ering only in the continuation probability
p. A subject in the role of the FM is asked whether he wants to make
the transfer of $3 in each treatment. According to the game tree in
keep the SM’s choice set constant across treatments. This seems important to control
for distributional concerns that might shape the back-transfer of the SM.
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Figure 6.1, whether or not the SM has a decision to make depends on
the FM’s choice and on Nature’s random move. To collect data from
all subjects in all treatments, we apply the strategy method. That is,
subjects in the role of the SM are asked to make a decision regarding the
back-transfer assuming the FM made the transfer and Nature did not
stop the game. To make the SM’s decision scenario plausible in each of
the three treatments we decided to make the choice of the initial transfer
by the FM quite attractive by using high values of p. Furthermore, we
wanted to avoid degenerate lotteries while making the di↵erence between
the decision tasks as distinct as possible. Specifically, the variable p takes
on the values 50, 70 and 90 percent across our three treatments.
The Observer
The experimental design is intended to manipulate the belief of the SM
about the payo↵ expectation of the FM (conditional on sending the
amount of $3). To verify that this manipulation works (i.e. that a
higher continuation probability is associated with higher payo↵ expec-
tations of the FM), we have a third player role in our experiment, the
role of an impartial observer. The task of the Observer is to guess how
much money the participants in the role of the SM send back, on av-
erage, to the paired FM assuming that the FM transferred the $3 and
Nature did not stop the game. From these joint conditional beliefs, we
can then calculate the expectation of the Observer about the expected
payo↵ associated with the initial transfer by the FM for each of the three
treatments. We can then check if and how this expected payo↵ varies
with the continuation probability. We use an impartial observer to elicit
beliefs to avoid the usual problems associated with eliciting beliefs from
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agents that also have to make a decision.9
6.3.2 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted between February and June 2015. To the
15 experimental sessions, we recruited 180 students from a large univer-
sity in Australia via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015). Each session
lasted approximately 45 minutes. No participation fee was paid and the
average earnings were $14.30. The experiment was programmed and con-
ducted with the experimental software CORAL (Scha↵ner, 2013). At the
beginning of the experiment, each participant was randomly assigned the
role of either the FM, or the SM or the Observer and participants kept
the role during the entire session. After session 10, we disposed the role
of the Observer because we attained enough data to test whether our
belief manipulation worked. At no time were subjects informed about
the identity of their matched partner. The full instructions can be found
in Appendix C.
In each session, participants where exposed successively to the three
treatments distinguished only in the continuation probability p. Subjects
received neither any feedback on the choices made by other participants
nor on the outcome of Nature’s move before all decisions were made. At
the end of the experiment, one of the three treatments was randomly
9If beliefs are elicited before the decision is made, this might lead to an “exper-
imenter demand e↵ect”, or to a “consistency e↵ect”: Subjects might condition their
choice on the stated belief because they believe that the experimenter expects them to
do so, or actions might be shaped by beliefs just to be consistent. Fleming and Zizzo
(2015) test the impact of the experimenter demand e↵ect on choices in a di↵erent
context and indeed find convincing evidence in line with it. By contrast, if beliefs
are elicited after the choices, then actions might influence (or cause) beliefs. This
is often referred to as the “projection hypothesis”, or the ”false consensus e↵ect”.
Bellemare et al. (2011) test the importance of the (false) consensus e↵ect and indeed
find evidence in line with it.
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selected for payment. The players’ actions as well as the move by Na-
ture for that particular treatment were revealed and payo↵s calculated
accordingly.10 The beliefs of subjects in the role of the Observer were in-
centivized using the quadratic scoring rule. Specifically, we implemented
the payo↵ function
Payo↵Observer = 15  0.5(x¯  xGuess)2,
where x¯ is the rounded average back-transfer made by subjects in the
role of the SM and xGuess is the Observer’s associated guess.
6.3.3 Theoretical predictions
In our experimental design and the trust game in general, a positive
transfer by the first mover always seems altruistic/kind on first sight:
the act is costly (deduction from his endowment) and benefits the second
mover. While this is true for all continuation probabilities, the FM’s
chance to receive a future return for his transfer changes because the
SM’s possibility of a back-transfer is varied. Thus Hypothesis 6.1:
Hypothesis 6.1
Given an initial transfer, the FM can expect a higher return the higher
the continuation probability, i.e. E(x1|p = 50%) < E(x1|p = 70%) <
E(x1|p = 90%).
Obviously, the SM could interpret a transfer kinder if p is low and thus
adjust her back-transfer. Consequently, such a more generous behaviour
generally could o↵set the smaller p at least partially. Yet, it should not
10The SM’s decision was only revealed to the FM if the FM sent the $3 and Nature
did not stop the game.
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lead to opposing predictions. To see this, let’s assume the opposite for a
moment: If the FM expects ex-ante higher rewards for a small continua-
tion probability, then the transfer should be interpreted as less kind for
small p and rewarded less generously. Thus, the FM’s expectations were
incorrect. Nevertheless, we provide more evidence on the relationship be-
tween the continuation probability p and the FM’s ex-ante expectations
by eliciting beliefs from impartial observers (see Section 6.3.1).
In what follows, we discuss the most commonly used models of (social)
preferences. They all di↵er in their underlying assumptions and the role
of expectations on an agent’s utility function and thus di↵er in their
behavioural predictions in the investigated modified trust game.
Neoclassical theory
In the standard neoclassical theory, beliefs about other’s behaviour play
a role only in so far as, in equilibrium, they should be correct. Belief-
dependent motivational interpretations, contrariwise, are neglected and
do not influence behavioural predictions. Instead, subjects are assumed
to solely maximize own monetary income and to act rationally. Given
these assumptions, the SM’s decision will not depend on the continuation
probability p. Rather, in the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium,
she would always choose to keep the whole surplus for herself.
Outcome-based social preferences
Acknowledging the fact that people may not only be own-income maxi-
mizing but also be motivated by fairness considerations, models of outcome-
based social preferences assume that the distribution of all players’ in-
come influences an agent’s utility function. In our experimental design,
the FM’s transfer is kept constant across all continuation probabilities
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p. Since the SM’s choice is influenced by outcomes only, she faces the
same decision problem at her decision node independent of p. Her back-
transfer may therefore take positive values, yet will not vary across deci-
sion tasks.11
Simple guilt aversion
Guilt in the context of social preferences refers to a guilt feeling as the
consequence of not living up to others’ expectations (Baumeister et al.,
1994; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007). In what follows, we focus on the
theory of “simple guilt” proposed by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
and extended by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007). The guilt aversion
hypothesis postulates that players experience a utility loss if they believe
that they let other’s payo↵ expectation down.12 The basic idea is that
the SM su↵ers from guilt to the extent that she believes that the FM gets
a lower monetary payo↵ than the SM believes the FM expects to receive.
The higher the SM’s second-order belief, her belief about the FM’s payo↵
expectation, the larger her experienced disutility from a certain payo↵
allocation assigning the FM less money than he is believed to expect.
Consequently, the SM will adjust her choice in order to mitigate or even
avoid the experienced guilt. In our design, a guilt-averse SM is therefore
predicted to increase her back-transfer as the continuation probability p
rises.
11An individual exhibiting outcome-based social preferences is not necessarily al-
truistic or inequality-averse. Also spiteful, envious or inequality-seeking agents inte-
grate the other agent’s payo↵ in their maximization problem. However, in our design,
these types would behave exactly as an agent only motivated by self-interest.
12In contrast, the theory of “guilt from blame” (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007,
2009) postulates that players experience a utility loss if they believe that others believe
that they believe that they let others’ payo↵ expectation down.
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Kindness-reciprocity
Models of intention-based social preferences typically focus on an agent’s
reciprocity based on his kindness interpretation (e.g. Rabin, 1993; Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). The perceived
kindness of a certain action thereby depends on the interpretation of
the other’s intention. The kinder the perceived intention, the kinder
the agent’s subsequent decision. In zero-sum games, second-order beliefs
(what the SM believes the FM expects to be the final outcome) shape
an agent’s intention perception: The more the SM thinks the FM hopes
to accrue for himself, the less kind the FM’s action is perceived. So,
if the FM makes the transfer because he is hoping to gain himself sub-
stantially from this move, i.e. he has high payo↵ expectations, the SM’s
back-transfer should be lower than if she beliefs the FM’s transfer to be
motivated by true kindness, i.e. he has low payo↵ expectations. Accord-
ing to Hypothesis 6.1, a higher continuation probability p will, ceteris
paribus, increase the FM’s payo↵ expectations. The action of a transfer
should therefore be interpreted as kinder if p is low and as less kind if p
is high. A SM motivated by such reciprocal preferences will adjust her
back-transfer accordingly: A SM with reciprocal preferences decreases
her back-transfer as the continuation probability rises.
6.4 Behavioural types
To describe and distinguish individual behavioural patterns, we define
four types of players – selfish (S), altruistic (A), guilt-averse (G) and re-
ciprocal (R) ones. For each of these types, we assume a linear relationship
between the continuation probability and the back-transfer. Specifically,
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the back-transfer of a SM of type t 2 {S,A,G,R} is assumed to be a
function of her unconditional altruism parameter ct and of a parameter
mt which reflects how she reacts to our belief manipulation:
xt(p) = ct +mtp (6.1)
Definition 6.1 (Selfish Agent) A SM is said to act in a selfish man-
ner if her back-transfer is always zero: cS = 0 and mS = 0, implying
xS(p) = 0 for all p.
Definition 6.2 (Unconditional Altruist) A SM is said to be an un-
conditional altruist if her choice is una↵ected by her belief about the pay-
o↵ expectation of the FM but she nevertheless returns a positive amount.
Thus, her back-transfer x is a constant amount independent of the con-
tinuation probability p: cA > 0 and mA = 0, implying xA(p) = cA for all
p.
Definition 6.3 (Guilt-Averse Agent) A SM is said to be guilt-averse
if her pro-sociality is increasing in her belief about the payo↵ expectation
of the FM. Thus, her back-transfer x is an increasing function of the
continuation probability p: cG   0 and mG > 0, implying xG(p) =
cG +mGp – with mG > 0 – for all p.
Definition 6.4 (Reciprocal Agent) A SM is said to be reciprocal if
her pro-sociality is decreasing in her belief about the payo↵ expectation of
the FM. Thus, her back-transfer x is a decreasing function of the contin-
uation probability p: cR   0 and mR < 0, implying xR(p) = cR +mRp –
with mR < 0 – for all p.
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6.5 Data and results
In total, we collected data from 180 students – 70 subjects in the role
of the FM, 70 subjects in the role of the SM, and 40 subjects in the
role of the Observer. Since each subject made a decision in each of the
three treatments, we have 210 observations for the role of the FM, 210
observations for the role of the SM, and 120 observations for the role of
the Observer.
6.5.1 The Observer
To confirm the validity of our experimental belief manipulation, we first
look at the data obtained from subjects in the role of the Observer. We
first investigate their guesses about the average back-transfer and com-
pare guesses with actual behaviour. As can be seen from Figure 6.2, the
Observers’ average guesses are roughly $1 higher than the actual choices
of SMs for all continuation probabilities. However, this di↵erence is not
significant for any of the treatments (the Mann-Whitney ranksum test13
p-values are 0.0596, 0.1639 and 0.1619 for the continuation probabilities
of 50%, 70% and 90%, respectively) so that the Observers’ guesses are
on average a decent approximation of actual behaviour.
Further, we can see a slight upwards trend in guesses as the continu-
ation probability increases. Yet, the di↵erences in average beliefs across
the three continuation probabilities are not statistically significant (the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test p-values are 0.3448 for H0: E(x|p = 50%) =
E(x|p = 70%), 0.3180 forH0: E(x|p = 70%) = E(x|p = 90%) and 0.2468
for H0: E(x|p = 50%) = E(x|p = 90%)).
13Comparisons between the di↵erent player groups are unmatched so that we use
the two-tailed Mann-Whitney ranksum test.
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Figure 6.2: Average back-transfers by the SMs as a function of the con-
tinuation probability p compared to the Observers’ average guess and
the associated expected return for the FM conditional on making the
transfer.
It is important to note that we have elicited joint conditional beliefs
about average back-transfers. Specifically, subjects in the role of the
Observer were asked how much they thought the SM would on average
transfer back, assuming the FM transferred the $3 and Nature did not
stop the game. We are however interested in preferences which are in-
fluenced by the (belief of the SM on the) payo↵ expectation of the FM
conditional only on the own decision (of sending the $3). To obtain in-
formation on this expectation, we multiply the joint conditional belief by
the continuation probability p. The resulting number exO1 , estimated from
Observers’ guesses, is significantly increasing in p: E(exO1 |p = 50%) =
1.86 < E(exO1 |p = 70%) = 2.78 < E(exO1 |p = 90%) = 3.67 (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, p-values < 0.01). Assuming that Observers’ beliefs are
a good approximation of real players’ beliefs, we interpret this result as
evidence showing that our belief manipulation works.
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Figure 6.3: Left panel: Fraction of FMs making the transfer for each of
the three continuation probabilities. Right panel: FMs’ average payo↵
conditional on making the transfer for each of the three continuation
probabilities.
6.5.2 The first mover
We now turn to the data obtained from experimental FMs. The left
panel of Figure 6.3 shows the fraction of FMs making the transfer for
each of the three continuation probabilities. Over 50 percent make the
transfer independent of p, but there is a clear increase in the fraction
as p increases – more FMs send the money when the probability that
the SM can actually send a back-transfer is higher. This is a further
indication in support of our main hypothesis that the payo↵ expectation
of the FM (conditional on sending the $3) is increasing in p. As can
be seen from the right panel of Figure 6.3, making the transfer pays o↵,
on average, only when the continuation probability is 90%. This reveals
that even if SMs’ back-transfers were on average higher for a low p, they
do not o↵set the higher risk taken by the FM. FMs’ payo↵ expectations
based on actual back-transfers should therefore be increasing with the
continuation probability which is in line with our main assumption stated
in Hypothesis 6.1.
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Figure 6.4: Boxplots of SMs’ back-transfers depending on the continua-
tion probability p.
6.5.3 The second mover
We now turn to our main data source, the data obtained from experi-
mental SMs. First, we look at average back-transfers. Figure 6.2 shows
that average SM behaviour is quite similar across the three continua-
tion probabilities. Statistical tests confirm that average back-transfers
are not significantly di↵erent across treatments (the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test p-values are 0.0822 for H0: E(x|p = 50%) = E(x|p = 70%),
0.3518 for H0: E(x|p = 70%) = E(x|p = 90%) and 0.0451 for H0:
E(x|p = 50%) = E(x|p = 90%)). Similarly, the distributions of choices
do not vary across p (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, combined p-values: 0.959
for H0:  (x|p = 50%) =  (x|p = 70%), 0.959 for H0:  (x|p = 70%) =
 (x|p = 90%) and 0.751 for H0:  (x|p = 50%) =  (x|p = 90%)). The
respective boxplots are shown in Figure 6.4. These results are in line
with the no-correlation results obtained in several previous studies (cf.
Section 6.2).
146 CHAPTER 6. RECIPROCITY OR GUILT AVERSION?
Looking at individual behaviour, it can be noted that SMs’ choices
appear quite heterogeneous so that we cannot determine one clear pat-
tern. The associated individual graphs are displayed in Appendix C.
The heterogeneity in reactions to changing continuation probabilities is
in line with our research hypothesis of diverse types: Some participants
do not respond to changing continuation probabilities (and thus di↵erent
expectations) at all, while others behave consistent with the guilt aver-
sion theory, and again others seem to follow the predictions of the model
of kindness-reciprocity. However, quite a substantial fraction of subjects
cannot be easily classified (around 26 percent).
To get more insights into individual behaviour, we run a mixture
model (Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2009), which allows us to estimate the
fraction of subjects whose choices are consistent with one of the types de-
fined in Section 6.4. The mixture model allows di↵erent types to coexist
in the same sample and it determines the support for each of the types
indicating their respective importance in the population. To simplify the
estimation procedure of the mixture model, we decided to identify and
exclude the selfish agents manually as they can easily be determined. We
ended up removing 15 individuals from our dataset who never returned
any money (participant numbers: 8, 29, 32, 35, 47, 83, 95, 110, 113, 119,
126, 132, 158, 164, 56 in Appendix C), and four agents who returned $1
once and zero otherwise (participant numbers: 17, 26, 128, 138). Hence,
27 percent do not exhibit any kind of social preferences.14 Using the
definitions in Section 6.4, we specify one likelihood function for the re-
maining competing types t 2 {A,G,R}, conditional on the respective
model being correct:
14We also run the mixture model including the selfish types where they would form
a “neutral” type together with the unconditional altruists. The higher likelihood was
however reached by excluding them.
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lnLt(x, ct,mt,  ) =
X
i
ln lti =
X
i
ln[ t(xi)],
where mt is restricted: mA = 0, mG > 0 and mR < 0. Our grand likeli-
hood of the entire model is then the probability weighted average of the
conditional likelihoods, where ⇡t denotes the probability that the respec-
tive type applies and where lti is the respective conditional likelihood:
lnL(x, ct,mt,  , ⇡t) =
X
i
ln[(⇡A ⇥ lAi) + (⇡G ⇥ lGi) + (⇡R ⇥ lRi)].
The parameter estimates can directly be found by maximizing this log-
likelihood. Table 6.1 presents the resulting maximum-likelihood esti-
mates of the mixture model.15 The first finding is that the estimates
for the probabilities of our type specifications are all positive and sig-
nificantly di↵erent from zero. Their respective size refers to the fraction
of choices characterized by each. For the data at hand, guilt aversion
seems to dominate slightly – with 46 percent – but closer inspection re-
veals that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the three probabilities
are identical (p-values: 0.1100 for H0: ⇡A = ⇡G, 0.0815 for H0: ⇡G = ⇡R
and 0.9359 for H0: ⇡A = ⇡R). Yet, looking at the estimation results re-
veals very flat slopes for both, reciprocal (mR = 0.007) and guilt-averse
types (mG =  0.024). Figure 6.5 graphically illustrates these findings. It
shows – for each of the three types – the plot of the estimated function of
the back-transfer on the continuation probability. Although, there seem
to be behavioural tendencies present, the e↵ect of a change in the con-
tinuation probability seems to be rather weak, especially for guilt-averse
15Our likelihood function seems to have several local maxima. The results reported
here refer to the estimates with the highest likelihood found.
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agents. But also the e↵ect for reciprocal agents is not very pronounced.
Mixture Model (N=153): lnL(x, ct,mt, ,⇡t) =
X
i
X
t
ln[(⇡t ⇥ lti)]
Parameter Estimate Robust SE
cG 3.008*** .742
cR 8.881*** .955
cA 1.236** .424
mG .007**
mR -.024***
  1.161
⇡G .464*** .069
⇡R .273*** .062
⇡A .293*** .071
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 6.1: Maximum-likelihood estimates of mixture model.
Since we do not interpret these results as convincing evidence in sup-
port of our hypothesis of the coexistence of guilt-averse and reciprocal
agents, we next try another approach to test for the presence of het-
erogeneity in the reaction to the second-order belief. Specifically, we
estimate two versions of a linear regression model of the back-transfer on
the continuation probability. One model allows only for random inter-
cepts while the other allows for random intercepts and random slopes.
Our “random-intercept” model reads:
xi(p) = c+  p+ u0i + ✏i,
where xi is subject i’s back-transfer, c is a constant, p is the continuation
probability and u0i is the subject-specific random e↵ect. The “random-
slope” model – allowing the intercept and the slope to vary between
participants – reads
xi(p) = c+  p+ u0i + u1ip+ "i,
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Figure 6.5: Plot of the estimated type-functions based on the estimates
of the mixture model.
where u1i is the additional subject-specific random e↵ect on the slope of
p. The results for both models are reported in Table 6.2. The estimates
of the “fixed” parameters confirm the results obtained from the mixture
model: The constant c is positive and significant but the e↵ect of p
on back-transfers is insignificant. Our main interest lies in the results
obtained for  u0 and  u1 as they represent the between-subject variation
in the intercept and the slope of p, respectively. The significance of  u0
can be tested using the likelihood ratio (LR) test of the linear regression
model in its restricted version of the random-intercept model. The null
hypothesis that  2u0 is zero can be rejected at the 0.01 percent significance
level (p-value < 0.0001). To test the significance of  u1 , we again use a
LR test. This time, we test the random-slope model against the random-
intercept model. The p-value is 0.2116 so that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that  2u1 = 0 and thus that the slope of the back-transfer as
a function of the continuation probability p is the same for all subjects.
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Multi-level Models (N=210): xi(p) = c+  p+ u0i + u1ip+ "i
Random-intercept model Random-slope model
Parameter Estimate Robust SD Estimate Robust SD
p .007 .007 .007 .007
c 2.988*** .609 2.988*** .578
Random e↵ects
 u1 .018 .008
 u0 2.746*** .262 2.456*** .359
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 6.2: Mixed-e↵ects maximum-likelihood estimates of multi-level
models.
6.6 Discussion
We have experimentally investigated the empirical relevance of the most
prominent models of belief-dependent motivations for behaviour in the bi-
nary trust game. We tested how subjects respond to another player’s pay-
o↵ expectations given a certain distributional outcome. Based on mixed
results in previous studies, we hypothesized that the behaviour observed
in the di↵erent versions of the trust game is generated by heterogeneous
mental processes: guilt aversion, kindness-reciprocity, unconditional al-
truism and own-payo↵ maximization. In particular, we argued that the
e↵ects of the first two are confounded and even masked when looking at
averages as their associated behavioural predictions go in opposite direc-
tions. Our triadic design implemented within subjects has allowed us to
study individual response patterns to exogenously manipulated second-
order beliefs. Our results however indicate that individual di↵erences in
reactions to the other agent’s payo↵ expectations may not be as impor-
tant as suggested by our research hypothesis. Results obtained from a
mixture model allowing for reciprocal and guilt-averse agents as well as
for unconditional altruists suggested that individual di↵erences exist only
in the level of exhibited pro-social behaviour. The e↵ect of the induced
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change in second-order beliefs on choices was found to be negligible –
on average and on the type level. We have confirmed these findings by
estimating two versions of a random-coe cient model allowing the reac-
tion of the SM to the belief manipulation to di↵er within our sample.
While we found support for heterogeneity in the level of unconditional
altruism, we do not find convincing evidence for heterogeneity in how
second movers react to the induced shift in their second-order beliefs.
Our results suggest that the most prominent models of belief-dependent
motivations – reciprocity and aversion against simple guilt – may not
accurately reflect how players in the role of the second mover in the
trust game react to their beliefs about the payo↵ expectation of the first
mover. Further work is needed in this area to understand the role played
by higher-order beliefs for behaviour.
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Part III
Conclusion and Discussion
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Chapter 7
Summary and Possible
Extensions
This thesis investigated the role of intentions on people’s decision-making
applying conceptual and methodological insights from behavioural and
experimental economics. Together, the three studies in this dissertation
enrich the existing knowledge on intentions and the motivational chan-
nels through which they become e↵ective. Each of the presented essays
was devoted to reciprocity in its broadest sense but investigated it in dif-
ferent settings and analysed it from slightly di↵erent angles. Each study
thereby focused on di↵erent channels through which intention-based so-
cial behaviour may be triggered. This thesis looked at various intentions
determining perceived kindness and investigated their judgement as well
as their e↵ect on another’s behaviour through reciprocity and trustwor-
thiness.
The study Driving a hard bargain is a balancing act: The impor-
tance of reciprocity in bargaining (Chapter 4) investigated the role of
156 CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
reciprocity in a simple bargaining setting. As bargaining is an ubiqui-
tous process in all our lives, it is of great interest which strategy helps
to achieve the best possible outcome for oneself and to avoid an im-
passe. Our results suggest that it is not advisable to only focus on one’s
own outcome and that it is also not su cient to look out for the other’s
outcome. Instead, it is crucial to also pay attention to the bargaining
strategy one adopts. We argued that players do not enter a bargaining
situation with a predetermined minimal acceptable payo↵ outcome, but
that the bargaining process itself influences an agent’s valuation of what
is acceptable. Specifically, o↵ers and counter-o↵ers serve as a commu-
nication device that allows agents to signal their preferences regarding
the final outcome. This in turn can influence the bargaining process by
provoking positive or negative emotions and reciprocal behaviour in the
other bargainer. In such, o↵ers provide information about one’s desires,
preferences and bargaining type, which will be judged as more or less
kind by the other triggering his reciprocal response. Using a two-stage
alternating-o↵er game over a surplus of $10, we saw that a responder’s
counter-proposal is influenced by the initial proposition made by a pro-
poser despite being classified as cheap talk. We found strong support for
negative reciprocity as high requests exceeding 60 percent of the surplus
are punished partly at own costs by counter-o↵ering an amount which
responders expect to be rejected or only just to be accepted by the pro-
poser. The bargaining outcome is critically influenced by the balance
of toughness and kindness signalled through the o↵ers made during the
haggling phase. Our results indicate that the punishment is not solely
driven by distributional preferences but that reciprocal concerns create
additional boundaries on how tough one should be in order to reach the
best outcome in a bargaining process. The perceived kindness of an ac-
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tion in this context depended on the associated belief about the other’s
intention or type.
Our results help to explain why negotiators avoid adopting an ex-
tremely tough bargaining stance in a negotiation, and are well advised
to do so as it can come with the cost of a negative reaction from the other
bargainer. Yet, this study should be seen as a starting point for further
research maybe expanding the number of o↵er rounds to see how the
reciprocal behaviour carries over a number of alterations. It would also
be interesting to explore how a larger pie size changes our results. From
previous research on the ultimatum game, one might expect a decline
in negative reciprocity as the amount at stake increases (e.g. Andersen
et al., 2011; Munier and Zaharia, 2002; Slonim and Roth, 1998). Yet,
we observe bargaining impasses and delays frequently in everyday-life
bargaining situations where high stakes are involved: Especially when
people from di↵erent cultures with di↵erent “bargaining norms” inter-
act, one needs to carefully choose one’s bargaining strategy. Not for
nothing, there exist many books on how to negotiate with (business)
partners from other countries.
The fifth chapter Why did he do that? Using counterfactuals to study
the e↵ect of intentions in extensive form games experimentally studied
the concept of intention-based benevolence by analysing its determinants
(in terms of gains and losses created by a first mover’s choice) and their
interactions. We followed the revealed altruism approach developed by
Cox et al. (2008a), and studied how the observable properties of a first
mover’s choice influence a second mover’s decision to be more or less
benevolent towards the first mover. With a modified investment game
as our work horse, we found that the generosity of a first mover indeed
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triggers a reciprocal action as formulated by the reciprocity theory by
Cox et al. (2008a). Generosity therefore proved to be a determinant of
the other’s perceived kindness. However, we found that intention-based
benevolence is more than a response to generosity. In particular, we
found that the voluntary act of making oneself vulnerable to the other
agent’s action, i.e. the willingness to take the risk to be worse o↵ after
taking a certain action than by maintaining the status quo, also induces
pro-social behaviour in a second mover. In this sense, intention-based
benevolence is not reducible to reciprocity but (also) a response to the
first mover’s vulnerability. Generosity is consequently not the only inten-
tion triggering pro-social behaviour; vulnerability-responsiveness should
receive more attention as a concept on its own. However, while the first
mover’s generosity and his vulnerability are important drivers of the sec-
ond mover’s benevolence, it is not influenced by the availability of a deal
nor an aversion against violating trust (as characterized in the investment
game by Berg et al., 1995). Especially the latter finding raises questions
regarding the precision of trust-characterization in the trust game; more
research emphasis should be put on the features invaluable for trust.
Intention-based benevolence such as trustworthiness and reciprocity
play an important role in all our everyday lives. They do not only sim-
plify our social interactions but are often critical for the occurrence of
beneficial economic transaction. Especially in situations where contracts
are not completely enforceable, standard theory predicts a market break-
down with severe e ciency losses. Thanks to people’s justified trust
that the other party will not fully exploit their opportunities to dis-
regard their contractual duties, market failures can often be overcome
(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 1998). Credence goods markets1 provide a particu-
1The term “credence goods” was first introduced by Darby and Karni (1973) and
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larly good example. Despite extreme information asymmetries between
sellers (trustees) and consumers (trustors), expert markets such as the
health care market or the market for repair services operate – yet not
100 percent e cient. It is therefore crucial to understand the concepts
clearly in order to strengthen and upholding trusting relationships from
both sides. Our finding of the importance of generosity and vulnerabil-
ity can thereby be seen as a starting point. However, while the present
study focused on a second mover’s reaction to a first mover’s vulnera-
bility and generosity, the availability of a deal as well as their combined
presence, one should note that other factors (that are not present in the
trust game) may also be relevant for intention-based benevolence. Be-
sides personality and cultural traits, it would for example be desirable to
investigate the role of costs of benevolence. In the traditional investment
game and also our design, the second mover’s trade-o↵ between own and
other’s payo↵ is one-to-one. Increasing e ciency by lowering the costs of
benevolence is likely to influence the second mover’s pro-social behaviour.
But to what extent? And how does e ciency interact with the vulner-
ability and the generosity of the first mover? Additionally, it would be
interesting to investigate whether first movers anticipate second mover’s
behaviour correctly and adjust their trusting behaviour to the involved
own risk/vulnerability as well as the provided benefits towards the other
player.
Chapter 6 was devoted to the last study Guilt-averse or reciprocal:
Looking at behavioural motivations in the trust game. Herein, we ex-
perimentally investigated the empirical relevance of the most prominent
refers to goods or services where an expert knows more about the quality a customer
needs than the consumer himself (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006).
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models of belief-dependent motivations for behaviour in the binary trust
game. We tested how subjects respond to another player’s payo↵ expec-
tations given a certain distributional outcome. Based on mixed results
in previous studies, we hypothesized that the behaviour observed in the
di↵erent versions of the trust game is generated by heterogeneous men-
tal processes: guilt aversion, kindness-reciprocity, unconditional altruism
and own-payo↵ maximization. In particular, we argued that the e↵ects of
the first two are confounded and even masked when looking at averages
as their associated behavioural predictions go in opposite directions. Our
triadic design implemented within subjects allowed us to study individ-
ual response patterns to exogenously manipulated second-order beliefs.
Our results however do not support our hypothesis of behavioural types.
Although, in our particular chosen design, heterogeneities seem to be
minor, the rejection of the presence of di↵erent types may be a overhasty
decision. In particular, I want to stress following shortcomings of our ex-
periment: First the number of observations per individual is small, which
makes the unambiguous detection of specific patterns di cult. Second,
the sample size might not be su ciently big in order to determine het-
erogeneities and types accurately and reliably. Moreover and probably
most importantly, we are not sure how participants perceive the dif-
ferent continuation probabilities and associated expectations. While we
validated our experimental design through the data obtained from impar-
tial observers, we can only say that it works on average. Second-order
beliefs may very well vary on the individual level and choices may be
responsive to them, yet their inter-dependence will remain unobserved
by assuming homogeneous expectations. Closely linked to perceptions is
an alternative explanation of our observations. It regards the questions
which expectations are decisive for behaviour: conditional or uncondi-
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tional expectations? Maybe subjects are more concerned with “choice
expectations” (conditional) than with “payo↵ expectations” (uncondi-
tional), which would be an interesting separate research question. A
more general concern regards the complexity of the experimental design
and the confusion of subjects that may go along with it. The formation
of beliefs requires a level of sophistication which is especially high in our
set-up as backward induction is required. Without learning opportuni-
ties, subjects may simply be cognitively overstrained. These concerns
could explain the weakness of our findings on heterogeneous types.2
Despite these limitations, our results suggest that the psychological
game theories proposed to explain trustworthy behaviour (reciprocity
and simple guilt aversion) may not accurately reflect how second movers
incorporate their beliefs about the first mover’s motive. Instead, other
explanations for reciprocal behaviour which are independent of expec-
tations (such as vulnerability-responsiveness or social norms) may play
the more important role. Note that the result could for example be
explained (at least partly) by the importance of vulnerability that was
found in study 2: If first mover’s risk to be worse o↵ by trusting is the
decisive factor determining second mover’s pro-social behaviour, the con-
stant positive back-transfers across decision tasks may be ascribed to an
unchanged vulnerability. Further work is needed in this area to under-
stand the role played by perceived intentions in the behaviour of the
second mover.
2High inter-subject variance can be explained through confusion and would ex-
plain the flat slope in the mixture model and insignificant result in the random-
coe cient models.
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Chapter 8
Discussion
8.1 “Strong reciprocity”?
All the experiments presented in this thesis aimed to investigate peo-
ple’s behaviour in one-shot settings instead of repeated interactions. It
might not be far fetched to imagine such one-time encounters nowadays.
Yet, in evolutionary terms they were assumingly far less important and
the a priori probability of a future reunion was probably never zero. It
therefore remains an open question if the observations made really re-
flect successfully adapted preferences for such conditions (Trivers, 2006).
Trivers (2004, 2006) and Binmore (2006) argue that social interactions are
intrinsically repeated encounters. The idea is that albeit given full infor-
mation, individuals do not disassociate themselves completely from the
real world where cooperation or pro-social behaviour is typically benefi-
cial. Contrariwise, Bowles and Gintis (2003) as well as Fehr and Schmidt
(2006) argue that subjects are aware of the setting they are playing in
and are able to leave their real-world experiences of repeated interac-
tions behind. Experimental evidence confirms that individuals cooper-
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ate or punish much more in games where they can acquire a reputation
or where the probability of meeting again is higher (e.g. Andreoni and
Miller, 1993; Ga¨chter and Falk, 2002; Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009).
But is awareness the decisive factor? Trivers (2006) argues that it is ir-
relevant as humans cannot switch o↵ their biological mechanisms. So,
cognitive adjustments might lead to di↵erent outcomes in one-shot and
repeated games but that does not necessarily mean that the observations
made are evolutionary evolved adaptations. In fact, the maximization of
fitness does not imply perfect behaviour in every possible situation (West
et al., 2011).
The underlying misconception may be a matter of the discrimina-
tion between ultimate and proximate reasons. While proximate explana-
tions are concerned with causal mechanisms underlying behaviour (“how”
questions), ultimate explanations regard the resulting fitness consequences
of behaviour (“why” questions) (West et al., 2011). Often findings of
proximate causes are (misleadingly) accredited to be also the ultimate
reason of observations. West et al. (2011) provide an example: Fehr and
Fischbacher (2003) describe a proximate mechanism by defining a strong
reciprocator as someone who has “a predisposition to reward others for
cooperative, norm-abiding behaviours” and “a propensity to impose sanc-
tions on others for norm violations”. Nevertheless, they then use it as the
solution of the ultimate problem of cooperation: “Strong reciprocity thus
constitutes a powerful incentive for cooperation even in non-repeated in-
teractions and when reputation gains are absent”. A similar statement
can be found in Bowles and Gintis (2004): “[C]ooperation is maintained
because many humans have a predisposition to punish those who vio-
late group-beneficial norms”. Continuing to ask for the “why” behind
reciprocal behaviour, and in particular punishment, quickly leads to an-
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other proximate cause: satisfaction (De Quervain et al., 2004). West
et al. (2011) argue that this does not solve the ultimate puzzle because
it does not answer why evolution should have produced a “psychology
or nervous system that mechanistically encourages (rewards) such pun-
ishment”. The same argument can be made for the “warm glow” after
giving (Andreoni, 1990). Although humans may enjoy a warm glow when
cooperating, that does not entail that the reason is to generate the warm
glow. It may very well be “an unintended by-product” (Roemer, 2015).
Indeed, some theorists go as far as suggesting that many of the social
emotions evolved after a system of reciprocal altruism had appeared in
order to preserve or regulate such social cooperation (Trivers, 1971).
While the debate will continue, the problem of determining whether
strong reciprocity provides the ultimate or only the proximate explana-
tion of why humans behave in a certain way in one-shot situations does
not derogate our results. In fact, we are actually interested in the proxi-
mate motivations of behaviour: How do certain features of and/or beliefs
about a decision situation influence an agent’s action? We want the data
gained in experiments to reflect people’s behaviour outside the lab (and
not their adjusted behaviour to the stylized and artificial environment).
Moreover, it does not mean that we have to give up the picture of the pro-
social human who cares about others and their decisions. This is made
clear by de Waal and Suchak (2010): Even though aiding behaviour
“may very well be evolutionary self-serving (e.g. ultimately increases the
actor’s fitness through reciprocal altruism or inclusive fitness)”, from a
proximate perspective it “may be genuinely altruistic in that the actor
performs it without selfish ends in mind”.
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8.2 Trust and trustworthiness
Trusting and trustworthy behaviour is pervading almost all human re-
lationships but also economic transactions (Fehr, 2009). We frequently
rely on our friends and family for favours and trust that the baker will
hand over the bread rolls after we give him the money. Similarly, we do
not drive o↵ after refuelling or leave the restaurant without paying. Few
doubt can be raised about the importance of trust and trustworthiness
as explanatory factors for social and economic behaviour. In fact, they
simplify our life and increase economic welfare for example by saving the
costs of writing and policing contracts.
Since the concepts of trust and trustworthiness are so central and rel-
evant in everyday life, they have been the subject of attention in multiple
research disciplines including economics, which also entailed its emerg-
ing empirical investigation. Some of these studies even suggest a (causal)
relationship between trust at the country level and aggregate economic
activity such as GDP growth and investment (Knack and Keefer, 1997)
or trade volume (Guiso et al., 2009). Kenneth Arrow recognized the
importance of trust on economic performance already in 1972 when he
wrote: “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an ele-
ment of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time.
It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in
the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.” (Arrow,
1972, p. 357)
Interestingly, in spite of the importance of these concepts, there exists
no consensus about their precise definitions. Bacharach et al. (2007) for
instance write: “[D]espite the centrality of trust and trustworthiness in
economic activity, and despite the widespread recognition today of their
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centrality, there remains much mystification about what produces them,
and even about what trust is.” Nevertheless, a primary and consistent
feature of the existing definitions of trust is vulnerability (Rousseau et al.,
1998; Johnson-George and Swap, 1982), prompting (Fehr, 2009, p. 238)
to conclude that “the essence of trust [...] consists of the [trustor’s] will-
ingness to make herself vulnerable to others’ actions”.1 Vulnerability
exists if the trustee has an incentive to exploit the trust granted for per-
sonal (monetary) gain and thus, it is the risk of being worse o↵ than
by not trusting. The definition of trust does not necessarily require a
potential gain (or loss) by the trustee although being compatible with
it (Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010). The term trustworthiness is mostly
used even more vaguely and is less well investigated. Usually, it is used
to describe a situation in which the trustee does not fully expropriate
the surplus created by the trusting act but shares it with the trustor
(e.g. Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2007). Alternatively, trustworthiness
may mean to not take advantage of the other’s vulnerability (Ben-Ner
and Halldorsson, 2010). To enhance trust, it is crucial to understand
under what circumstances trust is not exploited but honoured by trust-
worthiness. Analysing the driving factors behind trustworthiness enables
people who might trust to better judge the risk involved in their decision.
The investment game (Berg et al., 1995; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006;
Johnson and Mislin, 2011) has been the experimental workhorse used
by economists to investigate trusting and trustworthy behaviour. The
large experimental literature studying this game frequently interpret the
observed positive (back-)transfers as trust and trustworthiness, where the
latter is on average an increasing function of the exhibited level of trust
(Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Berg et al., 1995; Fehr and Schmidt,
1Fehr (2009) base this claim on an article by Hong and Bohnet (2007).
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2006). However, Cox (2004) has pointed out that it is unclear whether
the investment game is really about trust as it does not eliminate other
explanations for the observed behaviour such as unconditional altruism.
In the study Why did he do that? Using counterfactuals to study
the e↵ect of intentions in extensive form games, we continued the ap-
proach taken by Cox (2004) and argue that the observed second mover
behaviour in investment games is usually also not separable from reci-
procity2. Specifically, our design allowed us to investigate whether second
movers in the investment game behave benevolent as a reaction to the
gains and losses created by the trustor’s choice – i.e. his generosity or
his vulnerability – or because of the possibility of a mutual gain or as a
reaction to trust as characterized in the trust game (presence of vulner-
ability and the possibility of a deal). Our results indicate that the sec-
ond mover’s benevolence is driven by reciprocity and by a vulnerability-
responsiveness. We however did not find any evidence that trust itself
a↵ects the seond mover’s choice beyond the e↵ects of possible gains and
losses. Overall, trust as defined in the investment or trust games (i.e. as
the combination of vulnerability, generosity and deal-availability) may
not be accurate as this specific combination does not enhance benevo-
lence beyond the e↵ects of the former two. A more detailed investigation
of the e↵ects of the gains and losses created by a first mover is therefore
desirable in order to enhance the understanding of trust as a concept.
Additionally, other factors not present in the trust/investment game
(and our experiment) are most likely important drivers of intention-based
benevolence (and in particular trustworthiness) – most importantly prob-
ably being cultural traits and personality but also the costs of benevo-
2Defining “reciprocity” as the combination of rewarding generous behaviour and
punishing ungenerous behaviour at own material cost (Cox et al., 2008a; survey:
Camerer, 2003b).
8.3. ACTIONS, BELIEFS AND PERCEIVED INTENTIONS 169
lence or the closeness of involved parties.
8.3 Actions, beliefs and perceived inten-
tions
Humans have the ability to theorize about the mental states of oth-
ers. Having such a “theory of mind” allows us to attribute knowledge,
thoughts, beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth to others which helps
to predict or explain others’ actions. Furthermore, it enables one to
understand that mental states can be the cause of the behaviour of oth-
ers (Premack and Woodru↵, 1978). By constantly hypothesizing about
mental states, every human develops a common-sense psychology – ideas
about desires and beliefs, and how they influence actions – which is ad-
justed and fine-tuned in the light of encountered evidence (Suddendorf,
2013, ch. 6). Unheralded flexible scales of social cooperation were proba-
bly reached because humans additionally have a fundamental motivation
to share their own psychological states with others in order to pursue a
shared goal (Tomasello et al., 2005). However, that also means that suc-
cessful cooperation relies crucially on the exchange of each others’ inten-
tions – including attitudes, beliefs, feelings or expectations. In every-day
life, there are many social cues that help us to read the other’s motiva-
tions more accurately. Similarly, we have many means at our disposal
in order to let the others know about our own objectives or about how
we perceived their actions. Such methods of signalling include facial and
body expressions but by far the most powerful instrument is language.
Albeit relying on one signal is prone to deception, the combination of
several typically gives a fairly good idea about the present intentions.
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Unfortunately, in the laboratory setting, most of these channels are
hardly ever available to agents. Yet, inter alia the results presented in
this thesis show that individuals are often concerned about the other’s
perceived desires and intentions, and that their decisions depend on them.
As intentions typically cannot be observed, players have to rely on actions
to form their beliefs about the other’s objectives. An open question is,
though, how players infer intentions and judge behaviour.3
I think, one can quickly agree on the necessity of intentionality, in the
sense of choice-freedom, for the ascription of an intention to the other
person. Blount (1995) and O↵erman (2002) provide experimental evi-
dence that deliberate helpful (harmful) choices are rewarded (punished)
more frequently than identical but randomly generated choices. One
is only (morally and legally) responsible for one’s actions if one had a
choice and could have acted di↵erently. This argument is also the un-
derlying reason why recent findings in cognitive neuroscience (re-)started
a debate in criminal law: A number of studies raise doubts that such a
thing as the free will exists. Instead, they suggest that at least some of
“our” choices are subconsciously initiated before we become conscious of
it (Libet et al., 1983; Haggard, 2011). If criminals are accordingly not
responsible for their actions because they are pre-determined by their
genetics (and environment), on what legal grounds can we hold them
liable and thus prosecute them (e.g. Greene and Cohen, 2004; Jones,
2002; Norrie, 1983)? Although the details of this dispute go far beyond
the scope and pertinence of this thesis, the ongoing discussion highlights
the relevance and importance of intentionality in other fields as well.
3Interestingly, young children’s moral judgements and justifications are deter-
mined by an action’s outcome rather than the actor’s intention. Adults, on the other
hand, have learned to assign more importance to the aim/objective behind an action
than to an action’s consequences for moral judgement (Young et al., 2007).
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Once intentionality is established, motivations can often be specified
through counterfactual reasoning. Interpretations of a certain under-
taken action can thereby diverge depending on the available alternatives.
What a player could have chosen, but did not, may matter just as much
as the choice itself and can thus lead to very di↵erent final outcomes
of an interaction. Evidence for the relevance of the available actions,
the strategy space, is for example shown by Falk et al. (2003): Second
movers in the ultimatum game rejected the same o↵er less often when
it is the most generous o↵er than when it is the least generous in the
first movers opportunity set. Di↵erent options may thereby influence
an action’s assessments through their varying characteristics. This is the
approach we followed in the essayWhy did he do that? Using counterfac-
tuals to study the e↵ect of intentions in extensive form games in Chapter
5 where observable features of the available choices were assumed to
be the exclusive or at least the dominant determinants of participants’
intention-judgements and therefore su cient to derive their preferences.
Since the focus of that study is people’s reaction to the specific charac-
teristics investigated, the chosen approach is valid.
That such an evaluation strategy is however not always su cient can
be seen in the essay Guilt-averse or reciprocal: Looking at behavioural
motivations in the trust game in Chapter 6. We found that, depending
on the decision situation, not only the alternatives mattered but that also
“external” factors a↵ected subjects’ beliefs and perceptions, who altered
their choice-interpretation and in turn their responses. In the study, the
first movers’ options and their decisions were kept constant for second
movers throughout all decision tasks. Yet, despite the non-presence of
clear patterns, the majority adjusted their behaviour to the exogenously
manipulated likelihood to make the choice. As formally modelled by psy-
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chological game theory (Geanakoplos et al., 1989), the intention assigned
to a certain action depends not only on its observable properties and how
they compare to the properties of the option(s) not chosen, but also on
a player’s beliefs. Perhaps the most influential belief for the intention-
judgement is the belief about the other’s expectation in regard to one’s
own choice because it enables inferences about the other’s expectations of
the final payo↵ allocation. However, beliefs can be impacted by all sorts
of things such as framing (Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2012)
or by communication/actions which can be classified as cheap talk (see
Chapter 4). Belief elicitation often seems to be the consequent necessity
in order to draw the correct conclusions from observed choices. Yet, the
correct belief determination is not trivial and has to be done carefully
and in consideration of several drawbacks. A first step to ensure that
subjects take the task seriously and report truthfully is making rewards
dependent on the accuracy of the stated beliefs. Nevertheless, there are
distortions to be considered. In general, the elicitation of beliefs may af-
fect choices but the elicitation of choices may also a↵ect subjects’ beliefs
(Schotter and Trevino, 2013): Asking subjects about their beliefs may
increase their understanding of the game so that they make more sophis-
ticated decisions in line with their beliefs. On the contrary, there exist
several arguments on how choices could alter beliefs: Subjects may jus-
tify their action (to themselves or the experimenter) either to show that
the action was morally acceptable given this belief or that the action was
“right”, respectively consistent with their belief. The evidence is mixed:
some find positive, some negative, and again others find no e↵ects for
both interaction e↵ects (for a summary on the results see Schotter and
Trevino, 2013). These di culties probably explain the still reluctant in-
clusion of beliefs into experimental set-ups. Our strategy to avoid or at
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least to minimize the side-e↵ects associated with the belief elicitation was
twofold. In the essay Guilt-averse or reciprocal: Looking at behavioural
motivations in the trust game, we introduced an impartial observer whose
average beliefs could be used as instruments for the actual beliefs of inter-
est (second mover’s average beliefs). Such a design was however not rich
enough for our research question in the essay Driving a hard bargain is a
balancing act: The importance of reciprocity in bargaining, where we were
interested in individual beliefs. Since our main focus was nevertheless on
participants’ choices, we elicited the beliefs only after we had collected
all answers in the choice task. As we did not mention guesses until af-
ter choice strategies were made, the belief elicitation should not a↵ect
participants’ prior decisions. Moreover, I argue that beliefs are neither
a↵ected very much (if at all) by the choices made beforehand because
subjects had to make relatively many decisions on partitions (due to the
use of the strategy method) which lowers the probability of remembering
the exact choice previously made.
Summing up, the experimental investigation of intentions is subject
to manifold challenges. The interpretation of an action and the deriva-
tion of the other’s intention in the lab is rather di cult because the
auxiliary means like body and vocal language are missing. An action
by itself may therefore just not contain enough information to clearly
convey/communicate its actor’s goal or intention uniquely. As a con-
sequence, it is often crucial to elicit a player’s belief about the other’s
motives and expectations. The assumption of homogeneous beliefs can
occasionally be misleading since agents may interpret the same situation
di↵erently due to the limited cues.
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8.4 Emotions
The idea that many of our decisions are caused by emotions (at least as
the proximate cause) rather than being based solely on deliberate consid-
erations can be traced back to the work of David Hume and Adam Smith.
John Maynard Keynes (1937) also subscribed to this view: “Most, prob-
ably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of
which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as
the result of animal spirits – a spontaneous urge to action rather than in-
action, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative ben-
efits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.”4 Nevertheless, emotions
were ignored in economics for a long time. Economic models of decision-
making generally assume that agents decide between alternatives (be it
goods or actions) by evaluating their desirability and likelihood of their
consequences. Decision-makers then aggregate the so obtained informa-
tion by calculating the resulting expected “utility” and choose the option
that expectedly maximizes this utility. Emotions do not per se challenge
this conception. And slowly, behavioural and experimental economists
are starting to accept the challenge of integrating emotions in their the-
ories.
Expected emotions for instance can rather easily be incorporated in
economic models. Expected or anticipated emotions are feelings that are
not experienced at the time of decision-making but are foreseen to be
undergone in the future (Rick and Loewenstein, 2010). Hence, they are
only cognitions of future emotions which arise from thinking about the
consequences. Expected emotions can then be modelled just as another
characteristic of a certain choice which influences an agent’s utility (Rick
4The passage can be found in The General Theory of Employment, Chapter 12,
VII.
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and Loewenstein, 2010). Interestingly, Jeremy Bentham (1789) had al-
ready assigned a prominent role to emotions in his theory (and discussed
their determinants and nature quite extensively) when he first proposed
his construct of utility. In fact, he considered utility as the net sum of
positive and negative emotions (pleasure and pain). However, the psy-
chological substantiations of utility were subsequently ignored in later
models although economists did not explicitly deny the general compat-
ibility of expected emotions with the utility framework (Loewenstein,
2000). Recent examples of the successful incorporation of expected emo-
tions in economic theories include the regret model by Loomes and Sug-
den (1982) and the theory of guilt aversion by Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006).
But not all feelings can be foreseen or accurately predicted. That is
why we frequently even delay our decisions, saying “I will see how I feel.”.
The inclusion of such immediate emotions that are only experienced in
the moment of choice is more di cult. Underlying these immediate emo-
tions are often visceral factors which are most often very beneficial in
guiding our daily functioning but can also push our decisions in a direc-
tion di↵erent to the one suggested by a (weighted) long-term cost-benefit
analysis (Loewenstein, 2000). Such visceral factors capture people’s at-
tention and motivate them to make specific choices or act in a particular
way. Visceral responses can thereby change desires rapidly because they
are themselves a↵ected by external and/or internal stimuli. Hunger for
example can reflect the internal bodily state but appetite can also be
(artificially) triggered or magnified by external sources such as the smell
of food. The overriding power of these “passions” led David Hume (1739-
40) to write the often quoted sentence “[r]eason is, and ought only to be
the slave of the passions”. However, their fundamentality does not pre-
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vent us humans to over-interpret the importance of higher-level cognition
for decision-making. Instead, people interpret their own behaviour as a
result of deliberate considerations even when this is not the case (see
Wegner and Wheatley (1999) for a review on findings). Interestingly,
this is true even though immediate emotions often drive one’s behaviour
against self-interest and people are generally aware of that fact. This
does not mean that emotions are irrational in the long-run, though.5 In
the case of moralistic emotions, Trivers (2002) posits that they emerged
as strategies in the reciprocity game. Liking for example is the emotion
to initiate cooperation, anger protects a person against a cheater, and
guilt can prevent a cheater from actually cheating (Trivers, 2002, pp. 39-
41; Pinker, 1997, pp. 404-405). In this way, moralistic emotions are an
important factor in securing long-term cooperation benefits.
Despite the considerable challenges, some experimental work has been
done on the understanding and impact of an immediate emotional and
a more deliberate response to moral judgement and subsequent decision-
making. Xiao and Houser (2005) for example ask whether one punishes
because one feels anger or because the other’s action is recognized or
interpreted as unkind/uncooperative. They provide responders in the
ultimatum game the option to send written messages to proposers in
addition to their acceptance/rejection decision. They find that rejection
rates drop by half if the o↵ered amount was 20 percent or less of the
total. And 80 percent of the messages were expressing “negative emo-
tions”. For more generous o↵ers, they found no significant di↵erence in
rejection rates. Grimm and Mengel (2011) add that this emotional re-
5Evolutionary psychologists argue that the emotional system has evolved in order
to carry out fast evaluations of important judgements and decisions that occur re-
peatedly (Cosmides and Tooby, 2000). Yet, most emotional reactions reflect adapted
behaviour to ancient living environments and conditions which have changed signifi-
cantly over the last centuries. Thus, some emotions may seem irrational nowadays.
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action is relatively short-lived. They find that a ten minute delay before
responders in the ultimatum game accept or reject reduces the rejection
rate of low o↵ers of 20-30 percent of the total surplus from 60-80 to 20
percent.
These findings are especially interesting in the context of the use of the
strategy method. Under classical assumption of purely rational agents,
emotions do not play a role in decision-making and thus the use of the
strategy method remains without consequences. Yet, given the research
indicated above, more caution is appropriate. By making conditional
decisions for every possible information scenario, participants’ emotions
are likely to be reduced as their decisions are based on hypothetical con-
siderations (Roth, 1995a). Nevertheless, most studies investigating the
e↵ect of using the direct-response versus the strategy method report no
qualitative di↵erence in results (e.g. Brandts and Charness, 2011; Zizzo,
2010). Contrariwise, the level of punishment (Brandts and Charness,
2011) and trustworthiness (Casari and Cason, 2009) has been shown to
be reduced. In such, the presented work is most likely to provide the
lower bound of behaviour. The e↵ects of trust, kindness and intention-
based benevolence may be larger when emotions are not moderated.
In my view, further research on emotions is needed for attaining a bet-
ter understanding of the di↵erences and interaction of these two channels
of decision-making which Kahneman (2011) calls the fast automatic “Sys-
tem 1” and the slow “System 2” which includes complex computations.
More work on the types of emotions experienced and their accurate pre-
diction is also needed, along with the investigation of the circumstances
in and the degree to which decisions are guided by expected emotions.
In particular, the role of visceral factors underlying immediate emotional
responses have to date received too little attention given their enormous
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impact on our choices.
Chapter 9
Concluding Remarks
While the papers presented investigate nuances of di↵erent motivations
underlying pro-social behaviour, the overall picture is clear: People’s
behaviour di↵ers substantially from the standard economic predictions
assuming only self-interested individuals. While one’s own material well-
being most certainly is an important influence of people’s choices, it is
definitely not the only one. I would like to conclude by saying that this is
lucky for human society and end with a quote by Hirshleifer (1987): “The
economist must go beyond the assumption of “economic man” precisely
because of the economic advantage of not behaving like economic man –
an advantage that presumably explains why the world is not populated
solely by economic men.”
180 CHAPTER 9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Bibliography
(2003). The norm of restaurant tipping. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 52(3):297–321.
Abreu, D. and Gul, F. (2000). Bargaining and reputation. Econometrica,
68(1):85–117.
Al-Ubaydli, O. and Lee, M. S. (2012). Do you reward and punish in the
way you think others expect you to? The Journal of Socio-Economics,
41(3):336–343.
Anbarci, N., Feltovich, N., and Gu¨rdal, M. Y. (2015). Lying about the
price? ultimatum bargaining with messages and imperfectly observed
o↵ers. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 116:346–360.
Andersen, S., Ertac¸, S., Gneezy, U., Ho↵man, M., and List, J. A. (2011).
Stakes matter in ultimatum games. American Economic Review, pages
3427–3439.
Andersson, O., Galizzi, M. M., Hoppe, T., Kranz, S., Van Der Wiel,
K., and Wengstro¨m, E. (2010). Persuasion in experimental ultimatum
games. Economics Letters, 108(1):16–18.
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods: a
theory of warm-glow giving. Economic Journal, pages 464–477.
Andreoni, J. and Bernheim, B. D. (2009). Social image and the 50–
50 norm: A theoretical and experimental analysis of audience e↵ects.
Econometrica, 77(5):1607–1636.
Andreoni, J. and Miller, J. (1993). Rational cooperation in the finitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma: Experimental evidence. Economic Jour-
nal, pages 570–585.
Andreoni, J. and Miller, J. (2002). Giving according to garp: An exper-
imental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism. Economet-
rica, 70(2):737–753.
182 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arrow, K. J. (1972). Gifts and exchanges. Philosophy & Public A↵airs,
pages 343–362.
Ashraf, N., Bohnet, I., and Piankov, N. (2006). Decomposing trust and
trustworthiness. Experimental Economics, 9(3):193–208.
Attanasi, G., Battigalli, P., and Nagel, R. (2013). Disclosure of Belief-
Dependent Preferences in a Trust Game. Working Papers 506, IGIER
(Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi Uni-
versity.
Bacharach, M. and Gambetta, D. (2001). Trust in signs. Trust in society,
2:148–184.
Bacharach, M., Guerra, G., and Zizzo, D. J. (2007). The self-fulfilling
property of trust: An experimental study. Theory and Decision,
63(4):349–388.
Balafoutas, L., Fornwagner, H., et al. (2016). The limits of guilt. Tech-
nical report.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1997). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory
of mind. MIT press.
Battigalli, P. and Dufwenberg, M. (2007). Guilt in games. The American
Economic Review, pages 170–176.
Battigalli, P. and Dufwenberg, M. (2009). Dynamic psychological games.
Journal of Economic Theory, 144(1):1–35.
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., and Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt:
an interpersonal approach. Psychological bulletin, 115(2):243.
Bellemare, C., Sebald, A., and Strobel, M. (2011). Measuring the will-
ingness to pay to avoid guilt: estimation using equilibrium and stated
belief models. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 26(3):437–453.
Bellemare, C., Sebald, A., and Suetens, S. (2015). Heterogeneous guilt
aversion and incentive e↵ects.
Ben-Ner, A. and Halldorsson, F. (2010). Trusting and trustworthiness:
What are they, how to measure them, and what a↵ects them. Journal
of Economic Psychology, 31(1):64–79.
Be´nabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2006). Incentives and prosocial behavior.
The American Economic Review, 96(5):1652–1678.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 183
Bentham, J. (2007). An introduction to the principles of morals and
legislation. Courier Corporation. [originally published, 1789].
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and
social history. Games and economic behavior, 10(1):122–142.
Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. (2008). Status incentives. The American
Economic Review, 98(2):206–211.
Binmore, K. (2005). Natural justice. Oxford University Press.
Binmore, K. (2006). Why do people cooperate? Politics, Philosophy &
Economics, 5(1):81–96.
Binmore, K., Shaked, A., and Sutton, J. (1985). Testing noncooperative
bargaining theory: A preliminary study. American Economic Review,
75(5):1178–1180.
Blanco, M., Engelmann, D., Koch, A. K., and Normann, H.-T. (2010).
Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem? Experi-
mental Economics, 13(4):412–438.
Blount, S. (1995). When social outcomes aren? t fair: The e↵ect of
causal attributions on preferences. Organizational behavior and human
decision processes, 63(2):131–144.
Bolle, F., Tan, J. H., and Zizzo, D. J. (2014). Vendettas. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(2):93–130.
Bolton, G. E. (1991). A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and
evidence. The American Economic Review, pages 1096–1136.
Bolton, G. E. and Ockenfels, A. (2000). Erc: A theory of equity, reci-
procity, and competition. The American Economic Review, pages 166–
193.
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (2000). Reciprocity, self-interest, and the wel-
fare state. Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 26(1):33–53.
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (2003). Origins of human cooperation. Genetic
and cultural evolution of cooperation, 2003:429–43.
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (2004). The evolution of strong reciprocity:
cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Theoretical population bi-
ology, 65(1):17–28.
184 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (2009). Beyond enlightened self-interest: so-
cial norms, other-regarding preferences, and cooperative behavior. In
Games, Groups, and the Global Good, pages 57–78. Springer.
Brandts, J. and Charness, G. (2011). The strategy versus the direct-
response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons. Experi-
mental Economics, 14(3):375–398.
Burke, M. A. and Young, H. P. (2010). Social norms. Handbook of Social
Economics, pages 311–36.
Burnham, T. C. (2007). High-testosterone men reject low ultimatum
game o↵ers. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological
Sciences, 274(1623):2327–2330.
Camerer, C. (2003a). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic
interaction. Princeton University Press.
Camerer, C. (2003b). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic
interaction. Princeton University Press.
Camerer, C. F. and Fehr, E. (2004). Foundations of Human Sociality -
Experimental and Ethnograhic Evidence from 15 Small-Scale Societies,
chapter Measuring social norms and preferences using experimental
games: A guide for social scientists. Oxford University Press.
Campbell III, C. M. and Kamlani, K. S. (1997). The reasons for wage
rigidity: evidence from a survey of firms. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, pages 759–789.
Caporael, L. R., Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., and Van de Kragt, A. J.
(1989). Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic
incentives. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12(04):683–699.
Casari, M. and Cason, T. N. (2009). The strategy method lowers mea-
sured trustworthy behavior. Economics Letters, 103(3):157–159.
Charness, G. and Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and partnership.
Econometrica, 74(6):1579–1601.
Charness, G. and Kuhn, P. (2011). Lab labor: What can labor economists
learn from the lab? Handbook of labor economics, 4:229–330.
Charness, G. and Levine, D. I. (2007). Intention and stochastic outcomes:
An experimental study. The Economic Journal, 117(522):1051–1072.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 185
Charness, G., Masclet, D., and Villeval, M. C. (2010). Competitive pref-
erences and status as an incentive: Experimental evidence. Groupe
d’Analyse et de The´orie Economique working paper, (1016).
Charness, G. and Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences
with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3):817–869.
Chaudhuri, A. and Gangadharan, L. (2007). An experimental analysis of
trust and trustworthiness. Southern Economic Journal, pages 959–985.
Cialdini, R. B. (2001). Influence: Science and Practice. Boston, MA:
Allyn and Bacon.
Cialdini, R. B., Trost, M. R., and Newsom, J. T. (1995). Preference for
consistency: The development of a valid measure and the discovery of
surprising behavioral implications. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 69(2):318.
Clarke, D. M. (1923). The Ha´vama´l, with Selections from Other Poems
of the Edda, Illustrating the Wisdom of the North in Heathen Times.
Cambridge University Press.
Collard, D. (1975). Edgeworth’s propositions on altruism. The Economic
Journal, 85(338):355–360.
Cooper, D. and Kagel, J. H. (2009). Other regarding preferences: a se-
lective survey of experimental results. Handbook of experimental eco-
nomics, 2.
Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (2000). Evolutionary psychology and the
emotions. Handbook of emotions, 2:91–115.
Cox, J. C. (2004). How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and
Economic Behavior, 46(2):260–281.
Cox, J. C. and Deck, C. A. (2005). On the nature of reciprocal motives.
Economic Inquiry, 43(3):623–635.
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., and Gjerstad, S. (2007). A tractable model of
reciprocity and fairness. Games and Economic Behavior, 59(1):17–45.
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., and Sadiraj, V. (2008a). Revealed altruism.
Econometrica, 76(1):31–69.
186 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cox, J. C. and Hall, D. T. (2010). Trust with private and common prop-
erty: E↵ects of stronger property right entitlements. Games, 1(4):527–
550.
Cox, J. C., Kerschbamer, R., and Neururer, D. (2014). What is trust-
worthiness and what drives it? Technical report.
Cox, J. C., Sadiraj, K., and Sadiraj, V. (2008b). Implications of trust,
fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior. Experimental
Economics, 11(1):1–24.
Cox, J. C. and Sadiraj, V. (2007). On modeling voluntary contributions
to public goods. Public Finance Review, 35(2):311–332.
Cox, J. C. and Sadiraj, V. (2012). Direct tests of individual preferences
for e ciency and equity. Economic Inquiry, 50(4):920–931.
Crawford, V. P. and Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1431–1451.
Croson, R., Boles, T., and Murnighan, J. K. (2003). Cheap talk in bar-
gaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 51(2):143–159.
Darby, M. R. and Karni, E. (1973). Free competition and the optimal
amount of fraud. Journal of law and economics, pages 67–88.
Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man and selection in relation to sex.
Murray, London.
Darwin, C. (1969). On the origin of species by means of natural selection,
or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. Murray,
London (5th ed.).
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford University Press.
De Quervain, D. J., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M.,
et al. (2004). The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science,
305(5688):1254.
de Waal, F. B. and Suchak, M. (2010). Prosocial primates: selfish and
unselfish motivations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
B: Biological Sciences, 365(1553):2711–2722.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 187
Dufwenberg, M., Ga¨chter, S., and Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2011). The fram-
ing of games and the psychology of play. Games and Economic Be-
havior, 73(2):459–478.
Dufwenberg, M. and Gneezy, U. (2000). Measuring beliefs in an exper-
imental lost wallet game. Games and Economic Behavior, 30(2):163–
182.
Dufwenberg, M. and Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential
reciprocity. Games and economic behavior, 47(2):268–298.
Dulleck, U. and Kerschbamer, R. (2006). On doctors, mechanics, and
computer specialists: The economics of credence goods. Journal of
Economic literature, pages 5–42.
Durham, Y., McKinnon, T., and Schulman, C. (2007). Classroom exper-
iments: Not just fun and games. Economic Inquiry, 45(1):162–178.
Ederer, F. and Stremitzer, A. (2014). Promises and expectations.
Edmonds, C. (1855). Cicero’s Three Books of O ces, Or, Moral Duties:
Also His Cato Major, an Essay on Old Age ; Laelius, an Essay on
Friendship ; Paradoxes ; Scipio’s Dream ; And, Letter to Quintus on
the Duties of a Magistrate. Harper’s new classical library. Harper &
Brothers.
El Mouden, C., Burton-Chellew, M., Gardner, A., andWest, S. A. (2012).
What do humans maximize? Evolution and Rationality: Decisions,
Co-operation and Strategic Behaviour, page 23.
Ellingsen, T. and Johannesson, M. (2008). Pride and prejudice: The hu-
man side of incentive theory. American Economic Review, 98(3):990–
1008.
Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., Mollerstrom, J., and Munkhammar, S.
(2012). Social framing e↵ects: Preferences or beliefs? Games and
Economic Behavior, 76(1):117–130.
Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., Tjøtta, S., and Torsvik, G. (2010). Test-
ing guilt aversion. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1):95–107.
Elster, J. (1989). Social norms and economic theory. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 3(4):99–117.
188 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Embrey, M., Fre´chette, G. R., and Lehrer, S. F. (2014). Bargaining
and reputation: An experiment on bargaining in the presence of be-
havioural types. The Review of Economic Studies, page rdu029.
Engelmann, D. and Fischbacher, U. (2009). Indirect reciprocity and
strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. Games
and Economic Behavior, 67(2):399–407.
Engelmann, D. and Strobel, M. (2004). Inequality aversion, e ciency,
and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments. The
American Economic Review, 94(4):857–869.
Eriksson, T. and Villeval, M. C. (2012). Respect and relational contracts.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81(1):286–298.
Falk, A., Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U. (2003). On the nature of fair
behavior. Economic Inquiry, 41(1):20–26.
Falk, A., Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U. (2005). Driving forces behind
informal sanctions. Econometrica, 73(6):2017–2030.
Falk, A., Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U. (2008). Testing theories
of fairness—intentions matter. Games and Economic Behavior,
62(1):287–303.
Falk, A. and Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and
Economic Behavior, 54(2):293–315.
Falk, A. and Heckman, J. J. (2009). Lab experiments are a major source
of knowledge in the social sciences. Science, 326(5952):535–538.
Fehr, E. (2009). On the economics and biology of trust. Journal of the
European Economic Association, 7(2-3):235–266.
Fehr, E. and Falk, A. (1999). Wage rigidity in a competitive incomplete
contract market. Journal of Political Economy, 107(1):106–134.
Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2002). Why social preferences matter–the
impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incen-
tives. Economic Journal, 112(478):C1–C33.
Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism.
Nature, 425(6960):785–791.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 189
Fehr, E. and Ga¨chter, S. (1998). How e↵ective are trust-and reciprocity-
based incentives. Economics, Values, and Organization, pages 337–
363.
Fehr, E. and Ga¨chter, S. (2000). Fairness and retaliation: The economics
of reciprocity. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3):159–181.
Fehr, E., Ga¨chter, S., and Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity as a
contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence. Econometrica,
pages 833–860.
Fehr, E. and Henrich, J. (2003). Is strong reciprocity a maladaptation?
on the evolutionary foundations of human altruism.
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., and Riedl, A. (1993). Does fairness prevent
market clearing? an experimental investigation. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 108(2):437–459.
Fehr, E., Naef, M., and Schmidt, K. M. (2006). Inequality aversion,
e ciency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments:
Comment. The American economic review, 96(5):1912–1917.
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition,
and cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3):817–
868.
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (2006). The economics of fairness, reci-
procity and altruism–experimental evidence and new theories. Hand-
book of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity, 1:615–691.
Fisman, R., Kariv, S., and Markovits, D. (2007). Individual preferences
for giving. The American Economic Review, pages 1858–1876.
Fleming, P. and Zizzo, D. J. (2015). A simple stress test of experimenter
demand e↵ects. Theory and Decision, 78(2):219–231.
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., and Sefton, M. (1994). Fair-
ness in simple bargaining experiments. Games and Economic behavior,
6(3):347–369.
Ga¨chter, S. and Falk, A. (2002). Reputation and reciprocity: Conse-
quences for the labour relation. The Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 104(1):1–26.
190 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ga¨chter, S., Nosenzo, D., and Sefton, M. (2013). Peer e↵ects in pro-social
behavior: Social norms or social preferences? Journal of the European
Economic Association, 11(3):548–573.
Galinsky, A. D. and Mussweiler, T. (2001). First o↵ers as anchors: the
role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus. Journal of personality
and social psychology, 81(4):657.
Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D., and Stacchetti, E. (1989). Psychological
games and sequential rationality. Games and Economic Behavior,
1(1):60–79.
Gintis, H. (2000). Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of
Theoretical Biology, 206(2):169–179.
Goldreich, D. and Pomorski,  L. (2011). Initiating bargaining. The Review
of Economic Studies, 78(4):1299–1328.
Greene, J. and Cohen, J. (2004). For the law, neuroscience changes
nothing and everything. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci,
359(1451):1775–85.
Greiner, B. (2015). Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing
experiments with orsee. Journal of the Economic Science Association,
1(1):114–125.
Grimm, V. and Mengel, F. (2011). Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces
rejection rates in ultimatum games. Economics Letters, 111(2):113–
115.
Guerra, G. and Zizzo, D. (2004). Trust responsiveness and beliefs. Jour-
nal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 55(1):25–30.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2009). Cultural biases in eco-
nomic exchange?. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3):1095 – 1131.
Gu¨th, W., Schmittberger, R., and Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental
analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 3(4):367–388.
Haggard, P. (2011). Decision time for free will. Neuron, 69(3):404–406.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. ii.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1):17–52.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 191
Harrison, G. W. and Rutstro¨m, E. E. (2009). Expected utility theory
and prospect theory: One wedding and a decent funeral. Experimental
Economics, 12(2):133–158.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (2008). Contracts as reference points. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1):1–48.
He↵etz, O. and Frank, R. H. (2008). Preferences for status: Evidence and
economic implications. Handbook of Social Economics, Jess Benhabib,
Alberto Bisin, Matthew Jackson, eds, 1:69–91.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H.,
McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005).
Economic man in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments
in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(06):795–
815.
Hirshleifer, J. (1987). On the emotions as guarantors of threats and
promises. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Holt, C. A. (2006). Markets, games, and strategic behavior: recipes for
interactive learning. Pearson Addison Wesley.
Hong, K. and Bohnet, I. (2007). Status and distrust: The relevance
of inequality and betrayal aversion. Journal of Economic Psychology,
28(2):197–213.
Hume, D. (2012). A treatise of human nature. Courier Corporation.
[originally published 1739-40].
Hurley, T. M. and Shogren, J. F. (2005). An experimental compari-
son of induced and elicited beliefs. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
30(2):169–188.
Johnson, N. D. and Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5):865–889.
Johnson-George, C. and Swap, W. C. (1982). Measurement of specific
interpersonal trust: Construction and validation of a scale to assess
trust in a specific other. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
43(6):1306.
Jones, M. (2002). Overcoming the myth of free will in criminal law: the
true impact of the genetic revolution. Duke LJ, 52:1031.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan.
192 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., and Thaler, R. H. (1986). Fairness and
the assumptions of economics. Journal of business, pages S285–S300.
Kawagoe, T. and Narita, Y. (2014). Guilt aversion revisited: An ex-
perimental test of a new model. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 102:1–9.
Keynes, J. M. (2013). The general theory of employment, interest and
money. Edison Martin. [originally published 1936].
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic
payo↵? a cross-country investigation. The Quarterly journal of eco-
nomics, pages 1251–1288.
Kriss, P. H., Nagel, R., and Weber, R. A. (2013). Implicit vs. explicit
deception in ultimatum games with incomplete information. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93:337–346.
Krupka, E., Leider, S., and Jiang, M. (2011). A meeting of the minds:
Contracts and social norms. Technical report, mimeo, University of
Michigan.
Krupka, E. L. and Weber, R. A. (2013). Identifying social norms using
coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? Journal
of the European Economic Association, 11(3):495–524.
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. Oxford University Press.
Levine, D. K. (1998). Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments.
Review of economic dynamics, 1(3):593–622.
Levitt, S. D. and List, J. A. (2007). What do laboratory experiments
measuring social preferences reveal about the real world? The Journal
of Economic Perspectives, pages 153–174.
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., and Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time
of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity
(readiness-potential). Brain, 106(3):623–642.
Loewenstein, G. (2000). Emotions in economic theory and economic
behavior. American Economic Review, pages 426–432.
Loomes, G. and Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: An alternative theory
of rational choice under uncertainty. The Economic Journal, pages
805–824.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 193
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., and Smith, V. L. (2003). Positive reci-
procity and intentions in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 52(2):267–275.
Mullainathan, S. and Thaler, R. H. (2000). Behavioral economics. Tech-
nical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Munier, B. and Zaharia, C. (2002). High stakes and acceptance behavior
in ultimatum bargaining. Theory and Decision, 53(3):187–207.
Nash, J. (1953). Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society, pages 128–140.
Nikiforakis, N. (2008). Punishment and counter-punishment in public
good games: Can we really govern ourselves? Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 92(1):91–112.
Norrie, A. (1983). Freewill, determinism and criminal justice. Legal
Studies, 3(1):60–73.
O↵erman, T. (2002). Hurting hurts more than helping helps. European
Economic Review, 46(8):1423–1437.
Okasha, S. (2013). Biological altruism. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2013 edition.
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3):137–158.
Pennisi, E. (2005). How did cooperative behavior evolve? Science,
309(5731):93–93.
Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. 1997. NY: Norton.
Premack, D. and Woodru↵, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a
theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(04):515–526.
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and eco-
nomics. The American Economic Review, 83(5):1281–1302.
Rabin, M. (2002). A perspective on psychology and economics. European
economic review, 46(4):657–685.
Rai↵a, H. (1982). The art and science of negotiation. Harvard University
Press.
194 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rai↵a, H., Richardson, J., and Metcalfe, D. (2002). Negotiation anal-
ysis: the science and art of collaborative decision making. Harvard
University Press.
Rankin, F. W. (2003). Communication in ultimatum games. Economics
Letters, 81(2):267–271.
Reuben, E., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2009). Is mistrust self-
fulfilling? Economics Letters, 104(2):89–91.
Rick, S. and Loewenstein, G. (2010). The role of emotion in economic
behavior. In Lewis, M., Haviland-Jones, J. M., and Barrett, L. F.,
editors, Handbook of emotions, chapter 9. Guilford Press.
Roemer, J. E. (2015).
Ross, L., Greene, D., and House, P. (1977). Journal of experimental
social psychology, 13(3):279–301.
Roth, A. (1995a). Bargaining experiments. In Kagel, J. and Roth, A.,
editors, Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Roth, A. E. (1995b). The handbook of experimental economics. chapter
Bargaining experiments. Princeton university press Princeton, NJ.
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., and Camerer, C. (1998).
Not so di↵erent after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of
management review, 23(3):393–404.
Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econo-
metrica, pages 97–109.
Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas a
meta-analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality and soci-
ety, 7(1):58–92.
Samuelson, P. and Nordhaus, W. (1985). Principles of economics.
Scha↵ner, M. (2013). Technical report, QUT Business School.
Schotter, A. and Sopher, B. (2006). Trust and trustworthiness in games:
An experimental study of intergenerational advice. Experimental Eco-
nomics, 9(2):123–145.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 195
Schotter, A. and Trevino, I. (2013). Belief elicitation in the lab. Annual
Review of Economics, 6(1).
Schweinsberg, M., Ku, G., Wang, C. S., and Pillutla, M. M. (2012).
Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power
in negotiations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1):226–
231.
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, pages 99–118.
Slonim, R. and Roth, A. E. (1998). Learning in high stakes ultimatum
games: An experiment in the slovak republic. Econometrica, pages
569–596.
St˚ahl, I. (1972). Bargaining Theory. (Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet
vid Handelsho¨gskolan i Stockholm (EFI)).
Stanca, L. (2009). Measuring indirect reciprocity: Whose back do we
scratch? Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(2):190–202.
Stanca, L., Bruni, L., and Corazzini, L. (2009). Testing theories of reci-
procity: Do motivations matter? Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 71(2):233–245.
Strassmair, C. (2009). Can intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? an
experimental study. Technical report, Munich discussion paper.
Straub, P. G. and Murnighan, J. K. (1995). An experimental investi-
gation of ultimatum games: Information, fairness, expectations, and
lowest acceptable o↵ers. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion, 27(3):345–364.
Suddendorf, T. (2013). The gap: the science of what separates us from
other animals. Basic Books.
Sugden, R. (1984). Reciprocity: the supply of public goods through
voluntary contributions. Economic Journal, pages 772–787.
Tingley, D. H. and Walter, B. F. (2011). Can cheap talk deter? an
experimental analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(6):996–1020.
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., and Moll, H. (2005).
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cogni-
tion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(05):675–691.
196 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Train, K. (2009). Discrete choice methods with simulation. Cambridge
university press.
Trivers, R. (2002). Natural selection and social theory: Selected papers
of Robert Trivers. Oxford University Press Oxford.
Trivers, R. (2004). Mutual benefits at all levels of life. Science,
304(5673):964–965.
Trivers, R. (2006). Reciprocal altruism: 30 years later. In Cooperation
in primates and humans, pages 67–83. Springer.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly
Review of Biology, pages 35–57.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty:
Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157):1124–1131.
Vanberg, C. (2008). Why do people keep their promises? an experimental
test of two explanations1. Econometrica, 76(6):1467–1480.
Wegner, D. M. and Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation:
Sources of the experience of will. American Psychologist, 54(7):480.
West, S. A., El Mouden, C., and Gardner, A. (2011). Sixteen common
misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans. Evolu-
tion and Human Behavior, 32(4):231–262.
Wilcox, N. T. (2008). Stochastic models for binary discrete choice un-
der risk: A critical primer and econometric comparison. Research in
experimental economics, 12:197–292.
Wilcox, N. T. and Feltovich, N. (2000). Thinking like a game theorist:
Comment. University of Houston Department of Economics working
paper.
Wolitzky, A. (2012). Reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge
of rationality. Econometrica, 80(5):2047–2087.
Xiao, E. and Houser, D. (2005). Emotion expression in human punish-
ment behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of
the United States of America, 102(20):7398–7401.
Yamagishi, T., Horita, Y., Mifune, N., Hashimoto, H., Li, Y., Shinada,
M., Miura, A., Inukai, K., Takagishi, H., and Simunovic, D. (2012).
Rejection of unfair o↵ers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of
BIBLIOGRAPHY 197
strong reciprocity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
109(50):20364–20368.
Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., and Saxe, R. (2007). The neural
basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(20):8235–8240.
Young, P. (1998). Social norms and economic welfare. European Eco-
nomic Review, 42(3):821–830.
Zizzo, D. J. (2003). Empirical evidence on interdependent preferences:
nature or nurture? Cambridge Journal of Economics, 27(6):867–880.
Zizzo, D. J. (2010). Experimenter demand e↵ects in economic experi-
ments. Experimental Economics, 13(1):75–98.
198 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 4
General Instructions 
 
 
General Remarks  
Thank you for participating in this experiment on decision-making. During the experiment you and the 
other participants are asked to make a series of decisions. The money you will earn will depend partly on 
your own choices and partly on the choices of other participants. All payments will be made confidentially 
and in cash at the end of the experiment. Please consider all expressions as gender neutral.  
Please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any questions after we finish reading the 
instructions please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you and answer your question in 
private.  
 
 
2 Roles  
There are two roles in this experiment: Player A and Player B. At the start of the experiment you will be 
assigned to one of these two roles through a randomized procedure. Your role will then remain the same 
throughout the experiment. Your role will only be known to you. Each Player A will be randomly paired 
with one Player B. No one will ever be informed about the identity of the participant you were paired with 
nor will anybody else be informed about the choices you made. 
 
 
Earnings  
You will receive $3 for participating in this experiment. Depending on your decisions and the decisions of 
other participants you will receive an additional amount according to the rules explained below. 
 
 
Privacy  
This experiment is designed such that nobody, including the experimenters and the other participants, will 
ever be informed about the choices you or anyone else will make in the experiment. Neither your name 
nor your student ID will appear on any decision form. The only identifying label will be a number that is 
known only to you. At the end of the experiment, you are asked one-by-one to collect your earnings in an 
envelope from a person who has no involvement in and no information about the experiment. 
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A.1 Instructions – Experiment
The Game 
 
 
In this experiment, you play with one other participant. Each Player A will be randomly paired with one 
Player B. Each A/B pair can divide an amount of $10 among themselves.  
1. Player A proposes how he thinks the $10 should be divided between him and Player B.  
 
2. Player B can then either "accept" or "reject" Player A's proposition.  
 
o If he accepts, both players will receive an amount according to Player A's suggested partition.  
o If he rejects Player A's proposition, Player B makes a counteroffer regarding the split of the 
$10 between him and Player A. 
 
3. If Player B has rejected and made his counteroffer, Player A can either "accept" or "reject" the 
partition of the $10 that is proposed to him by Player B.  
 
o If Player A accepts, both players will receive an amount according to Player B's suggested 
partition.  
o If Player A rejects, both players earn nothing.  
 
 
 
Decision Tasks 
 
Decision Task - Player A 
If you are assigned the role of Player A, you will make two decisions: 
1. You are asked to make a proposition on how much of the $10 you want to keep for yourself. 
You can keep any amount between $0 and $10. The rest (if any) will be offered to Player B. 
 
2. You will not be informed whether Player B accepts or rejects your proposition before the end of 
the experiment. You are therefore asked to state the minimum amount you would need to 
receive in a counteroffer to just accept it. This means that you would accept all counteroffers 
above or equal to this amount and reject all below it. 
 
 
Decision Task - Player B 
If you are assigned the role of Player B, you are asked to decide whether you accept or reject Player 
A’s offer regarding the split of the $10.  
 
If you reject his offer, you are asked to make a counteroffer as to how you think the $10 should be 
divided. In your counteroffer, you can keep any amount between $0 and $10. The rest (if any) will be 
offered to Player A.  
During the experiment you will not be informed about Player A’s actual offer. You therefore make all 
your choices for each possible offer from Player A. 
 
 
 
Earnings 
At the end of the experiment the cash payments are determined for each pair of participants: 
  Payoff Player A 
Payoff 
Player B 
a) B accepts A’s offer of $X  $10 - $X $X 
b) B rejects A’s offer of $X and 
 
 
 
 
• B’s counteroffer of $Y for A is bigger than (or 
equal to) A’s minimum amount to accept 
 
• B’s counteroffer of $Y for A is smaller than 
A’s minimum amount to accept 
$Y 
 
 
$0 
$10 - $Y 
 
 
$0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions - Part II 
 
We ask you now to guess some of the answers the other player gave or is about to give. You can 
earn additional money for your guesses if they are correct.  
 
Player A -- Tasks  
If you were assigned the role of Player A, we ask you to guess if Player B will accept or reject 
your offer for all offers that you could have made. In case you think he will reject it, we also ask 
you to guess how much Player B will offer you in his counteroffer.  
 
Player B -- Tasks  
If you were assigned the role of Player B, we ask you to make two guesses about answers Player 
A gave or is about to give:  
1. We asked Player A to guess your reaction to his proposed split of the $10. We now ask you 
to guess how Player A thinks you would react for each of his potential partition 
propositions: If Player A offered you $X, does he expect you to accept his offer? And if you 
think he does not expect you to accept it, how much does he think you will offer him in your 
counteroffer?  
2. Suppose you rejected Player A's proposition. We ask you to guess how much you have to 
give at least to Player A in your counteroffer so that he still accepts it. This means that 
you would expect Player A to accept all of your counteroffers, in which you give him more 
than $X, and to reject all of your counteroffers, in which you give him less than $X. We ask 
you to make a guess about $X for each of Player A's initial offers.  
 
Earnings 
You can earn additional money if your stated guesses match the actual answers given by the 
other player: You earn $0.50 for every correct guess.  
x Player A: You receive an additional $0.50 for each correct belief about Player B's 
acceptance decision. In case you correctly guess that Player B rejects your offer, you earn 
extra $0.50 if your guess about Player B's counteroffer coincides with his actual offer.  
x Player B: You receive additional money if your guess about Player A's expectation of your 
reaction matches his actual expectation. Here you can earn $0.50 for each correct guess on 
whether Player A expects you to accept his offer and in case of a correctly expected 
rejection you receive $0.50 for each correct guess about what he expects you to counteroffer 
him.  
Furthermore, you earn an additional $0.50 for each correct guess about Player A's smallest 
accepted counteroffer.  
 
General Instructions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Remarks  
Thank you for participating in this experiment on decision-making. During the experiment you and the 
other participants are asked to answer a series of questions. At the end you will receive a flat payment of 
$10, which is independent of the answers you will give. Please, nevertheless, read the instructions 
carefully and answer the questions truthfully.  
Please consider all expressions as gender neutral.  
Please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any questions after we finish reading the 
instructions please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you and answer your question in 
private.  
 
 
 
Your Role 
In this experiment, you are asked to take the role of an impartial Observer whose task is to make 
guesses and judgements concerning the behaviour of players in the game described below. It is a typical 
game that has been played out many times. 
 
 
 
Privacy  
This experiment is designed such that nobody, including the experimenters and the other participants, will 
ever be informed about the answers you or anyone else will give in the experiment. Neither your name nor 
your student ID will appear on any decision form. The only identifying label will be a number that is known 
only to you.. 
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A.2 Instructions – Questionnaire
Your Questionnaire 
 
Suppose Player A’s initial proposition was to keep $3 for himself and to offer $7 to Player B. 
 
1. Do you think Player A expects Player B to accept or to reject his proposition? 
 
  A expects B to accept. 
  A expects B to reject. 
 
2. Now, suppose that B rejects A’s initial proposition to keep $8 for himself. What do you think 
is the lowest counter-offer Player A would then accept from Player B? This means that you 
would expect such a Player A to accept all counter-offers, in which he receives more or 
equal than …  
 
  $0 
  $1 
  $2 
  $3 
  $4 
  $5 
  $6 
  $7 
  $8 
  $9 
  $10
 
… and to reject all counter-offers, in which he gets less than the amount. 
 
3. How much do you think a Player A who makes such a proposition expects to earn at the 
end? 
 
  $0 
  $1 
  $2 
  $3 
  $4 
  $5 
  $6 
  $7 
  $8 
  $9 
  $10
 
4. On a scale from 0 to 10, how fair do you think Player A’s proposition is? 
 
0 – very unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – very fair 
           
 
5. On a scale from 0 to 10, how kind do you think Player A’s proposition is? 
 
0 – very unkind 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – very kind 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Why do you think Player A made a proposition, in which he keeps $8? (You can cross more 
than one answer.) 
 
  He is tough / would reject low counter-offers.  
  He wants to appear tough / make Player A think that he would reject low counter-
offers.  
  He is fair. 
  He is smart. 
  He wants to assure himself the larger part of the $10. 
  He is kind. 
  He is selfish. 
  He is nasty. 
  He did not understand the game. 
  Other: 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Receiving such an offer, in which you get $2 of the $10, how would you feel? (You can cross 
more than one answer.) 
 
  Fine. 
  Insulted. 
  Understanding. 
  Good. 
  Neutral. 
  Angry. 
  Happy. 
  Other: 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8. After receiving such a proposal, in which you receive $2 of the $10, would you consider to 
make a counter-offer to A, which is so low that you find it likely to be rejected by A? 
 
  Yes. 
  No. 
 
9. Suppose you were Player B and had the choice to end the game without an agreement 
(payoff of $0 for both of you). After receiving such a proposal, in which you receive $2 of the 
$10, would you choose to end the game?  
 
  Yes. 
  No. 
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Appendix to Chapter 5
General Instructions
General Remarks
Thank you for participating in this experiment on decision-making. Research foundations have
provided funds for conducting this research. During the experiment you and the other partici-
pants are asked to make a series of decisions. The money you will earn will depend partly on
your own choices and the choices of other participants and partly on chance. All payments will
be made confidentially and in cash at the end of the experiment. Please consider all expressions
as gender neutral.
Please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any questions after we finish
reading the instructions please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you and
answer your question in private.
Two Roles
There are two roles in this experiment: Player 1 and Player 2. At the start of the experiment
you will be assigned to one of these two roles through a randomized procedure. Your role will
then remain the same throughout the experiment. Your role will only be known to you. Each
Player 1 will be randomly paired with a Player 2. No one will ever be informed about the
identity of the participant you were paired with nor will anybody else be informed about the
choices you made.
Earnings
You will receive $5 for arriving in time. Depending on your decisions, the decisions of other
participants and chance you will receive an addional amount according to the rules explained
below.
Privacy
This experiment is designed such that nobody, including the experimenters and the other partic-
ipants, will ever be informed about the choices you or anyone else will make in the experiment.
Neither your name nor your student ID will appear on any decision form. The only identifying
label on the decision forms will be a number that is known only to you. At the end of the
experiment, you are asked one-by-one to collect your earnings in an envelope from a person who
has no involvement in and no information about the experiment.
1
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B.1 Instructions
The Decision Situation
The experiment consists of 60 decision situations, which are given by graphs. You are asked
to choose your preferred option in each of the 60 graphs. Only one graph will be randomly
selected for cash payments; thus you should decide which option you prefer in each graph
independently of your choice in other graphs.
The figure below gives an example of a decision situation. In each situation there are two roles:
Player 1 and Player 2.
The first move is made by Player 1. He is asked to choose between two options: Option A and
Option B.
In each graph Option A is a fixed allocation implying a payment for Player 1 and a payment
for Player 2. Option A is always represented by a filled dot in the graph. In the graph below
Option A implies a payment of $8 for Player 1 and a payment of $8 for Player 2.
In each graph Option B means that Player 1 gives Player 2 the opportunity to make a choice
among a set of possible allocations. Each allocation gives a fixed payment to Player 1 and a
fixed payment to Player 2. Option B is always represented by several hollow dots on a line.
In the graph below Option B gives Player 2 the choice between 7 di erent allocations. For
instance, the uppermost point on the line represents an allocation that gives a payment of $16
for Player 1 and a payment of $4 for Player 2.
2
Decision Task - Player 1
If you are assigned the role of Player 1, you are asked to make a choice in each of the 60 graphs
between Option A (the filled dot assigning you and Player 2 a fixed amount of money) and
Option B (in which you let Player 2 make a choice between several hollow dots each assigning
you and Player 2 an amount of dollars).
Please check one of the boxes below the figure indicating whether you prefer Option A, the
filled dot, or Option B, the line of hollow dots.
Decision Task - Player 2
If you are assigned the role of Player 2, you do not know what decision Player 1 is about to
make. You are therefore asked - in each of the 60 graphs - to make a choice as if Player 1
has chosen Option B, giving you the opportunity to decide on a payo  allocation on the line
of hollow dots. The allocation that Player 1 could have chosen is indicated by the filled dot.
Please indicate your choice by circling the preferred allocation on the line of hollow
dots.
Earnings
At the end of the experiment one of the 60 decision tasks is chosen randomly and cash payments
(in addition to the show up fee of $5) are determined for each pair of participants.
If Player 1 has chosen Option A in that decision task, then Player 1 and the Player 2 paired
with this Player 1 will receive the associated payments.
If Player 1 has chosen Option B in that decision task, then the payments for both players
depend on the choice made by the paired Player 2. Each of the available choices of the paired
Player 2 again implies a payment for both players.
Example: Suppose the graph shown on the previous page is chosen for cash payments in
addition to the participation fee. If Player 1 has chosen Option A in this situation than Player
1 receives a payment of $8 and Player 2 a payment of $8. If Player 1 has chosen Option B
instead, then the payments of both players depend on the choices of Player 2. Suppose Player
1 has chosen Option B and Player 2 has chosen the uppermost point on the line. Then player
1 receives a payment of $16 and Player 2 a payment of $4.
3
Control Questions
Question 1: Task of Player 1
Please indicate by a cross which one of the answers about the decision task of Player 1 is true.
⇤ Player 1 can choose any of the points on the line with the hollow dots.
⇤ Player 1 has no decision to make if Player 2 chooses the filled dot.
⇤ Player 1 can choose the filled dot or he can let Player 2 pick one of the hollow dots.
⇤ Player 1 can choose any point in the figure.
Question 2: Task of Player 2
Please indicate by a cross which one of the answers about the decision task of Player 2 is true.
⇤ Player 2 can choose any of the points on the line with the hollow dots.
⇤ Player 2 has no decision to make if Player 1 chooses the filled dot.
⇤ Player 2 can choose the filled dot or he can let Player 1 pick one of the hollow dots.
⇤ Player 2 can choose any point in the figure.
Question 3:
Does Player 2 observe the decision Player 1 has made?
⇤ Yes
⇤ No
Question 4: Earnings
Suppose Player 2 has chosen the lowermost instead of the uppermost point in the example graph
above. Further suppose that the Player 1 paired with this Player 2 has chosen Option A, the
filled dot. If this particular decision task was chosen for cash payments, how much would the
two players earn (in addition to the show up fee)?
Player 1 would earn $ _______
Player 2 would earn $ _______
4
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C.1 SMs’ Individual Back-transfers
General Instructions
General Remarks
Thank you for participating in this experiment on decision-making. During the experiment you and the other
participants are asked to make a series of decisions.
Please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any questions after we finish reading the instructions
please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. Please consider
all expressions as gender neutral.
Three Roles
There are three roles in this experiment: Player 1, Player 2 and the Observer. At the start of the experiment
you will be assigned to one of these three roles through a random procedure. Your role will then remain the same
throughout the experiment. Your role will only be known to you.
Earnings
Depending on your decisions, the outcomes of some random moves and the decisions of other participants you will
receive money according to the rules explained below. All payments will be made confidentially and in cash at the
end of the experiment.
Privacy
This experiment is designed such that nobody, including the experimenters and the other participants, will ever be
informed about the choices you or anyone else will make in the experiment. Neither your name nor your student
ID will appear on any decision form. The only identifying label on the decision forms will be a number that is only
known to you. At the end of the experiment, you are asked to collect your earnings in an envelope one-by-one from
a person who has no involvement in and no information about the experiment.
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C.2 Instructions
Decisions Per Period
The experiment is divided into three periods. You are asked to choose your preferred option in each of these
periods. Only one period will be randomly selected for cash payments; thus you should decide which option you
prefer in the given period independently of the choices you make in the other periods.
There are three roles in the experiment: Player 1, Player 2 and an Observer.
Player 1 and Player 2
In each period, Player 1 is randomly matched with one Player 2 but none of the participants will interact with the
same other participant twice and no one will ever be informed about the identity of the participant he was paired
with. Both players receive an endowment of $10 in each period.
The first move is made by Player 1. He is asked to choose whether he wants to send $3 of his endowment to Player
2 or not.
If Player 1 decides to transfer $3 to Player 2, his transfer will be multiplied by 5 while being sent. After Player 2
has received the $15, it is randomly determined whether the round is stopped at this point of time or if Player 2
has the opportunity to send money back to Player 1:
• With the probability 1≠ p, the round continues.
In this case, Player 2 can decide how much money he wants to send back to Player 1. He can choose
any amount between $0 and $15. Player 1 then receives his remaining $7 plus Player 2’s back-transfer as a
payment. Player 2 earns his initial endowment ($10) plus the multiplied transfer ($15) minus the amount he
has chosen to send back to Player 1.
• With a probability p, the round is stopped.
In this case, Player 1 receives the $7 that are left from his initial endowment and Player 2 receives his initial
endowment ($10) plus the by five multiplied transfer of Player 1 ($15).
If Player 1 decides not to transfer the $3 to Player 2, nothing happens and both players receive their initial endow-
ment of $10.
The stopping probability p can take values of 10%, 30% or 50%. The realization of p will be stated to all players
at the beginning of each period.
The decision procedure for Player 1 and Player 2 is illustrated by the graph on the following page.
Decision Task Player 1
If you are assigned the role of Player 1, you are asked to choose – in each of the three periods – whether or not to
transfer $3 to Player 2.
Decision Task Player 2
If you are assigned the role of Player 2, you do not know what decision Player 1 is about to make nor what the
outcome of the random draw will be. You are therefore asked to decide on how much money you would like to
back-transfer to Player 2 assuming Player 1 transferred the $3 to you and the game was not stopped by the random
draw. In each of the three periods, you can choose any amount between $0 and $15.
Information Disclosure
At the end of the experiment, one of the periods will be chosen randomly to calculate the cash payments. For this
particular period, both players learn whether Player 1 made the transfer of $3. If he did, it is determined whether
the round stops according to the stopping probability p of the chosen period. If the round is not stopped, both
players also learn Player 2’s decision about his back-transfer.
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Decision Stages Player 1 and Player 2
Player 1
KEEPS $3 SENDS $3
$3 are multiplied by 5
Player 1: $10
Player 2: $10
Player 2
receives $15
ROUND STOPS
with a probability of p
ROUND CONTINUES
with a probability of 1≠ p
Player 1: $7
Player 2: $25
Player 2
can send money back to Player 1:
amount x between $0 and $15
Player 1: $7 + x
Player 2: $25 - x
The Observer
In each period, the Observer is asked to guess how much money the participants in the role of Player 2 send on
average back to Player 1 assuming that Player 1 transferred the $3 and the random draw allows Player 2 to send
money back (the round is not stopped).
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Earnings
At the end of the experiment, only one of the periods will be chosen randomly to calculate the cash payments. The
exact payments are determined according to the choices that were made and the stopping probability.
Earnings – Player 1 and Player 2
The table below summarizes the payo s for Player 1 and Player 2 depending on their respective choices.
Choice Player 1 Random Draw Choice Player 2 Payo  Player 1 Payo  Player 2
no transfer - - $10 $10
transfer game continues back-transfer $x $7 + $x $25 - $x
game stops - $7 $25
Earnings – Observer
The Observer earns money depending on the accuracy of his guess. His payment depends on how much his guess
di ers from the (rounded) average of all Player 2s’ actual choices on the back-transfer in the randomly selected
period. The payo s are summarized in the table below.
Deviation from the average Observer’s Payo stated back-transfers
$0 $15
$1 $14.5
$2 $13
$3 $10.5
$4 $7
$5 $2.5
>$5 $0
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C.3 Screenshots – Experiment
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